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The thesis is a comparative investigation into the varying outcomes of conflict 
between two cases of identity movements and armed struggles- those of the Mizos 
and Bodos- in India’s Northeast region. The Mizo case is considered as an example 
of successful ‘ethnic accommodation’ while the Bodo conflict in the state of Assam 
continues to pose serious challenges to the stability of the region.  The study seeks to 
understand the role that the architecture of asymmetric federal arrangements in the 
region played in contributing to the variation in outcomes between the two cases.  
 
The thesis presents an account of longue durée processes of state formation that have 
contributed to the shaping of ethnofederal institutions in the Northeast. The thesis 
situates Northeast India in a political geography historically characterized by low 
population densities and the presence of two crucially linked topographies- hills and 
valleys – in which control over people rather than territories were the focus of 
successive rulers.  It demonstrates that the high costs of rule and rising geopolitical 
concerns of the British government in its eastern frontier in the early 20th century, 
resulted in the institutionalization of fixed boundaries in the hill areas of the region. 
This, the thesis argues, facilitated the shift  from a historically fluid hill-valley 
dynamics into more rigid and reified categories. These developments in turn 
determined the nature of identities, social cleavages and the ways in which political 
entrepreneurs subsequently deployed them in their struggle for power in each case.  
 
Using this framework, I thus show that divergent colonial and post-colonial state 
formation processes in the areas now known as Mizoram and Bodoland (in Assam), 
determined by the position of the two ethnic groups in the transformed hill-plains 
dynamics, are fundamental to understanding the research puzzle. The thesis 
demonstrates that colonial territorial institutions in the hill areas of Assam had a 
direct bearing on the construction and mobilization of the ‘hill tribe’ identity of the 
Mizos and were reflected in the architecture of postcolonial institutions of territorial 
autonomy accompanied by special rights for Mizos as well as minorities within these 
hill regions in the Northeast. As opposed to this, Bodos, by virtue of their plains-
dwelling status were not considered suitable candidates for territorial forms of 
autonomy after independence. This difference, the thesis argues, is crucial to analyse 
the subsequent variance in the conflict outcomes in the Mizo and the Bodo cases. In 
the latter case, a movement for recognition of a territorialised identity eventually led 
to the creation of a Bodoland Territorial Council, but unlike Mizoram, absence of any 
safeguards for local minorities within this institutional arrangement further 
aggravated the conflict. 
  
Based on extensive elite interviews and field observations, conducted in Mizoram 
and Assam over the course of 12 months, I thus analyse the effects of longer term 
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historical processes of state formation on the strategies employed by political actors 
in the present and their impacts on ethnic conflict or accommodation. In conclusion, 
the thesis reflects on the limits of ethnofederalism as a general solution to ethnic 
conflict in India’s Northeast, and discusses the distinctiveness of the region within 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
This thesis is a comparative investigation into the varying outcomes of conflict 
between Mizo and Bodo identity movements and armed struggles in India’s 
Northeast region. In the context of the region’s territorialized regimes of group rights 
and asymmetric federalism, the Mizo case is counted as an example of successful 
‘ethnic accommodation’ while the accommodation of the Bodo conflict in the state of 
Assam continues to pose major challenges.  The central research puzzle in the thesis 
is the difference in outcomes in these conflicts despite the presence of tailor-made 
asymmetric ethno-federal apparatus in each case. Unlike the Bodo conflict in Assam, 
Mizo insurgency not only culminated in a durable peace with the Indian state in 
1987, but Mizo relations with other ethnic minorities have been relatively stable.1 
The thesis contends that it is not so much the presence or absence of these federal 
institutions, as it is the differences in the specific historical ways in which these along 
with settlement patterns and identity formation have evolved that are a key to 
explaining the variance in conflict outcomes. It thus makes a case for examining long 
term processes of state formation in the Northeast that have significantly shaped sub-
state structures and institutions in the region, the nature of identities and strategies 
that political actors employ in present day politics as well as the response of the 
State2 to these conflicts. These factors, the thesis demonstrates, have had a direct 
                                                        
1There have been two low-intensity autonomy movements by Hmars (Halliday, 2015. Available at: 
<<http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-mizorams-flickering-hmar-insurgency/>> 
Accessed on July 3rd 2017 and Brus (The Telegraph, 2006. Available at: << 
https://www.telegraphindia.com/1060406/asp/northeast/story_6064256.asp>> Accessed on July 3rd 
2017) in the state of Mizoram and incidents of riots between Mizos and Brus in 1996 (Ibid). However 
as the chapter will show, ethnic violence in Mizoram may be consired miniscule compared to that of 
Bodoland in Assam. 
2 I use the term ‘State’ to mean both the Indian state i.e. the national or central government and the 
government of the state of Assam within the Indian union, unless specifically mentioned. 
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bearing on ethnic conflict or accommodation and form a key explanation for the 
divergent outcomes seen in Bodoland and Mizoram.  
 
Assam and Mizoram are both states in what is known as India’s Northeast, a 
region comprised of eight relatively small states, connected to the rest of the country 
by a narrow land corridor of 22 kilometres. The region has a distinctive demography 
with the largest concentration of Scheduled Tribe (ST) communities in the country, 
diverse ethnic and linguistic groups and a significant Christian population (See Table 
1.1).  
 
Table 1.1 Asymmetric federal arrangements in India’s Northeast states 
State (ST population, 2001 
census) 
Application of Sixth 
Schedule provisions 
Other Special rights 
Arunachal Pradesh (64.2%) NA  
Assam (12.4%) Karbi Anglong Autonomous 





Manipur (34.2%) NA  
Meghalaya (85.9%) Garo Hills, Jaintia Hills, 
Khasi Hills Autonomous 
Councils 
 
Mizoram (94.5%) Chakma, Lai, Mara 
Autonomous District 
Councils 
Rights to manage Mizo 
religious/social practices; 
Mizo customary law and 
civil/criminal justice; land 
ownership [Article 371G] 
Nagaland (89.1%) NA Rights to manage Naga 
religious/social practices; 
Naga customary law and 
civil/criminal justice; 
ownership of land and its 
resources [Article 371A(1)] 
Tripura (31.1%) Tripura Tribal Areas  





Sikkim (20.6%) NA  
(Source: Reproduced from Shneiderman and Tillin, 2015). 
 
Though it is rather remotely located vis-à-vis the power centres of the country, this 
region is geopolitically significant as it shares about 90 per cent of its boundaries 
with China, Bhutan, Myanmar and Bangladesh.  Topographically, the Northeast has 
three main valleys fed by a major river system, crisscrossed by hills and mountain 
ranges. The two topographies of contiguous highlands and river valleys below them 
have historically shared a close interaction through complex networks among polities 
and peoples (See Map 1).  The hill-valley relations have  significantly contributed to 
state practices, institutions and inter-group relations in the Northeast. As the thesis 
will argue, long-term shift in the relations between the two has affected the ways in 
which the State identifies ethnic groups, their own processes of self-identification and 
that of others as well as their relation to territory in present-day Mizoram and 
Bodoland and hence are critical to explain the research puzzle in this study. 
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Map 1. Political topography of Northeast India 
(Source: Map designed by Sebastian Ballard) 
 
Since independence, Northeast India has witnessed protracted conflicts of 
differing degrees. The region has seen political movements by different ethnic groups 
with demands ranging from separation from the Indian Union to various levels of 
self-governance or autonomy within India. In keeping with competing claims, the 
state of Assam was reorganized to create three new states at different times: Nagaland 
in 1963, Mizoram and Meghalaya in 1987.3 Furthermore, several territorial zones of 
positive discrimination were created for ‘tribal’ groups mainly dwelling in the hill 
                                                        
3 The Northeast after independence was constituted in major part of the state of Assam, besides the 
former princely states of Manipur and Tripura, and the Northeastern Frontier Agency (NEFA), now 
Arunachal Pradesh. 
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regions of Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura. These autonomy arrangements, 
mandated under the Sixth Schedule in the Indian constitution,  provide designated 
groups with far-reaching powers, at least in theory if not always in spirit. Tribes 
granted autonomy under this Schedule have rights over land use and forest and 
natural resource management, establishment of lower-tier self-governance 
mechanisms such as village councils or town committees and protection of traditional 
customs. The Schedule also provides for regional councils, primarily for territorially 
dispersed tribes in these states, which are accorded rights to collect land revenue, 
impose taxes, establish courts based on customary law and to try cases between 
members of Scheduled Tribes as well as regulate economic activities of ‘non-tribals’ 
in the area.  
 Despite these attempts at ethnic accommodation, insurgencies have multiplied 
in the decades after independence. In many of these cases, whenever a rebel 
organisation claiming to represent an ethnic group signs a peace settlement with the 
Indian government in a state, other groups or extremist factions within the same 
group quickly fill the void with similar allegations of neglect and alienation, thereby 
lending these conflicts a cascading effect (Lacina, 2015) . In other words, as the 
thesis demonstrates, conflict is not only driven by inter-group rivalries or conflicts 
against the State but also by within-group rivalry, wherein the moderate leadership is 
‘outbidded’ by those with a more extremist stance thereby spiralling into violent 
conflict.4 
 
For example in the case of the Naga insurgency,  Zapu Phizo- an Angami Naga- and 
his organisation, the Naga National Council (NNC), declared Nagaland (then a hill 
                                                        
4 The theory of outbidding, originally proposed by Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) prescribes that intra-
group rivalry can foment inter-group conflict. For a detailed discussion, see Chapter 2. This model is 
used to explain the cases of conflict under study (Chapter 6 and 7). 
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district in Assam) an independent state on August 14th 1947 and began an armed 
movement in 1952. The movement was met by the Indian state with both negotiation 
and coercion.5 New Delhi signed an agreement with the moderates that led to the 
creation of the Nagaland state in 1963, and included the Tuensang Tract which was 
part of the NEFA at the time. In 1975, sections of the militant group NNC decided to 
give up arms and agreed to a peace deal known as the Shillong Accord. Another 
section led by Muivah rejected this step and formed the National Socialist Council of 
Nagalim (NSCN-IM) in 1980 to continue an armed struggle.6  
 
 The South Asia Terrorism Portal has counted 109 rebel groups in 2006 in the 
states of Northeast thus showing that armed rebellion as a means to achieve 
aspirations is a common political feature of the region.7 Moreover, not only have 
ethnic groups in this region continued to challenge the Indian perspectives on 
national sovereignty, they are also confronting each other over conflicting visions of 
ethnic homelands on essentially overlapping territories. Identity politics based on 
territory has come to occupy center-stage and acts as a dominant fault line in the 
Northeast, manifesting not only within institutions of democracy and electoral 
politics but in the form of violent ethnic riots as well. 
 
                                                        
5 The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act was enacted in Nagaland district in 1958. This Act gives 
powers to the army and state and central police forces to shoot to kill, search houses and destroy any 
property allegedly used by insurgents in areas declared as “disturbed” by the home ministry. Security 
forces can arrest - without warrant- a person, who has committed or even “about to commit a 
cognizable offence” even on “reasonable suspicion”. It also protects them from legal processes for 
actions taken under the act. This Act has been in force in Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Meghalaya and 
Jammu and Kashmir at different times. 
6 NSCN (IM)’s main objective is to realize a “Greater Nagalim”- comprising of “all contiguous Naga-
inhabited areas”. This effectively means several districts from Assam, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, 
besides the state of Nagaland as well as a large tract of Myanmar 
7 SATP report, 2006 (<<www.satp.org>> Accessed on March 3rd, 2016). 
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The demographic distinctiveness, geographical distance of the region from the 
rest of the country, as well as asymmetric federalism make the Northeast a special 
case within the Indian polity. 8  Though ethno-federalism in other parts of India 
involved linguistic reorganization of federal units, it did not entail granting 
differential group rights to ‘local’ groups on the basis of territory as seen in the 
Northeast (Tillin, 2006). Extant literature on the region has causally linked ongoing 
cases of ethnic conflict in the Northeast to the presence of the territorial model of 
group rights (Baruah 2005; Barbora, 2005; Lacina, 2009). However there are very 
few studies  that seek to explain the variation in outcomes of conflict cases within the 
Northeast (exceptions include Hassan, 2009; Saikia, 2011; Cunningham, 2014). The 
thesis is thus an attempt to address this gap in the existing scholarship by seeking to 
explain not only the divergent outcomes of the Mizo and Bodo conflicts but also the 
differences in the response of the State in managing these conflicts despite a similar 
environment of asymmetric federal institutions. 
 
In this chapter I give a brief overview of the two conflicts under study 
highlighting some of the key differences. This is followed by a discussion of existing 
literature on the Northeast and conflict literature in general and why they fail to 
adequately explain the research puzzle. I then introduce the main arguments of the 
thesis and the causal mechanisms to explain why outcome of the Bodo conflict has 
varied from the Mizo case. The latter half of the chapter lays out the key elements of 
research design including reasons pertaining to the use of sub-national comparison 
and methods of data collection. I end the chapter by briefly outlining the structure 
and content of the rest of the chapters in the thesis. 
                                                        
8 Asymmetric arrangements are also in place in the ‘borderland’ regions of West Bengal (Gorkhaland) 
and Jammu and Kashmir (Ladakh). 
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1.1 The conflicts at a glance 
1.1.1 Mizoram: From Insurgency to Constitutional Politics  
Present-day Mizoram was part of the state of Assam till 1972 and constituted of the 
Mizo Hills autonomous council and the Pawi- Lakher regional council (for other 
minorities in the Mizo hills) under the 6th Schedule.9 The Mizo National Front (MNF) 
started as a relief group to support Mizo farmers struck by a devastating famine in 
1959.10 It later became a political party and contested elections in the Mizo Hill 
District in then undivided Assam. In 1966, it waged an insurgency against India that 
lasted for about twenty years. The Indian state used a two-pronged approach to deal 
with the Mizo rebellion. On one hand it used its security forces to launch a brutal 
counter-insurgency movement, which included the regrouping of villages (i.e. 
moving entire population of villages in new locations) in the Mizo hills and air 
strikes, both with an aim of combing out rebels in a challenging terrain. On the other 
hand, it continued a policy of compromise and negotiations with the moderate section 
of the Mizo leadership, who were committed to constitutional means. In 1972, in a 
bid to appease to the moderate Mizo Union, the Mizo Hill District Council was 
upgraded into a Union Territory (with a legislative assembly, a seat each in the 
Houses of parliament and a council of ministers as executive head). In the meantime, 
the Indian government continued negotiations with the MNF, although not always 
without hurdles. Sporadic incidents of violence continued but the intervention of the 
Presbyterian and the Baptist Church as an influential civil society institution in Mizo 
                                                        
9 The local minorities in the Mizo hills who were granted regional Councils and later Autonomous 
Councils are Lai, Mara and Chakma. Lais and Maras were respectively known as ‘Pawi’ and ‘Lakher’ 
till after independence and hence the name Pawi-Lakher Regional Council. During fieldwork 
interviews, it was revealed that they considered these names as pejoratives as these weren’t their own 
creations but rather given by ‘outsiders’.  
10 These hills have extensive bamboo cover, whose periodic flowering every fifty to seventy years, has 
been known to cause severe famines (Nag, 2008). 
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society eventually created an enabling environment wherein MNF could give up arms 
and return to constitutional politics in 1986, after signing the Mizo accord that 
created the state of Mizoram (Sawmveli and Tellis, 2010; Nibedon, 1980).  
  
Furthermore, when the Mizo Autonomous Council was upgraded into a Union 
Territory in 1972, three minority groups, including the Lai and Mara, belonging to 
same cognate Kuki-Chin group as Mizos and the Buddhist Chakmas, were offered 
autonomous councils. Another group Hmars, also related to the Mizos and 
concentrated in the north Mizo hills, waged a low-intensive armed struggle and was 
eventually granted a regional council, a peace that was actively brokered by the 
Mizoram state government. 
 
1.1.2 Bodoland: The limits of asymmetric federalism  
As opposed to the Mizos, political articulation of the Bodos began on a linguistic and 
cultural medium rather than a territorial one. Bodos were one of the first minority 
groups in the plains to question their unequal relationship in Assamese caste society. 
In response to the hardening Assamese identity as a result of a sub-national 
movement since early 20th century, Bodos began to voice grievances about their 
rights within the state of Assam. In the politics of Assam, the issue of illegal 
immigration of land-hungry peasants from Bangladesh has remained a dominant 
narrative. Between 1979-85, Assam witnessed the rise of the popular ‘anti-foreigners’ 
agitation, which demanded the detection of foreigners, deletion of their names from 
electoral rolls and deportation back to Bangladesh. A negative fall-out of the 
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Assamese nationalist movement is a sustained crisis of state legitimacy and 
radicalization of a section of its leaders giving it a separatist turn.11 
 
Bodos, a Scheduled Tribe in Assam, thus prompted by the hegemonic role of 
the Assamese community and failures of the state government in addressing 
grievances of ethnic minorities in the state, demanded a separate state of Bodoland 
(Prabhakara, 2012; Gohain, 1989). They expressed their grievances on two fronts: 
one, that they historically faced social discrimination at the hands of the dominant 
community of caste-Hindu Assamese in the state; and second, the alleged illegal 
settlement of immigrants from Bangladesh, with the tacit support of the Assam 
Congress government, was displacing them from their traditional land. The notion 
that the Bodos are one of the earliest settlers in the Assam valley has been actively 
deployed by Bodo political activists in their claim to be the ‘original’ or ‘most- 
indigenous’ sons-of-the-soil against similar claims on the part of the caste-Hindu 
Assamese (Baruah, 1999).  
 
In the 1990s, the Bodo movement entered a militant phase with the Bodo 
Liberation Tigers (BLT) increasingly wedded to violent tactics for the realization of 
their goal. This phase of the ethnic movement was a clear departure from the ones 
overseen by the moderate leadership in the previous decades. The latter had been co-
opted into Assamese politics and the Congress system12, a negotiation that seemed 
                                                        
11  Unhappy with the civil movement led by the Assam Students Union, a radical section of the 
Assamese youth decided to take matters in their hands. They formed the United Liberation Front of 
Assam (ULFA) in 1979 with the aim of creating a sovereign state of Assam (Baruah, 1999). Having 
undergone splits, the underground outfit is now represented by a ‘pro-talks’ and anti-talks factions. 
There has been a ceasefire agreement between the latter and the Government of India (Kashyap, 2015. 
Available at: <<http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/in-fact-why-anup-chetia-returned-why-
paresh-barua-is-still-key/>>. Accessed on Febuary 10th 2017). 
12 The term Congress System was coined by Rajni Kothari (1964) to explain the Indian party system 
after independence where the Congress dominated a multi-party structure between 1947 – 64. 
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difficult with this new brand of Bodo activists who were mobilizing a movement 
based on exclusive identity and territory. An attempt at peace failed in 1993 as the 
political actors (Assam government and the Assam Bodo Students’ Union) could not 
agree on the terms of settlement with regard to the number of villages that would 
make up the Bodo Autonomous Council. Violence ensued in the form of attacks 
against local minorities, particularly ‘Adivasis’ and Muslims of Bengali descent.13 
 
 In the following decade, several rounds of talks were conducted which finally 
yielded positive results and the Bodo Territorial Council (BTC) was formed in 2003. 
Institutionally, the powers vested in the BTC made it the most powerful council in 
the Northeast (Harsha S. and Ranglong, 2016). In effect, it had the largest legislative 
body among all councils with representation to Bodos far exceeding their population 
in the region and its jurisdiction was extended, by an amendment, to subjects beyond 
what was mandated under the Sixth Schedule.  
 
Despite these compromises, peace has not been restored in Bodoland. Since the 
2005 BTC election and through the 2006 Assembly and 2009 parliamentary 
elections, over 300 people were killed within the territory under the BTC 
administration (known as the Bodo Territorial Autonomous Districts or BTAD) and 
another 100 have died in fratricidal clashes among Bodo rival militias. 14  In 
                                                        
13 In Assam, Adivasi is a term used for ex and current tea plantation workers, hailing from tribal 
groups of Central India and settled in Assam by the British in the late 19th century. Interestingly, they 
do not have a Scheduled Tribe status in Assam. A movement is ongoing to demand the same though 
both local tribal as well as non-tribal groups in the state are against it. On the other hand, Bengali 
Muslims historically hailed from the Mymensing and Sylhet region, now in Bangladesh and were 
settled by the British in western parts of Assam in the 19th century. The colonial policy to engage the 
community in wet-rice cultivation in Assam was aimed at improving land revenue prospects in the 
province. The Assam anti-foreigners’ agitation of 1979-85 that produced a regional political 
alternative to the Congress party mainly targeted this community. 
14 Choudhury, 2010. ‘Blood-soaked Bodo poll tale- Four district crave for peace over development 
before BTC election on April 9’, The Telegraph April 5 2010. 
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comparison, the death toll in cases of ethnic conflict in Mizoram between 1992- 2015 
has been a total count of 49.15 In the Bodo dominated areas of Assam, a massacre of 
Bengali Muslims took place in 1993 and subsequently attacks on Adivasis occurred 
in 1996 and 1998 (Hussain 1995, p. 1154-55).16 Within ten years of its formation, the 
BTC has witnessed three major waves of violent clashes between Bodos and other 
groups in 2005, 2008 and 2012.  
  
In this context, this study is an attempt to answer the following research puzzle: 
given that both Mizos and Bodos have led homeland movements using territory as a 
central mobilizing issue, in a comparable institutional environment of asymmetric 
federalism, what explains the divergent outcomes of both conflicts? In the thesis, I 
address the puzzle by dividing it into the following parts: first, the ways in which 
territory acquired salience in the two movements and the ways in which identities 
were mobilized in each case; second, the response of the State to each conflict; and 
third, relations of each of these groups with local minorities in each region. Before I 
present the key arguments of the thesis, I discuss some of the existing literature and 
why it fails to answer the research problem.  
 
1.2 Existing Literature 
The extant literature on the Northeast presents it as a ‘troubled periphery’ (Bhaumik, 
2009) with a significantly high ethnic diversity (Manor, 1996) inheriting a common 
colonial and post-colonial institutional framework (Hausing, 2014; Tillin, 2006) and 
                                                        
15Available at: 
<<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/mizoram/data_sheets/insurgency_related_killin
gs.htm >> Accessed on August 13th 2015. 
16  There is a proliferation of a number of small-scale armed groups supposedly representing the 
interests of the Adivasis, Koch and other minority groups who are against what they see as a 
hegemonic peace of the BTAC who seek autonomy or the scheduled tribe status for their own 
respective groups (Saikia, 2015). 
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mired in prolonged ethnic conflict (Baruah, 2005). However, scholarship on the 
Northeast is dominated mostly with studies on individual cases of conflict (Roy, 
1995; Baruah, 1999; Goswami, 2014; Phanjoubam, 2016) or the region as a whole 
(Kolas, 2015; Bhaumick, 2009; Rajagopalan, 2008) with a handful of studies 
engaging in comparative analysis, the most notable one being Hassan’s (2009) work 
on Mizoram and Manipur. The aim of this thesis is to problematize the existing view 
that portrays the region as an epistemological whole, and bring to focus the complex 
internal diversity of the region.  
 
A dominant explanation for the persistence of conflicts in India’s Northeast is 
the theory of relative deprivation and internal colonization. These not only include 
economic and resource extraction arguments but also arguments about excessive 
centralization and the forced integration of the region with ‘mainland’ India (Baruah, 
1999; Brass, 1994). Scholars argue that the colonial and post-colonial states in India 
have created an extractive economy in the Northeast and such economic grievances 
form a major cause of rebellions in the region (Karlsson, 2011; Vandekerckhove and 
Suykens, 2010; Nag, 1993). Similarly, the social and economic position of minority 
groups vis-à-vis another dominant group have been claimed to create bitter inter-
group struggles or struggles against the state (Baruah, 1999; Weiner, 1978).   It is true 
that feelings of alienation and grievances greatly animate the political discourse in the 
Northeast. But as Hassan (2008) rightly points out, these factors cannot fully explain 
the varying responses of social groups ranging from demands for independence, 
separate self-governing units within the Indian federal set-up to active participation in 
constitutional politics. Indeed, these factors also cannot explain why Mizo peace 
sustained while Bodos continue to struggle, given both groups articulated socio-
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cultural and economic grievances against the dominant Assamese community and 
both conflicts had forms of territorial settlements. 
 
Another set of explanations use the concept of ‘contentious politics’ (McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly, 1996) to explain conflict in Assam (Dutta, 2016; Baruah, 2009b). 
Contentious politics in an ethnically fragmented society may be seen as resulting 
from a sustained interaction between groups with authority and those without, via 
collective action in the name of “a populace whose interlocutors declare it to be 
unjustly suffering harm or threatened with...harm” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 1996, 
p. 21). In this perspective then, “armed independentists or separatists, non-violent 
social movements, political parties, and interest groups form a continuum where the 
lines among various categories are blurred” (Baruah 2009b, p. 955). The difficulty 
with this view is that it omits the complexity and diversity of within- group 
dynamics, even where groups may profess similar overarching grievances. As the 
empirical chapters of the thesis will demonstrate, both Bodos and Mizos were 
internally fragmented and in-group rivalry often spiraled into between-group conflict.  
Conflicts in Assam have also been attributed to the ‘unresolved national 
question’ due to what scholars argue is India’s formally federal but actually 
centralized government structure (Baruah, 1999; Manor, 1996; Brass, 1990). 
Excessive centralization under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi is often cited as a reason 
for violent rebellions in the Northeast. Baruah (2003) also attributes the cause of 
conflicts to the top-down nature of the federal re-organisation of the Northeast, that 
did not respond to demands from below and therefore proved inadequate for 
managing diversity and conflict in the region. Again, these views seem inadequate to 
explain the outcomes of conflict between Bodos and Mizos. Contrary to the received 
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wisdom, as the thesis will demonstrate, Indira Gandhi’s decision to upgrade the Mizo 
district autonomous council into a Union Territory in 1972 seemed to have indeed 
facilitated the Mizo peace process. On the other hand, the Centre barely played any 
role in the first Bodo peace process of 1993, which was led by the Assam government 
alone, and which ended in failure, thereby further vitiating the environment of 
violence and conflict. 
 
Having discussed the existing literature on conflicts in the Northeast, I now turn 
to some of the explanations within the conflict literature in general that may be 
applicable in these cases and why they aren’t adequate to explain the variation of 
outcome of the two cases. For instance, an alternative explanation for occurrence of 
ethnic conflict is the presence of factors that make insurgent conflict ‘feasible’, 
including the absence of a strong state to interdict an insurgent conflict (Collier, 
Hoeffler and Rohner, 2009; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). From this perspective, conflict 
is a result of absence of institutions of central authority. In the absence of a state 
monopoly over violence, a situation of anarchy prevails leading to groups seeking 
measures to secure themselves while at the same time rendering other groups 
insecure, and those groups, based on Posen’s (1993) security dilemma principle, in 
turn adopt measures that threaten others. Thus in the absence or collapse of 
institutions of central authority, a vicious cycle of escalating threats prevails and 
leads groups to seek an ‘offensive advantage- that is, to grasp the resources that 
assure their security before these resources are seized by an opposing group’ 
(Crawford 1998, p. 13). Although this approach to conflict may be useful in 
explaining proximate causes of violence particularly as a result of strategic 
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interactions of competing actors and groups, it fails to satisfactorily answer the main 
research puzzle that this thesis addresses.  
 
Such explanations have been used elsewhere in South Asia with similar 
colonial experiences. For example, insurgencies in tribal agencies of Pakistan have 
been attributed to the latter’s lack of ‘statedness’ (Chalk, 2008; Patrick, 2010). 17 
However Naseemullah (2014, p. 502) denies a causal link between violence and 
absence of authority in the Pakistani case by pointing out that the agencies had been 
stable for decades even though it had long been “outside the state’s monopoly of the 
legitimate use of force.” He explains that the domestic insurgency that began in the 
region since 2004, was rather a result of weakening of a specific kind of indirect rule 
– what Naseemullah (2014) terms hybrid rule- between state and tribal structures in 
maintaining political order that historically prevailed in the region. 
 
The Northeast has had experience in varying degrees of indirect rule over long 
periods of state formation, which could also be broadly interpreted as the absence of 
central authority. To that extent, colonial rule in the hills that constitute present-day 
Mizoram entailed a border system whereby ordinary laws and administrative 
apparatus were kept out. However, in contrast to the predictions of this approach, it is 
in Mizoram where accommodation was possible while it is in Bodoland that violence 
still prevails. In other words, the research puzzle presented in the thesis is a reverse of 
what this approach prescribes. 
 
                                                        
17 I use the term “statedness” in the Weberian sense to mean the effective monopoly of the state over 
violence. Again, this position is similar to the concept of the ‘security dilemma’ in international 
relations theory (Posen, 1993). 
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Scholars also argue that states are less likely to negotiate a settlement if they 
fear ‘precedence-setting’ i.e. concessions to one group will encourage other parties 
(Toft, 2003; Walter, 2003). This explanation does not explain why the Indian 
government negotiated peace with the Mizos in 1987 when other rebel groups in 
Assam and Manipur were raising varying degrees of autonomy demands including 
that of a separate state and cessation. This explanation also doesn’t throw light on 
how the terms of settlement with a group come about, i.e. why was a state granted to 
Mizoram while Bodos only received an autonomous council despite making similar 
demands as Mizos, a question that has important implications for the outcome of the 
conflicts. Cunningham (2014) argues in the case of insurgencies in the Northeast 
India, that the likelihood of governments accommodating rebel groups is higher when 
the latter is internally divided. The findings presented in this thesis seem to contradict 
this explanation since Bodos were far more internally divided than Mizos ad yet it is 
in the latter case that peace has endured. Moreover, it cannot adequately explain why 
conflicts continue in some cases (as in the Bodo case) and not in others (as the 
Mizos) even after a settlement is reached.  
 
There are also studies that posit territorial conflicts as a function of group 
geography. Political geographers have used settlement patterns of ethnic groups as an 
explanatory variable (Posner, 2004; Cornell, 2002; Toft, 2003; Weidman, 2009). 
Scholars argue that geographically concentrated groups face a higher risk of conflict. 
Such groups are more likely to show a stronger attachment to territory and are able to 
overcome challenges of collective action, thereby increasing the chances of conflict 
(Weidman 2009, p. 528). Contrary to these findings, what we see is that Bodos, 
despite their multi-ethnic setting have been more prone to conflict while Mizos, who 
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are more concentrated geographically than Bodos, have sustained relative peace. The 
thesis does employ a group geography argument, but to show that asymmetric 
arrangements have succeeded in areas with relatively neat concentration of ethnic 
groups as seen in the Mizo hills and have had challenges in highly multi-ethnic 
regions like the Bodoland.18  
A second group geography argument focuses on the size of the concerned 
group vis-à-vis other communities in a particular region. For example, Deiwicks 
(2009) finds that the success of ethnofederal states depends on the distribution of 
ethnic groups over sub-national units. She argues that territory based ethnic 
mobilization is higher in contexts where settlement patterns of groups align with 
subnational units than in cases where groups are spread over several units, making 
secessionist conflict more likely in the former (Deiwicks 2009, p. 1). Similarly in the 
ethnofederal context of India, Adeney (2017) argues that territorial restructuring has 
increased conflict in regions where groups are intermixed.  In other words, empirical 
evidence from India shows that territorial redesign has a higher potential to aggravate 
conflict if the group demanding such a redesign is a minority in that territory. The 
thesis is in agreement with this line of argument. Unlike the Mizos who are a 
majority in the Mizo hills, Bodos are a minority within the area that is part of its 
autonomy and statehood movement. As the thesis will demonstrate, this is a plausible 
explanation for the continuation of the Bodo conflict.  However, as the historical and 
empirical chapters will also show, this factor is only a partial explanation to the 
varying outcomes in conflict in the Bodo and Mizo case. It does not explain why 
                                                        
18 There are other assumptions in this approach that are problematic. One, like primordial explanations, this 
approach tends to assume that groups, like states, naturally have conflicting political interests and presents 
preferences of groups to express their interests in a particular way as a given rather than explaining them. 
Secondly, its assumption that the function of central authority to simply mitigate and prevent conflict is rather 




despite variation in diversity in the areas inhabited by Bodos and Mizos respectively 
both have led identity movements based on territory. Moreover, this argument 
assumes that ‘minority’ and ‘majority’ status of a group vis-à-vis other groups is a 
given. On the contrary, by adopting a political topography approach, the thesis seeks 
to unpack these givens, i.e. examine how certain groups come to be seen as majorities 
or minorities in the first place. This is achieved by historicizing the process of 
identity formation among both groups thereby making long-term processes of state 
formation an important explanatory variable for the thesis.  
 
 
1.3 The Argument of the Thesis 
1.3.1 Historicizing ethno-federalism through a political geography approach 
The thesis adopts a conceptual framework that seeks to situate exisiting institutions of 
ethno-federalism in northeast India in a historical perspective. Ethno-federalism has 
been used, with differing degrees of success, to accommodate diversity as well as 
conflict in the region. In order for us to understand why these have succeeded in 
some cases and not in others, it is pertinent to look at the historical context of their 
origin and the particular institutional design in each case. As detailed earlier, both 
Mizo and the Bodo homeland movements have been informed by a particular spatial 
imaginary of identity in that the latter is seen as having natural links to a piece of 
territory. This is amply reflected in the ethno-federal arrangements available to both 
groups. In order to examine the mechanisms through which these linkages come 
about and their affect on ethno-federal institutions, it is imperative that one looks at 
how individual agency combines with topographical and demographic factors. As the 
following discussion will reveal, a political geography approach allows me to do so. 
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  Territorial conflicts, especially those involving ‘homeland’ territories, have 
been shown to be more likely to become intractable (Fearon, 2004). Ethnic violence 
is more likely to occur if the actors involved view territory as a non-negotiable part of 
their self-identity (Toft 2003, p. 2).  Given the centrality of territory to both conflict 
cases, this study therefore draws from a theoretical view that political processes (here 
ethnic conflict) are a function of how political actors view territory and the ways in 
which identity and territory come to be related (Toft, 2002, 2003; Fearon, 2004; 
Huth, 1996).  Here, territory itself may be understood as a result of historically 
contingent social processes in which social space and social action interact and shape 
each other (Paasi 2009, p. 110).  
 
 In other words, territory is a geographical expression of social power and 
political territoriality is a strategy that humans employ to control people by 
controlling area (Sack, 1986). Territoriality is thus a spatial strategy that entails active 
use of territory in influencing relations of power and rule (Anderson, 2001). While 
political actors often use territories to mean bounded and fixed geographical units 
(Massey, 1995), viewed through this lens, territories may be understood as actively 
negotiated and hence highly contested entities.  As the empirical chapters will 
demonstrate, both Mizo and Bodo activists at various stages of ther respective 
political movements have used territorial issues and mobilized a territorialized 
identity as a strategy to contest the power of (intra and inter-group) rivals. This is 
because as Vollaard (2009, p. 693) puts it, “[a] territorial strategy sets a certain 
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institutional logic in motion enabling and constraining political behaviour.”19 Using 
this framework, the aim of the thesis is then to give a comparable account of the 
mechanism involved in the use of territorial strategy by each group. The empirical 
chapters will show the different ways territory was institutionalized in each case and 
the corresponding differences in the strategies that Mizo and Bodo elites deploy in 
their struggle for power.  
 
In order to understand the specific ways in which identities get embedded in 
territorial structures, one also needs to view identity formation and state structuring 
as dialectical processes (Shneiderman and Tillin, 2015). As Shneiderman and Tillin 
(2015, p. 4) put it,  
…ethnicity must be understood as a multivalent concept that is at once embedded 
in specific histories of state and sub-state formation and generative of them…we 
cannot effectively critique claims made on the basis of ethnicity without 
investigating the micro-dynamics at the intersection of state and society which 
yield particular formulations of ethnic assertion at particular places and times. 
 
Again, this is useful for the study for it allows me to situate the territorialized 
identities in the Northeast in relation to “highly localized geographies while still 
being aware of the broader discursive and material formations” (Shneiderman and 
Tillin 2015, p. 4) that explain the research puzzle.  
 
Framing the study in this manner is useful in resolving the structure-agency 
debate that often plagues the study of identity formation and conflict. Explanations to 
social phenomena can be sought by exploring causal relations between the ‘macro’ 
(such as institutions) and ‘micro-level’ individual actions and that in turn ultimately 
                                                        
19 As Anderson (2001, p. 19) argues, it enables political actors to “greatly simplify issues of control 
and provide easily understood symbolic markers on the ground, giving relationships of power a greater 
tangibility and appearance of permanence.”  
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contribute to political outcomes (Coleman, 1990). Reconciling holism with 
methodological individualism this approach views agents and structures as mutually 
constitutive entities (Halperin and Heath 2012, pp. 93-4).20 Political institutions (here, 
asymmetric ethno-federalism) have been argued to be ‘autonomously’ important in 
shaping contours of ethnic conflict: which cleavages are activated and incentivized, 
whether the conflict escalates into violence or not, whether peace is possible and/or 
sustainable and so on (Horowitz, 1985; Adeney, 2005). At the same time, it is 
pertinent to note that institutions are themselves products of relations of power 
among political actors. In other words, historical contingency and active agency of 
political activists, including their choices, decisions and actions, play a key role in 
determining the institutional structures. Hence, in order to explain the phenomenon of 
ethnic conflict and variance of its outcome, it is essential that the study looks at the 
how individuals and groups influence the origins and the design of these ethno-
federal institutions in a historical perspective while at the same time analysing 
contemporary forms of identities emerging within the context contours of these 
institutionnal structures. Based on this conceptual framework, I now outline the main 
arguments of the thesis. 
 
1.3.2 The argument: Varying conflict outcomes as a result of state formation 
processes 
I began this chapter by suggesting that historical processes of state formation in the 
Northeast region form a key explanatory variable of the study. By state formation 
                                                        
20 At the same time, this approach views them as ontologically distinct entities. They are irreducible 
and analytically distinct in that structures are not self-aware like agents are.  Thus one of the tasks of 
social inquiry is to explore the impact of this ‘self-awareness’ of individuals on the social (Archer 




processes, I am referring to a complex interplay of factors that include both 
ecological and social agents (Kaviraj and Doornbos 1997, p. 29), through which 
polities negotiate their rule with people and geography. Thus, while the thesis takes a 
long term view of topographical and demographic factors, it foregrounds the agency 
of political activists in appropriating these factors to answer the research puzzle. In 
light of this principle,  tThere are two crucial components of state formation 
processes that  lend them explanatory power for the thesis: one, the historical 
relations between two topographies- hills and plains- in the region, or simply hills-
plains dynamics; second and related to the first, is the settlement patterns of groups in 
each of these topographies. The varying outcomes in Mizo and Bodo conflicts, I 
argue are a result of long term shifts in state practices within the two topographies as 
well as in the relationship between the two; and second, as a result of the differences 
in patterns of settlements in the hills and the plains owing to the differences in the 
terrains of the two topographies. 
 
First, the thesis demonstrates that India’s Northeast region is characterised by a 
particular political topography, involving low population densities and the existence 
of hills and valleys in close proximity. Using secondary sources and archival 
material, I show that the hills- plains dynamic have formed a core of state practices 
among successive rulers in the region. In chapter 3, I demonstrate that this particular 
political topography had a direct bearing on the nature of political formations in the 
region, wherein control over people rather than territories was the focus of successive 
rulers.21 Similarly, given this political topography in the Northeast, traditional modes 
                                                        
21 This argument also resonates with Herbst’s (2014) work on state formation in Africa. He argues that 
pre-colonial African states were organized around power that was non-territorial and were rather based 
on shared sovereignty because these states were often constituted of large tracts of sparsely populated 
land and hence territorial competition was infrequent (Herbst 2014, p. 38). 
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of organizing power such as the Paik system in the Ahom polity and the Bawi system 
among the hill-dwelling Lushais involved control of manpower rather than territory.  
 
Furthermore, practices of trade and shared rule between hills and valley polities 
formed important characteristics of the region’s political formations. This specific 
feature of political formation in the region historically distinguished it from other 
parts of the subcontinent, and significantly shaped state formation processes and 
hence ways of state control of the region until the late 19th century.22  I will also 
demonstrate that challenges posed by the political topography of the region continued 
to shape state practices of the earlier colonial rulers. Until the late 19th century, the 
colonial state continued some of the traditional state practices including the hills-
plains relationship, albeit in modified forms, to reduce the otherwise high costs of 
adminstration.  
 
However, the historically fluid hills-plains relationship began to be rendered as a 
more rigid binary in late 19th century and early 20th century Assam as a result of 
regimes of indirect rule that the colonial state had instituted. Drawing on Herbt’s 
(2014) thesis, I will illustrate that the colonial state used fixed boundaries to project 
power in areas where its actual administrative hold was weak. Thus from the late 19th 
century onwards, the state actively took measures to separate the hills from the plains 
by relegating the former as zones of exceptions, in order to reduce the high costs of 
administrating a sparsely populated, diffciult terrain.  
 
                                                        
22 The Ahom polity in the Brahmaputra valley defined the eastern limits of Mughal power, not only in 
terms of the latter’s extent of rule but also in terms of topographies, population densities, land use and 
consequently the nature of state formation and practices. 
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At the time of independence, these two connected topographies came to 
represent not only two distinct geographies but also two distinct civilizations and 
cultures. Political rule in the hills exercised through drawing of lines and boundaries 
not only transformed hitherto non-territorial polities into territorial ones but also gave 
a territorial dimension to identities. This distinction found resonance in the 
architecture of territorial autonomy arrangements institutionalized for ‘hill-tribes’ 
while ‘plains-tribes’ were not considered suitable candidates for the same. In the 
Assam plains, politics was dominated by the sub-nationalist movement led by caste-
Hindu Assamese elite who also set the terms of autonomy vis-à-vis their colonial 
masters. In this context, it became logical to think that plains-tribes’ like the Bodos 
would naturally assimilate into the dominant Hindu-Assamese community of the 
Assam valley (Prabhakara, 2012) while ‘hill-tribes’, owing to their ‘civilizational’ 
difference, as British anthropologist, Elwin’s (1959) views demonstrate, had to be 
protected and preserved as distinct cultures and polities.  
 
This narrative significantly contributed to the fact that since independence, the 
Mizo elite worked within a template that had a territorial logic. Rival political forces 
within the Mizo Hills continued to outbid each other using territorial issues. More 
notably, because they had a territorial template available to them, it was a strategic 
requirement for Mizos to mobilize an inclusive identity, which endured despite 
extremists outbidding moderates. Furthermore, I will reiterate the point on 
territoriality when I discuss the response of the Centre in dealing with this conflict. 
Given that the territory was institutionalized in the hills in independent India, the 
Indian state also operated within it and negotiated with competing local actors in a 
territorial framework.  
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On the other hand, groups historically dwelling in the valleys of Assam, like 
Bodos, were not considered suitable candidates for territorial rights. The absence of a 
territorial framework in the plains was reflected in the strategies that Bodo activists 
adopted in challenging Assamese hegemony in the decades after independence.  
Modelling themselves on the Assamese elite, the moderate Bodo elite conducted their 
politics mostly in the realm of language politics and their territorial demands were 
weak. Unlike the hills where the Congress was legally barred from the hills during 
colonial rule, in the plains, it was the Congress led by the Assamese who dominated 
the political discourse. It was the co-opting nature of the Congress that reflected in 
the moderate politics of the Bodos in the few decades after independence. 
 
It was only in the 1990s, when the movement took a militant turn and Bodo 
identity hardened (in relation to Assamese and other local minorities) that it came to 
acquire the dimensions of an exclusive homeland, modelling itself on the politics of 
the hills. The militant Bodo activists, in their attempt to ‘outbid’ the more moderate 
voices within the group took a stance that ended up making the idea of a homeland 
territory non-negotiable. But the hill-valley binary continues to inform the stance that 
the Assam government takes vis-à-vis Bodos in that they view Bodos as part of a 
greater Assamese nationality; parts of the valley that Bodos imagine as their separate 
homeland territory is seen by the Assam state as integral to its own identity, thereby 
making it non-negotiable. This is the reason that negotiations in the plains has been a 
more contentious issue leading to a failed attempt at peace in 1993 and continuation 
of violence after the second settlement in 2003. 
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Second, a related feature of the two topographies that has a bearing on the 
varying outcomes of the two conflicts is that of the settlement patterns of the two 
groups concerned. Highlanders in the Northeast owing to the nature of terrain have 
historically come to live in relatively neat settlements as compared to plains-dwellers. 
These were formalized further by the colonial rule. The form of population patterns 
in the hills thus had two important effects.23 One, it allowed for territorial recognition 
of group rights in the form of autonomous councils mandated by the Sixth schedule 
of the constitution. Second, it even allowed for local minorities within the Mizo Hills 
to be granted territorial power-sharing arrangements during the peace process 
between the Cnetre and the Mizo rebels. 
 
While political rule over the hills entailed a control of movements of people by 
separating them from the Assam valley, the latter saw some major demographic 
changes to serve the colonial frontier economy. The plains have thus historically had 
a much more diverse and overlapping settlements, aggravated by colonial policies of 
settling groups (Bengali Muslims from Mymensingh and Sylhet and Adivasis from 
central India) from other regions. The principal architects of the Sixth Schedule was 
aware of this reality, which became another reason why plain tribes like Bodos were 
not considered worthy candidates for territorial group rights. Furthermore, as chapter 
7 will demonstrate, the multi-ethnic setting of the Assam valley is also a key reason 
why territorial settlement hasn’t yielded the desired results of peace. In conclusion, 
                                                        
23 I use the term ‘neat settlements’ in the thesis with great caution. Steering clear off primordial views 
that often imbued colonial administrative vocabulary, the thesis demonstrates that the relatively neat 
settlements and identities in the hills were a result of particular form of state formation practices in the 
region, involving the interplay of both social (individual agency and institutions) and ecological 
(topography) factors. Furthermore, by adopting a constructivist point of view, the thesis recognizes the 
inner complexities of the Mizo identity despite its relative cohesiveness. 
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the thesis argues that there are limits of ethnofederalism as a general solution to 





1.4 Research Design 
This study is premised on a sub-national comparative framework, an approach to 
research that has made significant strides in the field of comparative politics in recent 
years. Particularly in the study of Indian politics, states and other sub-state units have 
emerged as ‘critical actors’ (Tillin 2013, p. 235) in explaining economic and political 
change. Some of the recent works on electoral studies (Yadav and Palshikar, 2008), 
federalism (Tillin, 2013), ethnic conflict and violence (Varshney, 2002; Wilkinson, 
2004) have made use of this approach to not only highlight specificities of cases but 
these have also contributed to the general development of theory. 
 
Comparison as a method of political inquiry is of course not a recent 
development. Some of the classic earlier works to have used this method are Lipset’s 
(1959) study of social requisites of democracy in Europe and South America; Theda 
Skocpol’s (1979) study of revolution in Russia, France and China; and more recently, 
Daniel Posner’s (2004) work on ethnic politics in Africa.  In small-N sample studies, 
comparative research can be of great assistance as it helps establish relations among 
variables rather than measuring them (Lijphart 1971, p. 683). In this study involving 
two case studies, the comparative research design enables me to demonstrate how 
long-term processes of state formation and re-structuring have affected the particular 
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forms of ethno-federal institutions in present-day Bodoland and Mizoram and how 
differences in these processes between both cases can help explain the variation in the 
outcomes. 
 
This approach is suitable for studies where cases per se generate interest 
because they pose a research puzzle or because of one’s interest in theory building, or 
both (Lijphart 1971, p. 691). In this respect, comparative analysis anchors this study 
by providing for both internal and external validity (Halperin and Heath 2012, p. 
205). The former enhances knowledge about these two cases with a thick description 
while the latter allows it to engage with wider debates and theories of federalism, 
ethnic conflict and violence, known to be applicable in other contexts. Brass’s work 
on Indian ethnic violence and Lijphart’s work on Indian federalism are classic 
examples of this approach (Brass, 1997; Lijphart, 1996). 
 
A comparative study of Bodoland and Mizoram benefits from both these 
aspects. The study is at once embedded in the local specificities of institutions, 
processes and actors in both cases and Northeast in general; while it also brings into 
conversation general theories of state formation, federalism and ethnic conflict that 
have been widely used and tested in numerous other cases around the globe. The 
thesis provides a fresh look at historical processes influencing the origin and design 
of ethno-federal institutions in present-day Bodoland and Mizoram with a nuanced 
account of the colonial and post-colonial state’s role as well as the role of local 
political actors in these areas. In so doing, the thesis also contributes to a general, 
theoretical understanding of the origin and particular form of ethno- federal 
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institutions, which have important implications for managing ethnic diversity and 
conflict in multi-ethnic settings. 
 
An important aspect of using the comparative framework is the need to justify 
the choice and ranges of case studies, as there is always a real risk of introducing 
selection bias (Halparin and Heath 2012, p. 209). Two main strategies are available to 
comparativists, based on J.S. Mill’s Method of Difference and Method of 
Disagreement, to mitigate this risk. The first is the Most Similar Systems Design 
based on selecting cases that share many important characteristics (theoretically), but 
differ in one crucial aspect and this forms the key explanatory variable of interest. 
The second strategy is the Most Different Systems Design, which allow selection of 
cases that are different in many respects but have one crucial similarity associated 
with the dependent variable. This study uses the former method of the similar 
systems design to enable a ‘controlled’ comparison.  
 
Three distinctive yet related features of the cases under study make them 
appropriate for a comparative analysis. One, both communities belong to a region 
that may be located in van Schendel and Scott’s Zomia scheme, wherein power was 
traditionally organized around people rather than territory. This was because the 
Zomia region has been characterized by low populations and difficult terrain thereby 
posing a major challenge for traditional polities to broadcast power over a 
geographical expanse. The paik system of Ahom administration in the Assam valley 
and the Bawi system that Lushai chiefs practiced in the hills are cases in point. 
Second, the Indian state (colonial and post-colonial) designated both groups as 
‘tribes’ to distinguish them from the caste Hindu Assamese identity. Both groups 
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have successfully deployed a ‘tribal’ identity in a bid to get political concessions 
from the state. Third, both groups have waged rebellion against the state and were 
offered varying forms of asymmetric territorial settlements. Despite these comparable 
aspects, existing literature has mostly treated the two cases in isolation with 
explanations ranging from conflict based on relative deprivation, internal 
colonization and state capacity. While the thesis acknowledgesd the contribution of 
these individual studies, it argued that the differences in outcomes of political 
processes in the two cases are causally explained more accurately in a comparative 
perspective.  
 
Since this study is a within-nation comparison, it is crucial to stress the 
importance of such subnational units of analysis in comparative politics. ‘Scaling 
Down’, as Richard Snyder (2001) terms it, helps get beyond the ‘whole nation bias’ 
(Rokkan, 1970) in the field of comparative politics. This is a tendency of 
unreflectively gravitating toward national- level data and national units of analysis 
leading to “miscoding of cases that can distort causal inferences and skew efforts at 
theory building” (Snyder 2001, p. 94). This can be rectified with a greater sensitivity 
to and focus on within-nation variation. Not only does this facilitate more accurate 
descriptions of complex processes of change, but it also aids in better theorization of 
these processes (Snyder 2001, p. 94). Second, a focus on subnational units can make 
it easier to conduct controlled comparisons that increase the probability of obtaining 
valid causal inferences in small-N research thereby effectively mitigating the ‘many 
variables, small N’ problem.  
 
Third, within-nation variations help challenge ideas of false ‘exceptionalism’ as 
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well as ‘false’ universalism. Though a rich tradition has emerged in the study of 
Northeast, the extant literature often suffers from these dual problems. Oftentimes, 
Northeast India is essentialized as a case unto itself creating what Tillin (2013, p, 
236) describes as “separate islands of scholarship.” This study recognizes the 
compelling need to break this ‘false exceptionalism’ and engages with a range of 
different contexts including Southeast Asia and Africa in a comparative perspective.  
Another tendency seen in the emerging scholarship on Northeast India is an attempt 
to lump this region into a homogenous whole. A setting for a diverse ethnic 
population, movements of people, political and cultural practices and a number of 
varied conflicts, the internal diversity of Northeast region presents itself as an 
exciting space for comparative research. However, the prevailing forms of inquiry 
that treat the region as an exception as well as an epistemological whole has 
precluded any meaningful comparative study within. In this scenario, as Hausing 
(2015) recognizes, an exercise in comparison of this nature seems not only relevant 
but also a need of the hour. This study not only presents an account of micro-level 
dynamics of both cases, but also adds up to more than the sum of its parts by tracing 
some long-term transitions in the region at large. 
Furthermore, as Tillin (2013, p. 237) argues, “By comparing states within a 
common federal system, a degree of control is exerted over the structure of political 
institutions.” This is particularly true for present-day Bodoland and Mizoram, which 
have similar federal structures and a history of ethnic conflict. As argued earlier, both 
these areas have historically been part of a common political geography of Assam 
characterized by low population patterns, active relations between hills and plains 
areas and state practices revolving around control of people over territory. The 
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selection of these two cases thus may be situated within the areas approach to 
comparison. Geographically closely located cases often share a cluster of 
characteristics that can be used as controls (Lijphart 1996, p. 688). Though 
comparability is not inherent in any given area but it is more likely within a particular 
area than in randomly set of cases. Thus it is for the reasons accounted above, that 




1.5 Components of Fieldwork 
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In order to understand why the Bodo conflict outcomes varied substantially from that 
of the Mizos, the study takes into account both long-term historical processes as well 
as contemporary political action shaped by those processes.  I have used a range of 
qualitative data collection and analysis in order for this structure-agency dialectic to 
have validity and rigour. An important feature of this research is that it combines 
social and institutional structure with individual agency and decision-making, a 
principle that is fundamental to this research. In this research, the outcome is the 
phenomenon of ethnic conflict manifesting in varying degrees in Bodoland and 
Mizoram. The research seeks to identify the micro-level causes that may lead to this 
outcome, and then works to identify causes at the institutional levels and the relation 
between both the levels in shaping each other. This cause-effect link between the 
explanatory factors and the outcome was divided into smaller steps and observable 
evidence for each step was investigated (Van Evera, 1997, cited in Halperin and 
Heath 2012, p. 89). For instance, the nature of local political competition (inter and 
intra ethnic contestations), forms of political mobilization and identity formation 
shaped and constrained by the institutional arrangements in these two cases, have 
been identified as key components of the explanatory variables.  
It is wise to be aware that all methodological approaches have their 
shortcomings. To overcome these, different methods can be combined in ways that 
can produce richer understanding as well as enhance validity. Such methodological 
triangulation provides for checks and balances that can check biases and 
misperceptions that may creep into the study. For instance, de Volo and Schatz 
(2004, p. 270) suggest that using personal interviews in addition to participant 
observation and group discussions can provide less biased results as an individual 
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might be more forthcoming when spoken to alone rather than in public.24 As much as 
possible, I fact-checked any claims made by respondents regarding dates and 
statistics by referring to secondary sources and newspaper archives.  
While there are many ways to verify ‘recalled facts’ in an interview or 
discussion, it can be challenging to be rigorous with episodic or auto-noetic 
memories. The latter “involves the ability to recall personal experiences” and is 
associated with “introspection, reflexivity and anticipation” (Collins and Gallinat 
2010, p. 11). For example, the ‘remembering’ of Laldenga as a great leader or a 
shrewd political activist often revealedsaid more about the respondent’s location 
within the politics of Mizo insurgency than about Laldenga himself. During 
fieldwork I was also aware that the memories narrated to me could have been 
influenced by the intersubjective dynamic between the respondent and me. The fact 
that a section of the English-speaking Bodo elite I interviewed were more cautious 
and even ambiguous with their language to describe the ‘other’ may have been 
influenced by their perception of me as a ‘modern and liberal’ woman pursuing 
education in London. Prejudices against other communities and social faultlines 
became apparent mostly outside the ambit of formal interviews, in social gatherings 
or informal conversations. At times, interviews and group-discussions both in 
Bodoland and Mizoram would be transformed into a ceremony to felicitate me as 
‘one of their daughters (i.e. a person from the Northeast) who has made it’. I found 
this quite striking since one of my social identities is that of the dominant Assamese 
community with whom both Bodos and Mizos have had tensesed relations. These go 
on to underline the malleable nature of social identities, even in contexts where 
identities are often deployed as permanent, unchanging facts.  
                                                        
24 James Scott (1985) combined his ethnographic account of everyday Malay peasant resistance with 
data on state, regional and local political and economic structure to provide a rich analysis of peasant 
resistance. 
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Thus reflexivity is thus recognised as a necessary component of fieldwork 
and Gallinat, 2010). It not only made me aware of the possibilities of biases in the 
narratives that I was exposed to during fieldwork but also how my own biases may 
affect interpretations and representations of a polarized environment characteristic of 
protracted conflict situations. Armed with this awareness, I attempted to access all 
sides of the stories and events narrated to me. For instance, even while being 
personally sympathetic to the history of the self-respect movement of the Bodos vis-
à-vis the Assamese, it was important to understand the conflict from the perspective 
of those minority communities like the Bengali Muslims who have felt 
have been at the receiving end of violence in the course of the Bodo movement. 
Similarly, a Mizo perspective on peace and stability had to be supplemented by the 
views of local minorities in the state. 
 
1.5.1 Archives  
I used archives from newspapers, speeches and movement pamphlet/ literature to get 
an immersive experience into the past of these movements. The study benefitted from 
access to the Assam Tribune, a popular English daily newspaper, which provided 
historical material on the course of the two movements.  Since this research involved 
examining events from decades ago, analysis of newspaper articles and movement 
literature allowed me to access data that was otherwise difficult to obtain through 
personal contact with past decision makers. By analysing and coding the content of 
documents, speeches, election campaign, manifesto etc. it was possible to evince the 
intentions of actors involved in crucial political decisions. The research also 
benefitted tremendously from the use of rich archival material available at the India 
Office Records, the National Archives of India and State archives of Assam and 
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Mizoram. Colonial records on administration of Assam and the Lushai (Mizo) hills 
provided an anchor on which the two historical chapters have been built. The 
correspondence between administrators, special reports commissioned by the British 




In addition, I conducted over 60 semi-structured interviews in Assam and Mizoram 
with a wide range of actors: political, bureaucratic, student leaders. Interviews and 
discussions were also conducted with movement veterans, ex-militants, members of 
cultural and literary organisations and academics working on the politics of the 
region. As Pierce (2008, p. 119) states: “Political elites are actors who exercise a 
disproportionately high influence on the outcome of events.” Interviewing the 
political elite at various levels in both states was thus useful to get a direct insight 
into the world of political movements. Most leaders were forthcoming with their 
opinions and did not hesitate to speak on issues that were deemed controversial. For 
example, a senior executive member of the Bodo Territorial Council was quite candid 
in his criticism of the Chief Executive Member (who heads the council), thereby 
reiterating the factional politics, characteristic of the Bodo movement.25 Other Bodo 
parties and organisations expressed sharp differences with the ruling party at BTC, 
thereby highlighting a multiplicity of views within the Bodo movement. On the other 
hand, interviews with veterans of the Mizo underground movement (1960s-1987) 
revealed a more inclusive organisational structure that seemed to have successful 
managed factional feuds.  
 
                                                        
25 Interview with Executive Member, Bodo Territorial Council, August 20th 2014, Kokrajhar. 
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Thus interviewing as a research tool provided me with detailed and specialized 
information from individuals whose role have had a great impact in shaping the 
outcomes under study and provided me with in-depth knowledge about each case. 
Semi-structured interviews, as a combination of structured as well as open questions, 
enabled me to strike a balance between factual information and a deeper probe into 
the activist’s subjective experiences. Elite interviews helped to shed light on the 
hidden elements of political action that are not clear from the analysis of political 
outcomes, or other primary sources. By interviewing key participants in the political 
processes under study, I was able to piece the larger context in which decision-
making was taking shape and how in turn these actions were affecting the course and 
outcomes of these political movements.  Crucially, elite interviews gave substance 
and meaning to the existing analyses (Hochschild, 2009) of the form and nature of 
institutions and structures in the Northeast. 
 
I interviewed a wide-range of political actors including members of political 
parties and organisations that function in the councils as well as at the level of the 
state government. Attempts were made to get access to activists across the 
organisational hierarchy as members at different levels of party had varying insights 
according to their experiences. One of the most valuable experiences was talking to 
some of the veterans and ex-members of political parties and militant outfits. For 
example, my interview with the family of Bodofa Upendranath Brahma gave me 
personal insight into the man who was pivotal in the Bodo statehood movement. 26 
The humble setting in which the Bodofa’s family live in Dotma, a village near 
                                                        
26 ‘Bodofa’ in Bodo language is Father of the Bodo nation. Brahma, who was the All Bodo Students’ 
Union President from the late 1980s, spearheaded a re-energised movement that ultimately took a 
militant turn. Brahma was the first to demand for a separate state exclusively for Bodos. He passed 
away in 1990 having suffered from cancer. His death only added to his stature and elevated him to the 
mythical figure that the Bodo movement needed at its a critical juncture. 
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Kokrajhar town was in striking contrast to the opulence displayed by the Bodo 
Territorial Council (BTC) members. Bodofa remains a mythical symbol for Bodo 
resistance, one that the current crop of Bodo activists has used as part of their 
political repertoire.  
 
Members of cultural organisations such as the Bodo and Assam Literary 
organisations, the Presbyterian Church and the Young Mizo Association (YMA) in 
Mizoram play a dominant role in shaping the political discourse in the two states. 
These organisations have strong views on questions of language, culture and identity 
and have been articulating them in the political process. Interviewing members of 
these organisations had an added value to understand the contextual factors in each 
case. I also interviewed other non-state actors including journalists of local 
newspapers, experts and academics, members of student unions as well as ex- 
members of surrendered or disbanded militant groups. 
 
I was aware that this tool has some limitations and weaknesses and it was 
incumbent on me to critically assess and weigh the value of the data collected. In 
particular, there is always a possibility of politicians or policy makers attempting to 
slant their accounts and inflate or minimize their own role in an event or process, 
depending on whether there is political capital to be gained or lost from association 
with the issues in question (Tansey 2007, p. 10). I followed Davies’ framework for 
assessing the reliability of primary resources which includes asking four questions 
(Davies cited in Tansey 2007, p. 11): the information obtained should be from a first-
hand witness, and not based on hearsay; second, the level of access of the interviewee 
to the events in question should be known; third, if possible, the interviewee’s track 
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record of reliability should be established; and finally, even when the reliability of 
interviewee is considered to be high, multiple sources should be consulted for all 
significant data points. 
 
1.5.3 Focus groups 
Focus group discussions were another useful tool to gauge the multiple viewpoints of 
a range of actors and organisations that have had a direct bearing on the conflict 
outcomes. For instance, the Bodo Sahitya Sabha and the All Bodo Students’ Union 
have been at the forefront of the Bodo political movement and focus group 
discussions with members of these organisations not only put the movement in a 
historical perspective but also gave insight into the role that these organisations 
played in the Bodo identity formation vis-à-vis other groups. Discussions with 
members of the Young Mizo Association (YMA) associated with the Presbyterian 
Church in Mizoram pointed out the influential role that these institutions had in both 
social and political life in the state.  
 
These organisations in Bodoland and Mizoram respectively seemed to have 
played a crucial role in the specific ways in which identities were mobilized in the 
given institutional set-up. Student unions representing different ethnic groups were 
another source as they play an extremely active role in the politics of both states. 
Discussions also helped to bring out insights into the emotional elements of an 
argument and hence sometimes had the potential to reveal more than a formal 
interview. Questions about identity, autonomy and self-rule are emotive issues and 
understanding them from the perspective of actors involved is very useful.  I followed 
these steps to conduct a focus group discussion (Halperin and Heath 2012, pp. 277-
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78). I first identified a key objective/theme for the session and then formulated hinge 
questions to be thrown in during the session to elicit the information needed. I 
selected a few individuals or members from different organisations and got them to 
discuss the issue for about 45- 60 minutes. 
 
In the course of my fieldwork, informal discussions with political activists, 
acquaintances and friends helped refine my understanding of the Bodo and the Mizo 
society in general. A combination of methods drawing broadly from ethnographic 
traditions helped me uncover an insider’s perspective on political life as well as 
ground-level articulation or manifestation of processes involved in it. As de Volo and 
Schatz (2004, p. 268) argue “by examining how actors themselves view the myriad 
political situations in which they are involved, we bring to the fore their influence on 
political outcomes, constrained as it is by structural factors.” The fieldwork 
experience allowed me to immerse myself in a context where ethnic identity is 
politically a potent issue. In Mizoram, attending social ceremonies (including a 
funeral) gave me deep insights into the influence of Church organisations in 
determining the everyday rules of group membership. An encounter with victims of a 
militant attack in Bodoland during my fieldwork not only brought me close to the 
realities of a context where violence had a ‘normalized’ everyday form, but it also 
provoked me to re-examine the issues of research ethics and personal safety in 
conflict settings. Moreover, by embedding myself with local actors in local contexts, 
I got a clearer insight into the nuances of self- identity formation and construction of 
the ‘Other’. Vignettes from some of these encounters are discussed in the empirical 
chapters 6 and 7. 
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1.6 Thesis Structure 
Chapter 2 reviews two sets of literature that largely inform the arguments and 
analyses in the thesis. First, it explores the debates within the field of comparative 
federalism about whether and how asymmetrical federalism accommodates or 
exacerbates ethnic conflict. A discussion of this literature is pertinent since the 
politics of the Northeast in general and that of the Mizos and Bodos in particular have 
been shaped within an institutional context of asymmetry. This is followed by a 
review of literature on ethnic identity and conflict in broad categories, namely: 
constructivism and instrumentalism. As the chapter will show, both are relevant to 
the comparative analysis of the mechanisms that constitute the Mizo and Bodo 
conflicts. While the instrumentalist theory of outbidding helps to contextualize the 
individual conflicts within the local political competition, a constructivist view, with 
particular emphasis on the role of institutions equips me to explain the changing 
dynamics of identity formation in each case.   
 
Chapter 3 forms the historical anchor for the thesis. It considers processes of 
state formation that have had a bearing on the architecture of federal institutions in 
the region and consequently on the conflict outcomes in present-day Mizoram and 
Bodoland.  Using James Scott’s Zomia scheme, the chapter situates Northeast India 
in a political geography historically characterized by the presence of two crucially 
linked topographies- hills and valleys – in which control over people rather than 
territories were the focus of successive rulers. The chapter shows that polities in the 
region were not very different to each other in their state formation practices until as 
late as the early 20th century. The colonial administration was dependent on 
traditional institutions and practices which kept intact, albeit in certain modified 
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forms, the networks and institutions that linked the hills with the valleys of Assam. 
This was because, like traditional Ahom or the Manipuri polities, the colonial state 
found the costs of extending direct rule in such difficult conditions of political 
geography too costly. Contrary to the extant literature’s claims about radical shifts in 
the region upon its immediate interface with the British, this chapter demonstrates 
that the colonial state like its predecessors took, to a large extent, the political 
geography of the region as a given in order to minimize costs of administration. In 
practice, this led to the continued practices of hill-valley trade, regimes of shared rule 
and indirect rule and fluid boundaries and identities. 
 
The second half of the chapter demonstrates that the rising geopolitical concerns of 
the British government in its eastern frontier in the early 20th century, resulted in the 
institutionalization of fixed boundaries which transformed historically fluid hill-
valley dynamic into more rigid categories. These developments in turn determined 
the nature of social cleavages and the ways in which political entrepreneurs 
subsequently deployed them in their struggle for power in each case. This chapter 
thus examines how the discourse on territorial autonomy (differential rights based on 
territory) in the Northeast gained political salience. In the Lushai Hills, this also 
manifested in the form of regimes of ‘indirect rule’ that made the Church rather than 
civil administration a stronger institution for organising Mizo society.  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 deal with the Mizo and Bodo cases from the late 19th century 
respectively. Chapter 4 traces the development of a territorialized identity in the 
context of indirect rule in the Mizo hills. It shows that despite its intentions of 
minimal interference and dependence on existing power structures in the hills due to 
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high cost of adminsitration, colonial contact inevitably led to profound changes in the 
way identities were formed. Moreover, the presence of Missionary activities led to 
the formation of a new modern elite who challenged the traditional chieftainship in 
the hills. This new elite forged an inclusive identity in its struggle for power against 
the chiefs. The chapter also traces the origins of the discourse on autonomy that 
became commonplace after independence. It shows that the hardening hills-plains 
binary backed by a discourse on civilizational difference between caste and tribes 
ultimately contributed to the rise of territorial recognition of group rights in the hills 
after 1947.  
 
Chapter 5 on the other hand puts into sharper focus the identity formation 
processes in the Assam valley. Unlike the hills, communities in the plains had much 
fuzzier identities though caste Hindu Assamese still occupied the higher rungs of 
social stratification. In the early decades of the 20th century, socio-religious 
reformation movements created a conducive envronment for Bodos to mobilize an 
identity outside of the Assamese caste structure. This section of nascent elite not only 
questioned their lower status in the caste hierarchy, but also the hegemonic Assamese 
identity. However as the second half of the chapter illustrates, autonomy in the plains 
was dominated by and a result of Assamese sub-nationalism. The Assamese elite was 
leading a movement against the dominance of Bengali Hindus in middle class jobs 
while at the same time opposing the British policy of settling Bengali Muslim 
peasants in the Assam plains. Thus autonomy in the plains was tied to the protection 
of identity and land of the Assamese in general and not for ‘tribal’ communities only. 
It is for this reason that the Sixth Schedule wasn’t instituted in the plains; instead the 
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model of autonomy instituted in the Assam valley after independence was not based 
on tribal or group identity at all. 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 discuss the fieldwork material from the two cases respectively 
since independence. They deal with the political elite, identity formation and inter-
ethnic relations in Mizoram (Lushai hills) and Bodoland. Chapter 6 gives a detailed 
analysis of the Mizo case, showing how the Mizo elite successfully forged a cohesive 
Mizo identity due to compulsions of local political competition. It also discusses how 
the existing discourse about territorial autonomy for hills people allowed for the 
creation of institutional checks for other local minorities, mostly inhabiting the 
southern parts of the Lushai hills.  
 
Chapter 7 brings to focus the Bodo conflict in Assam. It demonstrates how a 
weak territorial frame in the plains of Assam prevented the creation of a territorially 
bound identity among the Bodos in the first few decades after indepedence. Instead, 
internal political dynamics and developments in hill politics ultimately manifested in 
the construction of the Bodo identity on exclusive lines, quite different from the 
inclusive Mizo identity and propelled the Bodo statehood movement. It also looks at 
how these shifts in identity formation have shaped Bodo relations with other groups 
in the region (two communities in particular- Koch Rajbanshis and Bengali Muslims) 
and are reflected in the absence of safeguards for local minorities in the institutional 




The concluding chapter summarizes the main arguments of the thesis and discusses 
some other comparable cases (Naga and Manipur in Northeast and Jharkhand in 
central India). It underlines some of the limitations of this study and also discusses 
the scope of further comparative research in the Northeast region and in the field of 








Ethnic conflicts have emerged as an important subject of academic inquiry garnering 
attention from across a range of disciplines, from political science and international 
relations to sociology, anthropology and psychology. Ethnic conflict may be defined 
as a form of conflict where at least one group defines its goals exclusively on ethnic 
terms and in which the fault line of confrontation is one of ethnic variation (Cordell 
and Wolf 2011, p. 4). Tambiah (1989) notes that the resurgence of this field in social 
science literature in the 1960s and early 1970s was a reflection of not only certain 
forms of conflicts in the third world, but also as a reaction to the manifestation of 
ethnic movements in the industrialized world. The bloody dissolution of Yugoslavia, 
violent ethno-national movements in former Soviet Union, conflicts between Catholic 
and Protestants in Northern Ireland, Chinese and Malay in Malaysia, Greek and Turk 
in Cyprus, insurgencies in Kashmir, Punjab and the Northeast India, gruesome ethnic 
conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi and Sudan illustrate the ubiquity and the diverse 
contexts of these conflicts the world over.  Ethnic conflict has been one of the most 
persistent sources of political violence and has even led to democratic breakdown in 
countries such as Lebanon, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka. 
 
Though a plurality of theoretical and methodological approaches is available to 
understand this social phenomenon, I discuss two distinct bodies of literature relevant 
to this thesis. First, I discuss the ongoing debates on ethnic conflict in the field of 
comparative federalism. As the introductory chapter illustrated, the Northeast 
presents a unique case in India’s ethno-federal context due to the asymmetric nature 
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of state restructuring and territorial recognition of group rights. As a discussion of 
asymmetry will show, these set of institutions have been at the heart of controversies 
with regard to their ability to accommodate or exacerbate ethnic conflict. Since these 
federal institutions have a direct bearing on the political processes and conflict in the 
region, it is pertinent to see how the general literature on federalism can inform us 
about the two cases under study. 
 
I then discuss a second body of literature that informs our understanding of 
ethnic conflict. I organise this scholarship in two broad categories: instrumentalist 
theories, that seek to explain ethnic conflict as a result of the calculated decision-
making of self-seeking actors (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972); and constructivists, 
who argue that ethnic identities, cleavages and conflicts are socially constructed and 
hence contingent on a number of interplaying factors. Such factors may be structural 
(Horowitz, 1985), discursive (Prunier, 1995; Geertz, 1973; Kapferer, 1988), 
institutions (Crawford, 1998; Piombo, 2009) or a result of actions of elites and 
individuals (Devotta 2005; Chandra, 2005). The feature that unites both these 
approaches is their rejection of the primordial view that social categories are 
unchanging facts of the world and that conflict is an outcome of natural differences 
between groups. Given that the phenomenon of ethnic conflict is causally 
heterogeneous, extended in space and time, consisting of different types of actions, 
processes and events (Brubaker and Laitin, 1998), scholars often use a combination 
of these approaches. For instance, studies that seek to explain conflict as a result of 
elite manipulation often use a combination of constructivist and rational-choice 
theories (for example: Chandra, 2004). Conversely, Kapferer’s (1988) work on Sri 
Lanka, or Geertz’s (1979) study of the Bali massacres, though using a constructive 
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approach of discursive formation, are much closer to a primordial account, when they 
describe ‘cultural systems’ as having their own logic and agency at a supra-individual 
level. I conclude this chapter with a discussion about bringing the two distinct yet 
related literatures into conversation in order to satisfy the primary aim of the thesis 
i.e. to present a historical account of the ethno-federal arrangements and explain the 
variation of outcomes of Mizo and Bodo conflicts.  
 
2.2 Federalism and ethnic conflict 
There is some scholarly consensus that federal institutional arrangements are 
effective in managing diversity within nation-states and that most long-standing 
multinational democracies are those that have a federal set-up (Stepan, 1999). 
Fundamentally, a state is federal when it has at least two levels of government joined 
by elements of both shared-rule and self-rule. While shared rule refers to the central 
level of government that acts on behalf of the federation, the regional governments 
are entrusted with a certain amount of self-rule or autonomy over their constitutive 
units (Elazar, 1987; Swenden, 2006). Building heavily on observations of the U.S 
model of federalism, Riker (1975) stressed that long-standing federations are a result 
of bargains whereby erstwhile sovereign units agree to pool parts of their sovereignty 
and come together for various reasons. Stepan (1999, p. 21) defines this model of 
federal origins as coming-together federalism. On the contrary, he argues that many 
democratic federations like India, Belgium and Spain have adopted the holding-
together model of federalism. In this model, federalism is adopted in a polity as the 
best available alternative to hold the country together in a democratic set up by 
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constitutional devolution of power in order to turn the threatened units into 
federations.27  
 
Burgess and Gress (1999, p. 43) argue that “federal political systems are 
consciously and purposively designed to facilitate flexible accommodation for the 
many diversities which acquire political salience.” Thus states using a federal design 
to either resolve or prevent ethnic conflict among territorially concentrated groups 
have come to be known as ethno-federal states. In these states, at least one constituent 
unit is comprised of a majority of a national minority and there should be an 
institutional recognition of its multinational character (Papillon 2008, p. 128). 
Success stories include states as varied as Canada, India and Switzerland. There is 
empirical evidence to show that federal systems of government are better equipped to 
deal with violent conflict than unitary systems (Bermeo, 2004). Based on a careful 
analysis of data from Ted Robert Gurr’s Minorities at Risk (MAR) project, Bermeo 
suggests that the diffusion of power in federalism does benefit territorially 
concentrated minorities as it provides more layers of government and thus more 
settings of peaceful bargaining (Bermeo 2004, pp. 474-7). 
 
Yet, the ability of federal states to accommodate diversity has been at the centre 
of an ongoing debate. In the early 1990s, states that were collapsing, notably 
Yugoslavia, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia were mostly ethno-federations (Hale, 
2004). These developments led many scholars to contend that ethno-federalism is 
inherently destabilizing, as it tends to reinforce and reify ethnic differences. Scholars 
such as Roeder (1991) and Snyder (2000) have thus argued that ethnic federalism 
                                                        
27 He further classifies some countries as putting together federalism whereby a nondemocratic central 
authority coercively creates a multinational polity, some of the component units of which had 
previously been independent (Stepan 1991, pp. 22-3). The USSR is a case in point.  
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causes conflict and state breakdown, rather than settling it. As Snyder observes, even 
though these arrangements need not necessarily produce ethnic conflict, they create 
strong incentives for political entrepreneurs to mobilize the masses on exclusive 
ethnic lines (Snyder 2000, pp.  201-2).  
 
2.2.1 Ethno-federalism and conflict in India  
Defying critics of ethno-federalism, India remains as an example of a stable 
federation, where the constituent units have been organized both on linguistic and 
non-linguistic basis, even as federal reorganization on the basis of religion was and 
has been rejected by the Indian elite, due to historical reasons (Brass, 1974). In the 
field of comparative federalism, the Indian experience has moved from being “a 
troublesome outlier…to a case that is now comparable and contributing to theory 
building and testing” (Arora, Kailash, Saxena and Suan 2013, p. 101). Two studies 
involving India that have wider theoretical implications are Adeney’s (2007) 
comparative study between India and Pakistan and Linz, Stepan and Yadav’s (2011) 
exposition on state-nations. Adeney's (2007, p. 165) main theoretical contribution is 
to argue that optimally devised federal institutions (by designing homogenous 
provincial units in addition to providing recognition and security to the communities 
within them) can minimise the probability of ethnic strife from occurring, but also 
serve as a tool for managing ethnic conflict once it has erupted. Linz, Stepan and 
Yadav argue that asymmetric federalism is usually at the heart of the state-nation 
model and cite the examples of India, Belgium and Canada to substantiate their 
arguments. 28 They suggest that the state-nation model espouses a pattern of multiple 
but complimentary identities and involves crafting a sense of ‘we-feeling’  “with 
                                                        
28 State nations, according to the authors, are polities in which more than one group assets itself a s a 
nation and are engaged in sub-nationalist movements (Stepan et al. 2011, p. xii) 
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respect to the state-wide political community, while simultaneously creating 
institutional safeguards for respecting and protecting politically salient socio-cultural 
diversities” (Stepan et al. 2011, p. 5). At the same time Adeney (2017) has shown, 
through a group level analysis, that even India shows a mixed result as an ethno-
federation managing diversity and conflict. This argument is even more relevant 
when we situate it to examine the mixed record in India’s northeast. 
 
An alternative way of understanding the link between federalism and conflict is 
to see the degree of conflict as a function of the symmetry or asymmetry prevailing in 
a federation (Tarlton, 1965). Tarlton (1965) defined asymmetry as the diversity 
among the component units, articulated by the provision of varying degrees of power 
and autonomy to them. Asymmetry is thus the extent to which the component states 
do not share in the common concerns and conditions. Conversely, symmetry is the 
extent to which the constituent states are similar in their concerns to the federal 
system as a whole (Tarlton 1965, p. 861).  
 
The nature of asymmetry in multinational societies is a result of a combination 
of socio-cultural, economic, political and constitutional factors that produce 
variations in the influence and power of the component units. Every federation has 
some sort of de facto asymmetry if one is to focus on the influence and powers of 
component units of a state due to factors such as political culture, territorial size, 
socio-economic factors and demographic patterns. By contrast, de jure asymmetry is 
a result of conscious constitutional design that formally recognizes the difference 
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among constituent units.29 Varying types or degrees of autonomy may be allocated to 
some of the units and not others with respect to specific policy areas under de jure 
asymmetry (Tillin, 2006; Weller and Nobb, 2010).  
 
Coming back to the Indian case, Stepan (1991) classifies it as a ‘demos- 
enabling’ asymmetric federation as the central government in India reserves the right 
to create new states and redraw boundaries of existing states to reflect linguistic 
demands of minority groups with a simple majority, given the approval of the 
concerned state legislature. Though the constituent assembly resisted the organization 
of states on ethnic lines, it left considerable scope for redrawing of internal 
boundaries and thereby open to contestations in future. At the same time, there are 
legal scholars such as Noorani (2002) who have cast doubt on an Indian model of 
federalism by underlining the prevailing centralist bias in the polity.30 Some scholars 
have also argued that regional secessionist movements as in Punjab, Kashmir and 
Assam emerged in the context of growing centralizing strategies during Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi’s leadership (Kohli, 2004; Baruah, 1999; Wilkinson, 2010). 
 
On the other hand, contrary to Stepan’s claims, it has been argued that India’s 
federalism by and large is symmetrical, as the federal units in India possess the same 
constitutional rights except by virtue of any de facto asymmetric factors.31 As Tillin 
                                                        
29 Taylor and Kymlicka have rejected the argument that general decentralization can alone satisfy 
national minority communities and posit the notion of asymmetry in the larger demand for recognition 
of the national status of these communities (Kymlicka, 1995; Taylor, 1992). 
30 A much criticized feature of Indian federalism has been the adoption of provisions which enable the 
Union to take over the government of a state claiming for a national emergency under Art. 356. 
‘President’s rule’ has been imposed over one hundred times in different states since 1950. 
31 Article 345 of the Indian Constitution gives provisions to legislatures of every state to adopt any 
language in use in that state or Hindi as for official purposes (Constitution of India). Even after 
linguistic reorganization, all states have similar rights in terms of language and no special prerogatives 
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(2007) points out, asymmetry requires that certain rights are granted to some states 
and not others, and in India, and by this yardstick, only the Northeast and Kashmir 
can pass as cases of asymmetric federalism. This view thus disputes Stepan’s 
argument that asymmetric federalism has been important in multinational polity like 
India in holding-together its constituent states. Under Article 370, Kashmir was 
endowed with provisions to draw up its own constitutional arrangements and grant 
citizenship and restricted the powers of the central Parliament to make laws only on 
matters of defense, foreign affairs, and communications.32 However, with respect to 
India’s largely symmetric federal character, the Northeastern states - Nagaland, 
Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Manipur and Sikkim - with a 
predominantly tribal population seem to be the most notable exception. The varieties 
of special status in these states may be seen as what has been earlier described as de 
jure asymmetric federalism rather than just de facto asymmetry as in the rest of the 
country.  
 
As discussed in the thesis introductory chapter, the presence of asymmetric 
institutions in the Northeast clearly makes it as a special case within the larger ethno-
federal context of India. However, what makes a discussion on asymmetry further 
relevant to this study is a similar debate surrounding federalism in general i.e. 
whether asymmetry accommodates or exacerbates ethnic conflict. Indeed, Tarlton 
(1965) was the first to suggest that too much asymmetry without centralization would 
create a greater ‘secession-potential’. Many scholars share Tarlton’s anxiety and warn 
                                                                                                                                                              
have been reserved for any language or community. In fact, the reorganization of states in 1956 made 
the Indian polity more symmetrical rather than less (Arora, 1995; Tillin, 2006).  
32 Tillin also disputes the claim that Jammu and Kashmir has substantive asymmetry in important 
respects since it was not granted as a recognition of the state’s distinct Muslim identity; second, 
though Article 370 guarantees special rights to the state in paper, excessive interference of the Centre 
has put the state in a more equal status as other states in the Union (Tillin, 2006). 
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that asymmetry has a tendency of reinforcing divisions by institutionally freezing 
them (Suberu, 1991; Roeder, 1991). From this perspective, asymmetric arrangements 
tend to reinforce minority identity to the detriment of the principle of shared 
citizenship and further weaken ties between the majority and minority groups. On the 
other end of the spectrum, empirical studies show that all multinational federation, 
with an exception of Switzerland, are constitutionally asymmetric, and that allocating 
varying linguistic-cultural and to some extent legal capabilities to different 
component units is necessary for keeping the polity stable (Stepan, 1999; McGarry, 
2005). Scholars subscribing to this view argue that if symmetry is forced upon a 
multinational federation, national minorities may feel a greater need to secede as their 
demands for recognition and autonomy are perpetually ignored (Burgess and Gress 
1999, p. 54). 
 
Most studies about asymmetry institutions in the Northeast may also be situated 
on either side of the debate on the role of asymmetric federalism in managing 
diversity and conflict. Scholars like Dev (2004) and Stuligross (1999) endorse the 
view that asymmetry has been by and large successful in accommodating diversity in 
the multi-ethnic setting of the Northeast. Dev argues that the Indian Constitution of 
1947 was ahead of its time in not only recognizing diversity but also in 
institutionalizing representation of the diverse collectivities in the democratic 
structures of the polity in order to overcome the “assimilationist individualism” 
inherent in the liberal conception of citizenship (Dev 2004, p. 4749). Stuligross 
(1999) argues that India inherited the colonial legacy of classifying and listing 
communities into various categories in which is implicit an assumption that members 
of some communities ought to present their claims to the state as communities and 
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not individuals. The constitution makers in India were facing a dilemma with regard 
to the incorporation of diverse tribal populations into the Indian nation. In the context 
of the assimilation – integration debate of the Constituent Assembly, Nehru’s tribal 
policy of integration recognized that assimilation was likely to occur on the basis of 
an unequal power relation that would put tribal populations in a grossly 
disadvantaged position. 33  Hence Stuligross (1999, p. 501) observes that the 6th 
Schedule is the purest form of the integrationist position in the Indian constitution. 
 
Asymmetry in the Northeast has found support from a functional perspective 
too. For instance, scholars have argued that the principal aim behind the Autonomous 
District Councils was to deepen the democratic process at the most local level of a 
highly multi-ethnic region (Stuligross, 1999; Kundu, 2010). These arrangements are 
seen to have emerged as a compromise solution in response to leaders of movements 
that seek statehood. Kundu (2010, p. 3) also suggests that these institutions provide 
an important space for resolving ethnic unrest and provide for a political space where 
constitutional practices can evolve. Despite many functional weaknesses (financial 
dependence on state governments; legislative powers also largely depended on the 
governor and the state government, and ADCs have not emerged as engines of 
growth) the ADCs have been advocated as a formal link between tribal communities 
and the state and as pressure valves precluding ethnic groups from resorting to 
violence in the first instance (Stuligross, 1999).  
 
On the other side of the debate are those who find the current model of ethno-
federalism in Northeast India problematic for a number of reasons. For example, 
                                                        
33 The assimilation-integration debate is discussed in detail in chapter 4.  
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studies have shown concern about the propensity this apparatus has in cascading 
group claims for exclusive territorial recognition in an inherently overlapping, multi-
ethnic setting of the region (Baruah, 2003; Tillin and Shneiderman, 2015). Critics 
believe that the creation of territorially defined autonomous arrangements in the 
multi-ethnic region of Assam further marginalized local minorities (Singh, 2008; 
Tillin, 2016). Lacina (2009, p. 999) goes a step further to argue that these autonomy 
institutions have led to the creation of “localized autocracies”, which not only 
promote elite corruption but localized political violence as well. She notes that 
despite continuous anti-Centre sentiments, the contemporary conflict scenario in the 
Northeast revolves around local rivalries such as resource disputes, clashes between 
‘sons of the soil’ and ‘immigrants’.  
 
As a broad review of this scholarship reveals, both sides of the debate have 
pertinent arguments backed by empirical evidence. Asymmetry in Northeast India 
has also shown mixed results. This much is clear from the extant literature on the 
region (Das, 2005; Barbora, 2005; Lacina, 2009). Where the gaps lie is in the absence 
of serious, historical engagement with the question of why these institutions succeed 
in some cases and not in others within this region. Scholars on the Northeast and 
comparative federalism in general remain divided on their views about the 
relationship between asymmetric federalism and ethnic conflict. Both views provide 
ample empirical cases to substantiate their claims.  The presence of successes or 
failures of federal institutions thus call for an examination of those contextual factors 
or conditions which explain why some are able to accommodate conflict while others 
fail to do so. In other words, the focus of discussion needs to go back to the origins 
and the design of these institutions themselves. This study is also a step towards 
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analysing the contextual factors at the sub-national level in India’s Northeast. In 
order to anaylze these contigent factors, one needs to look at how ethnic identity is 
formed and mobilized in the first place. The instrumentalist and the constructivist 
view of ethnic conflict aid us to do so and I now turn towards discussing them. 
 
2.3 Instrumentalist approaches to ethnic conflict 
As Varshney (2003) aptly points out, a study on ethnic conflict is confronted with at 
least two basic tasks: it needs to provide the micro-foundations of ethnic behavior 
and second, it needs to explain ethnic mobilization. A diverse range of explanations 
on this subject is tied by a common concern, that of identifying and examining 
factors that explain the presence (and the nature) of ethnic identity, and/ or explain 
why ethnicity based conflicts occur. Instrumentalist theories answer this question by 
arguing that leaders mobilize ethnic identity for the sake of power. Derived from the 
rational-choice perspective from the field of economics, instrumentalist approaches 
posit the occurrence of conflict in the self-seeking behaviour of individuals. Put 
simply, these theories suggest that actors make decisions based on a cost-benefit 
calculus of self-interest; if the costs outweigh benefits of a concerned action, it would 
be considered against self-interest and hence would be avoided (Varshney, 2003). 
Thus this approach propounds that social actions including those resulting in conflict 
are a result of micro-foundations of individual behavior, and are seen as relatively 
stable attributes of social life (Rasaratnam, 2016). 
 
Several scholars have used this approach to explain conflict and a popular way 
of using instrumentalist theory is to view elite competition as the basic dynamic 
precipitating ethnic conflict. In contrast to materialist and internal colonization 
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theories of ethnic conflict (Olzak, 1992; Rothschild, 1982; Hetcher, 1975), this view 
argues that inequality between groups does not by itself spur the development of 
ethnic consciousness. Rather ethnic communities are seen as the product of self-
seeking actions of elites. Ethnic conflict can thus occur when there is some conflict 
either between local and external elites or between indigenous elites. For example, 
Brass (1997) presents his case on riots in India by using an elite theory of ethnic 
violence. He argues that Indian elites engaged in contests for electoral power might 
find it in their interest to frame violence as communal which in turn is accepted by 
the publics favouring more violence.  
 
Similarly, in another study on ethnic violence in India, Wilkinson (2004) 
demonstrated that electoral incentives at levels of local constituencies as well as the 
state governments that control the police interact to determine where and when 
violence against minorities occur and whether the state will choose to intervene to 
stop it. Horowitz (1991, p. 177) has shown that majority ethnic parties contending for 
state governments often quell a brewing protest before its escalation only when it is 
significantly dependent on minority votes or a possible future coalition with a 
minority party, often termed as ‘vote-pooling’. Chandra’s (2005) argument of 
centrifugal tendencies of ethnic parties in crosscutting ethnic cleavage societies is 
similar to the concept of vote- pooling. 
 
However rationality simply understood as a cost-benefit analysis poses some 
serious difficulties. One, it fails to explicate why masses follow leaders who use 
ethnicity as a trope in seeking power, especially in cases where the costs of 
participation is quite likely to be high. Related to this is also the ‘free riders’ problem 
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that has to be grappled with. Varshney (2003) answers this well by expanding the 
meaning of rationality to include both instrumental and value rationality. A value-
rational action is one resulting from a conscious conviction that the action has an 
inherent value, independent of any outcome it might or might not have (Weber, 
1978). He suggests that microfoundations of human behavior, and more specifically 
“ethnic behaviour”, need to be sensitive to “historically inherited attitudes and power 
relations among many groups” and a purely instrumental reading of rationality fails 
to do that (Varshney 2003, p. 93).  Thus in this view, ethnic conflict is a result of both 
issues of self-interests as well as those concerned with dignity and self-respect. 
 
Second, and more importantly, critics point out that viewing ethnicity through a 
purely instrumentalist lens is unable to answer some of the questions that are 
associated with a complex phenomenon such as ethnic conflict. For instance, on its 
own, this view is unable to explain why leaders in the first place choose ethnicity 
over other possible axes of mobilization such as class or gender. Scholars within this 
approach have attempted to answer this problem. For example, Schelling (1963) 
argues that there exist focal points, which have the instrumental power of facilitating 
mutually consistent expectations and patterns of behavior, and ethnicity is one of 
them. In other words, ethnicity provides humans with the “epistemological comforts 
of home” (Varshney 2003, p. 90) i.e. a familiar trope available in the social 
environment (Hardin, 1995). Horowitz (1985) suggests that individuals identify with 
ethnic labels because these are visible markers of categorization and segregation. In 
another context, Chandra (2004) contends that in democracies characterized by 
access to public goods through patronage, voters are more likely to use ethnicity as a 
marker i.e. they believe that they are more likely to benefit by electing co-ethnic 
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candidates. Thus scholars following instrumentalist and/ or rational-choice theories 
have attributed the use of ethnicity in political mobilization (and conflict) either to 
psychological need of human behaviour or to a rational assessment of benefits. 
 
 However, the difficulty with these explanations is that they still fail to answer 
why ethnicity takes precedence over other forms of identity or issues when it comes 
to group mobilization. This is where constructivist theories, fill the gap left by 
rational-choice theories. Constructivism gets into the heart of the issue to explain 
how identities are constructed through historical and structural processes, institutions 
and individual actions; and by so doing it explains why ethnic identity forms a potent 
basis for mobilization and even conflict. I turn to this approach shortly after a 
discussion on a specific instrumentalist theory i.e. ethnic outbidding, as the latter 
serves as an important mechanism in explaining political processes of the two cases 
under study.   
 
2.3.1 Instrumentalist explanation to conflict through ‘ethnic outbidding’  
One of the first applications of rational-choice to explain ethnic violence through elite 
competition was Rabushka and Shepsle’s (1972) theory of ethnic outbidding. A 
detailed discussion of this theory is warranted in the review as it forms one of the 
conceptual tools to explain elite behavior in the Mizo and Bodo cases. “Ethnic 
outbidding may be referred to processes through which parties within the same ethno-
national bloc seek to portray themselves as the true defenders of the group position 
while simultaneously undercutting the legitimacy of in-group rivals” (Gormley-
Heenan and MacGinty 2008, p. 44). Claim and counter- claim may result in an 
‘ethnic auction’, whereby attempts at inter-group rapprochement are made impossible 
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by intra-group accusations of treachery and betrayal. As Sartori puts it, if “outbidding 
becomes the rule of the game, somebody is always prepared to offer more for less, 
and the bluff cannot be seen” and this can lead to the negation of competitive politics 
(Sartori cited in Devotta 2005, p. 141). The central idea of the outbidding theory is 
that ethnic divisions threaten the working of democratic institutions. 
 
 The ethnic mobilization period may be seen as the first phase in the centrifugal 
dynamics of outbidding when single ethnic parties emerge to represent each of the 
main ethnic groups usually followed by some form of regime change (Mitchell, 
Evans and O’Leary, 2006). The outbidding thesis predicts that the inter-ethnic 
centrifugal moves are almost certain to reach the second phase i.e. the 
institutionalization of intra-ethnic competition in the form of intra-group party 
proliferation (Horowitz 1985, pp. 354-5). This phase is marked by “counter-
mobilizations within their own segments” and denouncement of “any further 
cooperative moves as betrayals” thereby often leading to derailment of an ongoing 
peace process or disruption of the established peace (Horowitz 1985, p. 354-5). This 
theory is widely used to explain instances where elite competition has spiralled into 
conflict. For example, in the context of Sri Lanka, Devotta (2005) shows how 
politicians from the majority Sinhalese community used outbidding as a means to 
attain power and in so doing systematically marginalized the Tamil minority 
population. He argues that the process of outbidding became so embedded in the 
institutional structure of Sri Lankan politics that it became one of the causes of the 
reactive nationalism among Tamils leading to a number of riots and eventually a 
bloody civil war (Devotta, 2005).  
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Thus the outbidding theory makes a key observation regarding the nature of 
ethnic conflicts i.e. inter-ethnic conflict can be conditioned and fostered by intra-
ethnic processes. Scholars using this theory highlight two processes through which 
competition escalates into conflict. One, through the process of in-group policing 
which involves the administration of formal or informal sanctions, even violent 
sanctions, within a group to ensure a certain line of action or maintain dominance 
over power. For example, Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers have murdered leaders of 
rival Tamil groups, dissidents within their own ranks and even civilian Tamils 
suspected of helping the Sinhalese (Laitin, 1995). Similarly, in the case of Rwanda, 
before the genocide politics involved jockeying for power between moderate and 
extremist Hutu elites. The Hutu extremists used inter-ethnic murder as a justification 
for why they and not the moderates should speak for the interests of the peasants. Not 
only did they portray the Tutsis as pure evil but also propagated the idea that the 
moderate leadership were the stooges of their enemy (Prunier 1995, p. 141). A 
second mechanism involves the deliberative provocations or confrontations with 
outsiders to deflect any in-group challenges by redefining the fundamental fissures of 
conflict as being inter-group. The role of intra-Serbian struggles in the bloody 
dissolution of Yugoslavia is a case in point (Gagnon, 1994-95). 
 
The impact of the processes of outbidding as originally predicted by Rabushka 
and Shepsle is that settlements would be difficult to negotiate and if reached, more 
difficult to sustain so that “ethnic conflict is not manageable within a democratic 
framework” (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972, p. 217). Movement to the ‘extremes’ is 
often replicated in the other ethnic groups, fearing their moderate parties will not be 
able to defend their interests from the extremist ethnic party of the ethnic other.  
 78 
 
The problem with the classic model of outbidding is that it almost tends 
towards the primordial view as it assumes that multi-ethnic societies organised 
around ethnic identity have an inherent tendency towards conflict. Recent studies 
have shown ways in which ethnic parties might avoid such a pessimistic fate 
(Chandra, 2005). Chandra (2005) suggests that initial spirals of ethnic outbidding 
might eventually give way to centripetal tendencies in societies with institutions that 
allow the politicization of multiple dimensions of ethnic identity, what Rothschild 
alternatively calls cross-patterned reticulation (Rothschild, 1982). For example, in the 
case of India, at least four major crosscutting ethnic cleavages exist - language, 
religion, caste and tribe and this fluidity prevents the emergence of lasting fault lines 
and protracted conflicts that might lead to a breakdown of democracy (Manor, 1996; 
Chandra, 2005). In the case of Mizoram and Bodoland in particular, the outbidding 
theory provides a suitable framework to understand how within group elite dynamics 
affect inter-group relations and hence the probability of violence. Of course, the study 
rejects the pessimistic (and rather primordial) view that multi-ethnic settings are 
doomed to violence. The case of Mizoram itself proves otherwise. 
 
After detailing the literature on instrumentalist theories of ethnic conflict, I now take 
a look at the second approach i.e. constructivism. 
 
2.4 Constructivist theories of ethnic conflict 
The now discredited primordial theories of ethnic identity are more or less replaced 
by the assertion that ethnicity is socially constructed, a view which is commonplace 
among social scientists (Fenton, 2003; Varshney, 2001b). Primordialism defines 
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ethnic identities as ‘natural’, fixed and unchanging. As Geertz notes (1979, pp.  259-
60), 
By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the ‘givens’…One is bound 
to one’s kinsman…as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, 
common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some 
unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself. 
 
According to this view since ethnic ties are inherent in humans, divisions caused by 
these ties become natural too and are popularly called ancient hatred (Peterson 2002). 
This approach explains that the fear of domination, expulsion and even extinction lie 
at the root of conflict and a sheer intensity of these “accumulated hatred” (Crawford 
1998, p. 10) then drives members of ethnic groups to commit violence.   
 
The constructivist view rejects the primordial position and sees ethnicity as a 
social category with two main features: (1) rules of membership that decide who is to 
be included and excluded; and (2) content i.e. sets of characteristics such as beliefs, 
language, customs, shared historical myths which are thought to be typical of 
members of that category (Fearon and Laitin, 2000).34 In other words, to say that 
identities are socially constructed is to suggest that the membership rules, content and 
valuation are the products of human action and hence are subject to change (Fearon 
and Laitin, 2000). In this context, ethnic violence then may be seen as a consequence 
of an ambiguity and uncertainty of the boundaries delimiting ethnic categories 
(Tambiah, 1989).  
 
Constructivists mainly criticize primordial approaches to identity and conflict. 
They critique the belief that groups (elites and/or masses) mistakenly have about 
                                                        
34 Barth (1969) has argued that ethnic claims are not claims about cultural characteristics of group 
members rather these claims are about differences thought to distinguish them from others.  
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social categories being natural and unchanging facts of the social world.35 They argue 
that ethnic activists are often unlikely to include a sense of historical construction or 
contingency about their identities.  Thus a constructivist view is an attempt at 
undermining these everyday primordial assumptions by providing empirical evidence 
of how the content and even membership rules change over time and may be created, 
recreated and appropriated.  
 
Various theoretical approaches have been employed to understand how these 
social categories are produced and reproduced and I discuss them in three broad 
categories. Firstly, if discursive formations or cultural systems construct ethnic 
identities, then “constructivist explanations for ethnic violence tend to merge with 
cultural accounts that stress the internal logic of culturally specific ways of thinking, 
talking and acting” (Fearon and Laitin 2000, p. 846). Here it is the nature of the 
discourse that constructs an ethnic identity that determines whether violence would 
occur or not. Second, if individuals are viewed as constructing ethnic identity, then 
constructivist explanations of ethnic violence tend to merge with rationalist and 
strategic analyses that particularly emphasize elite manipulation of masses. A third 
thread of thinking sees institutional design providing incentives for the construction 
of ethnic identities (Chandra, 2005; Shneiderman and Tillin, 2015). I discuss them 
briefly. 
 
Constructivism through discursive formation characterizes ethnicity and ethnic 
conflict/ violence as “meaningful, culturally constructed, discursively mediated, 
symbolically saturated and ritually regulated” (Brubaker and Laitin, 1998). 
                                                        
35 Fearon and Laitin (2000, p. 848) call this “everyday primordialism.” 
 81 
Discursive formations are seen to have their own logic and agency that constructs 
individuals and groups as well as a range of practices including violence. For 
example, Geertz (1979) examined the discourse around the Balinese cockfight in the 
analysis of the Bali massacres of 1965. He (1979, p. 450-2.) argued that the violent 
symbolism of cockfights made the massacres seem less of an aberration of a peaceful 
society.  
 
Newer developments within this approach, however, reject the idea that 
cultures shaped by discourses are bounded or static. For instance, in his study on 
Rwanda, Prunier (1995) attends to the important question of how discourses come to 
be formed and sustained in the first place. In the case of Rwandan conflict, he 
explores the creation of the colonial discourse of Tutsi racial superiority with an 
implication of “an aggressively resentful inferiority complex” among Hutus (1995, p. 
150). Later in an inverted form of a cultural and knowledge system, Hutus portrayed 
Tutsis as evil foreigners who had to be stopped from re-imposing their tyranny. In 
this case, discourse is invoked as a means to achieve power thereby converging 
instrumentalist approaches with a more discursive constructivist approach. This 
convergence is very useful to understand conflict in post-colonial societies where 
legacies of colonial structures can have a strong relation with the nature of politics 
after independence (Kaufman, 2001).  
 
Symbolic politics theory also provides a similar explanation wherein ethnic 
identity is defined by a “myth-symbol complex that sets out not only who is in the 
group, but also who the group’s heroes and villains are, what its history is, and what 
it means to be a group member” (Kaufman 2001, pp. 136-138). For example, as 
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Baruah (1999, p. 122) notes, the Assam anti-foreigners agitation was marked by 
invoking of poems and songs, ‘We Assamese are not (culturally) poor. In what sense 
are we poor?’ or ‘Today we have martyrs who can say that if Assam dies, we too will 
die’ as a way of reclaiming the Assamese identity from being subordinated by 
‘outsiders’. Another example is the contentious Orange Order parades in Northern 
Ireland celebrating William of Orange’s Protestant victory at the 1960 battle of 
Boyne, which also symbolizes defeat in the Catholic myth-symbol complex 
(Kaufman 2011, p. 96). He argues that the parade through Catholic neighbourhoods 
was symbolic of Protestant dominance and hence orf group worth (Kaufman 2011, p. 
96). 
 
A second possibility where the content and the boundaries of ethnic categories 
might be constructed is by individual actions. Here the constructivist approach 
merges with a rationalist or instrumentalist approach, discussed previously in the 
review. Antagonistic identities may be a result of elite machinations and politicking. 
Elites fan ethnic violence to build political support that can have the effect of 
constructing hostile identities or further hardening existing identity fault lines.  
Though the content of ethnic identities are in flux, the boundaries that define 
membership of the groups tend to get fixed and further hardened as a result of 
conflict.  As McGarry and O’Leary (1995, p. 250) point out in the context of 
Northern Ireland, the content of the social categories ‘Protestant’ and “Catholic’ has 
changed so much that it would be difficult to find any longstanding cultural 
differences that distinguish them.  
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The question then arising with regards to the constructivist approach is: if all 
identities are socially constructed, why does conflict break out in some cases and not 
in others? This is a relavant question that can be answered better if we ask why elites 
and/ or groups identify and categorize themselves in particular ways and with 
reference to particular cleavages. I answer this in the next question by looking at the 
institutional structures that provide opportunities and constraints in politicizing 
particular social cleavages and identities.  
 
2.4.1 Role of Institutions  
Institutions may be understood as “a set of rules, compliance procedures and moral 
and ethical behavioural norms embedded in those rules and compliance procedures 
designed to constrain the behaviour of individuals in the interest of maximizing 
wealth, social order and the well-being of a society” (North 1981, pp. 201-2). In other 
words, institutions can shape the logic of the political game in that they structure the 
process and outcomes of political interactions (Mozaffer, Scarritt and Galaich 2007). 
Identities may be transformed into politically salient categories by institutions 
(Piombio, 2008; Crawford, 1998). This transformation is particularly stark in 
contexts that underwent colonial rule. The constraints and incentives offered by 
colonial policies created opportunities for political entrepreneurs among colonized 
groups to draw on cultural identities to mobilize resistance to imperial control, gain 
access to political power, and also exercise power in the construction of new national 
institutions in post-colonial contexts. Dirk’s (2001) work on the role of colonial state 
in creating a modern social category of caste through an elaborate system of 
enumeration and classification is a case in point. Similarly, internal political 
domination and discrimination codified in political institutions like apartheid in South 
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Africa and the institution of slavery in Jim Crow laws in the United States also 
defined social cleavages and conflict in these societies (Crawford, 1998, p. 19). 
Furthermore, where state institutions structure political membership and resource 
distribution according to ascriptive criteria, rewarding and punishing particular ethnic 
groups, those identities become legitimate in the political arena thereby intensifying 
their political relevance (Chandra, 2005). 
 
For this thesis, the role of institutions - both formal and informal - are crucial to 
analyze how particular forms of identities and cleavages were rendered politically 
salient. Institutions of state practice (such as the Paik system and the trading posts or 
Duaars connecting hills with the plains) of successive rulers and their shifting nature 
in the Northeast may be attributed to the particular ways in which groups in the two 
topographies come to identify themselves and their relation with territory. Similarly, 
post-independence, asymmetric institutions giving territorial recognition to group 
rights in the Mizo Hills would enable the local elites to forge a territorialised, 
inclusive identity after independence. Furthermore, as the empirical chapter on the 
Mizo case will demonstrate institutions of territorial nature also set the rules of the 
political game in the Mizo Hills. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The approaches and literature thus surveyed here all contribute in addressing the 
question: what causes ethnic conflict and why is it possible to accommodate it in 
certain cases and not in others? A combination of these approaches is useful for to 
study a causally heterogeneous phenomenon of ethnic conflict. This chapter reviewed 
the subject of ethnic conflict from the perspective of two distinct bodies of literature. 
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The first section explored the debate within the field of comparative federalism of 
whether asymmetrical arrangements have a higher propensity of accommodating 
ethnic diversity and conflict or not.  The remaining section looked at conflict through 
the perspective of rational decisions of social actors and theories of constructivism. 
Both literatures discussed a rich body of scholarship, with theoretical and empirical 
bases, that seeks to explore the relationship between forms of political subjectivities 
and conflict outcomes.  
 
As is usually the case with studies on ethnic conflict, I use a combination of 
these two approaches in my thesis. Instrumentalist theories, specifically the theory of 
ethnic outbidding, allow me to explain the nature of the Mizo and Bodo ethnic 
identities and how Mizo and Bodo elites use them as a basis for mobilization in their 
struggle for power. On the other hand, constructivism enables me to answer why 
these political entrepreneurs use the particular forms of identities and issues in the 
first place. In particular, the view that institutions or state structures themselves help 
to provide resources for identity formation is key for the research puzzle. 
 
Since the study looks at both the role of asymmetric federal structures and the 
political and cultural elite in explaining the phenomenon of ethnic conflict, the 
attempt of the thesis is to bring both literatures into conversation. In other words, to 
understand the outcome of the study - varying degrees of ethnic conflict - the 
question of how elite behavior shapes and is in turn shaped by structures and 
institutions has to be addressed. At the heart of the Mizo and Bodo story is the 
question of political subject formation, which include both the affective content and 
the boundaries of ethnic identity. As the empirical chapters will demonstrate, both the 
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content and the boundaries of these two identities have been shaped by long term 
processes of state restructuring. These include historical institutions of state practice 
as well as the post-colonial federal institutions in the region. Furthermore, these 
political subjectivities have in turn informed the design of these federal state and sub-
state structures.  This linkage is crucial to understand how ethnic politics is shaped 
and in turn shapes contours of structures and institutions of asymmetry. As the 
literature review shows, most of the scholarship on federalism addresses the 
functional import of asymmetry in managing conflict in multinational contexts, and 
has paid less attention to how these affect processes of ethnic identity formation. The 
latter has been a subject of inquiry mostly in the field of identity politics and politics 
of recognition.  
 
Keeping in mind the dialectical relationship of state restructuring and identity 
formation, the next chapter gives a detailed historical account of state formation 
processes that not only shape how subsequent polities have ruled but also related to 
ways in which collective subjectivities are formed. As will be demonstrated, in a 
particular form of political topography of the region, which included a mixed hills-
plains terrain and low population, subsequent states, including traditional and the 
early colonial states, organized power around people and not territory. These 
processes begin to unravel only in the late 19th century when the colonial state 
designs a system of boundaries thereby leading to a more rigid topographical 





Chapter 3 State Formation in India’s Northeast 
 
 
… geographical influences account for much that happens or 
has happened. At the same time human actions alters the 
aspect of those things of which geography takes cognizance.
                    




The previous chapter provided a broad overview of two distinct bodies of scholarship 
namely, formation of ethnic identity, and federalism that have contributed to our 
understanding of conflict. As the chapter showed, these approaches alone cannot 
explain the research puzzle I seek to address and an attempt was made to bring these 
inter-related but distinct bodies of literature into conversation. This chapter takes a 
closer look at the literature on state formation in Northeast India and sets the scene 
for the question of how territory and territorialized identities became politically 
salient in India’s Northeast region. In particular, it explicates the intricacies that 
longue durée state-formation processes have entailed for identity formation and state 
practices in the region. 
 
 This study is a clear departure from the received wisdom of dividing the 
history of the region into three neat categories: pre-colonial, colonial and post-
independence as seen in the works of scholars such as Baruah (1999), Misra (1998), 
Nag (2002) and Bhaumik (2009). This chapter, in particular follows a scheme that 
traces dynamics of state restructuring from pre-colonial to late 19th century and from 
late 19th to early 20th century. In the first stage, it attempts to understand these 
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processes in the particular political topography of the region, historically 
characterized by low levels of human populations and the presence of two connected 
topographies i.e. hills and valleys in close proximity. James Scott’s (2009) Zomia 
framework and Herbst’s (2014) study on Africa are instructive in understanding these 
two crucial elements of state formation in the region. A key argument in this chapter 
is about the relation between political topography and forms of state control. Regions 
with large land mass and low population densities often involved appropriation of 
populations rather than quest for territory as a basic element of state-formation. This 
is because control over territory in such geographies involved much higher costs for 
states to project power. In practice, this translated into forms of territorially unfixed 
states, often characterized by ideas of shared rule and overlapping territories among 
competing polities and/or groups. The chapter marshals evidence from archival and 
secondary sources on the Northeast region of India to emphasize this claim.   
 
Second, it uses the hills-plains dynamics as a central theme to understand the 
ways in which states and peoples came to organize power and its implication on 
social relations. Furthermore, I highlight the continuities in the state practices from 
the traditional polities to that of the early colonial rule until the late 19th century. I 
demonstrate that both pre-colonial and the earlier colonial state successively grappled 
with the political topography of the region in order to project power and control in 
ways that minimized the costs of administration. High costs of establishing control 
made the colonial administration dependent on traditional institutions and practices- 
creating ‘zones of exceptions’, especially in the hilly terrains. The colonial state not 
only followed a policy of relative non-interference in the hills, but it actively 
supported existing practices of posa (blackmail money) and hill-valley trade in this 
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period. Thus till the end of the 19th century colonial administration had a very light 
footprint in the region, particularly in the hills areas. 
 
Colonial rule did instigate some profound changes in the region, most 
important of them being the creation of fixed boundaries, territorial units and 
changed social relations due to mass-scale proselytization; but these changes were 
more rapid and visible from the late 19th to early 20th century. At the turn of the 
century, the colonial discourse on the Northeast frontier increasingly seemed to 
emphasize the separation of the two topographies and the groups inhabiting them. 
The second half of the chapter argues that there were two important reasons for this 
transformation, namely British commercial and strategic interests. A bid to create a 
‘resource frontier’ (Baruah, 2016) in the region by tapping into the commercial 
potential of the tea industry brought the colonial masters in direct confrontation with 
hill dwellers. Since maintaining stability and protecting British commercial interests 
were priorities of the government, it necessitated the physical demarcation of hills 
from the valleys. Secondly, changing geo-political concerns in the Northeastern 
frontier of colonial India from the late 19th century further lent urgency to the creation 
of fixed borders. I base this argument on the principle that borders can be used as 
tools of maintaining control, in a context where actual administrative hold of a 
political regime over a territory is weak (Herbst, 2014). Owing to challenges of 
geography and sparse population patterns, states (here the British colonial 
establishment) can use fixed territorial borders to avoid the otherwise high costs of 
physically manning and administering the hinterland. In the Northeast region, these 
processes manifested in isolating the hills thereby contributing to the construction of 
the hill-plains cleavage more sharply.  
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3.2 State formation in the Northeast till late 19th century 
3.2.1 Non-territorial forms of political control in India’s Northeast 
Narratives about the nation-state, movements for homelands and inter-state/ group 
conflict are often predicated on the idea of a bounded territorial polity. In the master-
narrative of the modern state, sovereignty over a fixed geographical space seems to 
have emerged as a universal given and as the final phase of a teleological process. 
Theorists like Ernest Gellner (1983) and Benedict Anderson (1983) saw the 
emergence of nations and nation-states as linked to the transformation of social, 
economic and political life that first began in Europe during the 18th and 19th century 
and eventually spread around the globe through European colonial empires and 
subsequent decolonization. As Charles Tilly (1990) noted, the European experience 
of state consolidation was based on wars of territorial conquest. This was because 
high population density of Europe made land relatively scarce and hence valuable 
and therefore became subjected to political control. In a perpetual situation of 
conflict, medieval and early modern states had to build bureaucracies, gather 
information, and map their territories and their people in order to strengthen 
themselves (Robinson, 2002).36 Thus a constant threat and hence the need to protect 
valued territory required the state to emphasis control of remote areas and hinterlands 
(Herbst 2014, p. 14). This process, Tilly argues, facilitated the creation of the modern 
system of nation-states with bound territories and a set of institutions that 
consolidated in Europe by the 19th century. Thus “the focus on control of land as the 
basis of state authority is not surprising in Europe where, due to population densities, 
land was in short supply” (Herbst 2014, p. 36).  
                                                        
36  For instance, as Robinson (2002, p. 514) points out, mapping was institutionalized during the 
Napoleonic Wars so that the military would have first-rate maps in event of a French invasion.  
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In other contexts, however, power consolidation could have been and was 
imagined and experienced differently. For instance, pre-colonial African states were 
organized around power that was non-territorial and were rather based on ideas of 
shared sovereignty. Jeffrey Herbst (2014, p. 38) argues that this was primarily 
because these states were often constituted of large tracts with sparsely populated 
land, and hence territorial competition was infrequent.37 Consequently, many pre-
colonial African societies were characterized by unbundling of ownership and control 
of land, a feature observed among the Ashanti, the Nunu and the Zulu people (Herbst, 
2014, p. 40). Similarly, state building in pre-colonial Southeast Asia was confronted 
with “higher levels of geographical friction” (Scott 2009, p. 50). Scott notes that 
virtually all of pre-modern state cores in this region were found in an ecological 
setting comprising of hilly terrain and abundant land with a short supply of 
manpower (Scott 2009, p. 42). Thus, an essential challenge to state formation in 
Southeast Asia was the difficulty of state travel vis-à-vis the relative ease with which 
humans could escape the reach of the state. Consequently wars over territory were 
rather secondary as the challenges of terrain set up sharp limits to the effective 
control over land. Here again, organizing peoples as opposed to broadcasting power 
over territory more or less marked the basic feature of authority in the region. Thus in 
the context of Africa and Southeast Asia, it was relatively more expensive for states 
to exercise control over territory when compared to densely settled areas of Europe 
and Asia. 
 
                                                        
37 Other studies also support this argument (Bates, 1983).  Only those regions in Africa in which 
ecologies have supported relatively high densities (Great Lakes, Ethiopian), have had traditions of 
relatively centralized state structures (Bates 1983, p. 35) and have periodically been able to exercise 
direct control over their peripheries. 
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Herbst’s formulations on pre-colonial African state formation and Scott’s work 
on Southeast Asia are instructive in our understanding of power organization in pre-
colonial Assam. The topography of Assam includes valleys (namely the Brahmaputra 
valley, the Barak valley and the Imphal valley) washed by a major river system, 
surrounded and interspersed by mountain ranges on all sides. This political 
topography placed limits on the consolidation of traditional agrarian states in these 
valleys as well as the neighbouring hill polities. This had significant implications for 
state relations with populations in that it was appropriation of people rather than 
quest for territory that was key to state making. Parallel to other political systems of 
Southeast Asia including the Burmese (Myint-U 2011, p. 282), the focus of 
traditional polities was organisation of manpower rather than control over land. 
 
3.2.2 State formation processes in the Northeast 
In the period between the 12th and the 16th century, the Ahom kingdom in the 
Brahmaputra valley emerged as a dominant polity in the region that is now known as 
Assam. The Ahom or Shans, a Tibeto-Burman speaking group originally from Burma 
crossed the Patkai range and entered Assam in 1228 from northern and eastern hill 
tracts of Upper Burma and western Yunnan. By early 16th century, Ahom dominance 
had expanded to cover the entire Brahmaputra valley. More importantly, it shaped the 
limits of the Mughal power in the east (Myint-U 2011, p. 282). The Ahom polity had 
an elaborate system of organizing manpower in Assam. From the 13th century 
onwards, Ahoms successfully introduced wet-rice cultivation when they began 
consolidating their control over northern parts of the Brahmaputra valley. This form 
of agriculture required labour supply that was made possible through the paik system. 
A paik was the basic unit of the labour force in the Ahom polity. Written chronicles 
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of the period reveal that rather than taxing cultivators on their land, the paik system 
made it compulsory for every household to provide at least one male member 
between ages 16-50 to render services to the polity (Guha 1983, p. 6). 
 
Since the region was relatively sparsely populated, the polity’s control over 
paiks was an important element of state building. Presiding above twenty paiks each, 
there was an officer called Bora while a Saikia and Hazarika commanded a hundred 
and a thousand of these paiks respectively. Manpower was organized around a 
territorial unit called got, and at least one paik had to be at disposal for state services 
(agriculture, civil construction, crafts production, services to hill polities) including 
for military services (Dikshit and Dikshit 2014, p. 588). The paik system constituted 
the foundation of the Ahom socio-political organization, so much so that rebellion 
among the paiks of Moamaria group against the government contributed significantly 
to the downfall of an already weakened polity in the 18th century (Guha, 1984). 
 
Similarly, in the hills of Assam, the geography and the demographic patterns of 
the dwellers there shaped their agricultural practices and more significantly their 
relation with land. Groups like Lushais and Kuki-Chins that lived in the hills were 
not organized around a fixed territory. As Lt. Col. John Shakepeare (1912, p. 123), 
the Superintendent of then Lushai hills noted, “The temporary bamboo villages of the 
Lushai Hills… move every 5 or 6 years” and “the population…accustomed to move 
from one chief’s village to that of another.” Pachuau (2014), a Mizo anthropologist 
also argues that clan/tribe identities that now constitute the modern Mizo identity 
were created in movement and not in ideas of fixity. A she (2014, p. 100) notes: “In 
the Lushai Hills, a person was attached to a chief, who due to the practice of swidden 
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cultivation, had to move the location of the settlement every few years. An 
individual’s location was not fixed, whether to territory or even to a chief.”  
 
Besides shifting cultivation, Lushais and other Kuki-Chin polities were 
preoccupied with organizing labour to work in agriculture and animal husbandry or to 
be used as payment or tribute to neigbouring tribes. Like the Ahom Paik system, the 
Lushais had the Bawi system 38  to serve this purpose. Bawis were “redeemable 
bonded labourers”…who…“either through recruitment or voluntary surrender to the 
neighbourhood chief, seek[ing] permanent generational bondage” (Nag 2016, p. xiv). 
A bawi, who usually came from non-chiefly clans, would be provided for in return 
for their labour to a chief for life. Chiefs recruited bawis not only as in-house 
domesticated labourer but also for swidden cultivation and building homes, hostels39 
and other such public works. 
 
Hill polities raided not only other villages in the hills but also swooped down 
and ‘looted’ villages belonging to Ahom jurisdiction. As a legacy of colonial 
anthropology, ‘raiding’ has often been seen as characteristic of ‘primitive’ societies, 
apparently reflective of their barbaric and pre-civilizational behavior (Devi, 1968). 
Recent scholarship (Wouters 2012, p. 47) however problematizes this narrative by 
suggesting that these weren’t a result of their ‘barbaric’ nature but rather a result of 
sheer necessity given the paucity of manpower and resources. The abduction of 
                                                        
38The Bawi system emerged as a major contentious issue between the colonial government and 
Christian Missionaries; at the center of the debate was the question of whether this system was to be 
understood as slavery (Nag, 2016). I discuss this issue in later in the chapter while explaining the 
emerging Mizo elite in the early decades of the 20th century. 
39 Also known as the institution of Zawlbuk in Mizo (literally translates as Bachelors House) where 
young male members of the clan resided and were ingratiated in practices of traditions, warfare and 
other social roles. It is argued that the Zawlbuk functioned as a “potent institutionalized mechanism of 
social control” among these groups (Patnaik and Lalthakima 2006, p. 6) 
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plains people might have been a means of absorbing the shortage in manpower, and 
in principle did not seem very different from the state practices of the so called 
‘advanced’ valley polities in organizing labour in a sparsely populated region.40 
 
Concomitantly this also meant that the boundaries of these polities differed 
from that of the modern territorial conceptions and were thus not definable by 
modern cartography. Political power was not asserted through the traditional state’s 
ability to maintain and protect an external boundary enclosing a geographical space; 
rather vital to state capacity was its ability to control heartlands, hill passes, custom 
points, market places and river courses (Cederlöf 2014, p. 36). Both valley and hill 
polities in the region carefully guarded access to trade routes, foothills and ghats on 
rivers and clashes among polities often took place as contestations over these crucial 
points (Cederlöf 2014, p. 36) In other words, political topography of the region had a 
bearing on the imagined boundary – the limits of power - as consisting of crucial 
points rather than a continuous boundary line.  
 
3.2.3 Hills-Plains relations in India’s Northeast  
This chapter uses James Scott’s (2009) The Art of the Ungoverned as a point of entry 
into the subject of state formation in Northeast India. Scott’s thesis is directly 
relevant to this study because in his historical scheme, India’s Northeast, particularly 
its hill regions, have been invoked as part of the Southeast Asian massif called 
Zomia. It was originally conceived by Willem van Schendel (2002), as an example of 
a region with strong socio-economic and linguistic ties and state practices. Scott 
(2009, p. ix) suggests that Zomia consists of lands at altitudes above roughly 300 
                                                        
40 This point was also highlighted by J.V Hluna, co-founder of the Mizo History Association, during field-
interview, Aizawl, April 20th 2014. 
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meters all the way from the Central Highlands of Vietnam to Northeast India and 
traversing five Southeast Asian nations (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and 
Burma) and four provinces of China (Yunan, Guizhou, Guangxi and parts of 
Sichuan).41 
 
At the core of Scott’s analysis is the hill-plains binary, which he argues 
remained the single most salient cleavage governing state formation in the region 
before late 19th century. Scott (2009, p. 42) explains that virtually all of “the pre-
modern state cores in Southeast Asia are to be found in an ecological system 
predominantly supporting wet-rice cultivation.” The founding of agrarian states was 
thus, according to him, the contingent event that came to distinguish and shape the 
dialectic between a settled, state-governing population of the valley and a frontier of 
less governed or virtually autonomous people. This geographical and political 
distinction, he further argues, had significant implications for state relations with 
populations. Populations could move in and out of states thereby often rendering 
stake-making processes “cyclical and reversible” (Scott 2009, p. 7). Hence key to 
polity formation in this context was that of appropriation of people rather than quest 
for territory. 
 
Following Scott’s work, it is not surprising that the binary distinction of the 
hills and the plains is a central and recurring theme in the study as well as articulation 
of identity and conflict in India’s Northeast. This distinction has come to define 
                                                        
41 Zomia as an analytical category is useful for this study in that it is a vast contiguous highland region 
cutting across modern state boundaries and located at the fringes of both political spaces and 
academically defined areas (Schendel, 2002; Wouters, 2012). In this scheme, such ‘self-governing’ hill 
peoples, who are often categorized as ‘barbaric’ or ‘our living ancestors’, have been deliberately 
evading the oppressions of state-making projects of the valleys for over two millennia. In this chapter, 
however,  I critique this point.  
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social categories – such as hills tribe, plains tribe - in the region and is also reflective 
of the asymmetric institutional arrangements designed to cater to the region’s ethnic 
diversity and competing claims for territory. Ethnic entrepreneurs in the region often 
reify the distinction between these two geographical spaces and the groups inhabiting 
them. 
 
Following from colonial administrative legacy, the scholarship engaging with 
the Northeast India has had an evolutionary thrust in evidencing the difference 
between hills and valleys. Amalendu Guha (1983, p. 4) has noted, “No tribe leaped to 
statehood while it was still at its pristine state when it still lacked a sedentary 
agricultural population, a degree of division of labour and social stratification.” 
According to him, ‘tribes’ such as the Tai-Ahom, Dimasas, Meitis, Koch, Khasis 
crystallised into rudimentary state formations by the 15th century. Based on his 
training in Marxist history, Guha (1983, p. 4) proffered that ‘statehood’ processes in 
each of these cases were made possible by the generation of a requisite surplus 
afforded by wet-rice cultivation. Wet-rice cultivation and the use of the plough were 
then transferred to the ‘less advanced tribes’ that practiced swidden cultivation and 
because of the latter’s ‘pre-state’ stage were ultimately absorbed by the advanced 
political formations. Guha (1983, p. 12) substantiated his theorization by showing 
that the Ahoms had absorbed the Nagas, Morans, Sootiyas and Kacharis by 16th 
century. 
 
Sanjib Baruah, who otherwise argues against the artificiality of the hills-plains 
binary, also endorses Scott’s categorization of hill regions of the Northeast as non-
state spaces when he (2009, p. 8) says, “contemporary Northeast India’s linguistic 
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and cultural diversity reflects the resilience of a historic non-state space despite 
powerful odds.” Likewise, in the case of Meities of Manipur it has been said,  
The valley inhabited by the Meities…her dense population, highly fertile land, 
advanced technology and better social and economic organisations led to the 
growth of kingdoms and principalities while in the hills, the political systems could 
not develop beyond village societies…The stiff mountain ranges and the narrow 
river valleys which provide secure habitat without enough sustenance to the pre-
historic people are not conducive to the growth of the state systems (Kabui 2003, 
pp. 8-9). 
 
Similarly, Chaube (1999, p. 174) notes with reference to the Lushais, 
The vast tract of hilly land, lying between Chittagong and the Irrawaddy valley to 
the south of Cachar and Imphal, has been inhabited by people who were broadly 
grouped by Grierson in the Kuki-Chin linguistic family. Their nomadic way of 
life was the greatest obstacle to political stabilization  
 
 
Thus similar to Scott’s idea of hill dwellers as non-state, anarchic and freedom-loving 
people, state formation in the Northeast region has often pivoted the valley as the 
norm.42 There have been some attempts to counter this linear, evolutionary narrative; 
Edmund Leach’s (1954) work on Burma merits attention here. Leach marshalled 
evidence to show the interdependence of valley-dwelling Shan and hill-dwelling 
Kachin political systems.  Other works have demonstrated how hill dwellers could 
straddle a dual identity: Kachin while inhabiting the highlands and that of Shan when 
they populated the valleys (Lehman, 1963). Kammerer (1988) also shows that though 
hill/valley is a significant axis for self-definition among highlanders, it is not the only 
one; the Karen of Burma, for example, consider Lua to be kin on the basis of their 
common residence between plains and mountain tops and their similar position vis-à-
vis valley principalities, but at the same time they feel no affinity with hill peoples on 
higher slopes (Kammerer 1988, p. 262). 
                                                        
42 See Sadan (2010) and Jonsson (2014) for a critique of Scott’s thesis. 
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Similarly, Schendel (1992) has shown the existence of complex multi-ethnic 
arrangements among ethnic groups in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (now in 
Bangladesh). He provides evidence from an early colonial manuscript of the 
existence of the complex ‘ethnic situation’ and variable ethnic boundaries in these 
uplands. Buchanan, the author of the manuscript, had found several groups living in 
the Chittagong highlands which included groups such as Chakma, Zo, Bawm, 
Tipperah engaged in shifting cultivation, in addition to Bengalis, Baruas and 
Arakanese who were neither swidden cultivators nor permanent residents (Schendel 
1992, p. 99). A web of political arrangements existed in the Hill tracts. There were 
villages inhabited by swidden cultivators belonging to different language groups; 
villages that were ‘ethnically stratified’, being inhabited by an ethnic group together 
with its debt peons from different groups; and villages where the chiefs had servants 
from other groups (Schendel 1992, p. 99). Furthermore, chiefs often collected tribute 
from households belonging to several ethnic groups (Schendel 1992, p. 99). Thus it is 
quite evident that groups living in the valleys and hills of the region had been defying 
neat binaries for centuries. It is thus possible to see populations of the Northeast as, in 
Scott’s (2009, p. 19) terminology, a ‘shatter zone’ on account of constant migration 
and movement of people, “where the human shards of state formation and rivalry 
accumulated willy nilly, creating region of bewildering ethnic and linguistic 
complexity” with no fixed ethnic or territorial boundaries.  
 
3.3 Hills-plains interaction as a crucial element of state formation 
Historically, there existed a complex web of power relations between the plains 
polities and that of highlanders, which problematizes the contemporary rigidity of 
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these categories. Scott’s (2009, p. 27) own emphasis on this feature is evident when 
he says that the valley and hill spaces are deeply connected and their histories have to 
be read against each other. However, Scott’s thesis of flight of people from valleys to 
highland in a bid to evade state-making processes may be seen as somewhat 
simplistic. As will be discussed in this section, an opposite flow i.e. people moving 
from the hills into the plains also occurred regularly. Indeed, plains polities had to 
dedicate substantial effort in not only regulating or restricting this movement but also 
in establishing ingenious power sharing arrangements with the highlanders. There 
was substantive trade among polities, and hill dwellers such as the Nagas and Garos 
were often recruited in state services (Luthra, 1971). This was accompanied by acts 
of warfare when hill polities raided villages on the foothills and plains in order to 
acquire resources and manpower (Wouters, 2012). Processes of state making were 
thus characterized by civil relations between and, sometimes imminent, threats from 
the hill peoples moving down into the plains. A discussion of Ahom relations with its 
hill neighbours illustrates this point. 
 
The Ahom relations with its neighbouring hill peoples were varied, depending 
on political exigencies and the strength or weaknesses of the ruling chiefs of these 
groups. The Ahom court had a system of recording events in a manuscript form 
called Buranjis, which provide some details about the polity’s relation with its 
neighbours. The Ahom government followed a policy of conciliation towards the hill 
tribes backed by a display of force whenever it could be employed effectively. 
Political exigency demanded that they adopt a “policy of seduction” to purchase 
peace from powerful hill groups (Wouters 2012, p. 49). Alexander Mackenzie 
(1884), the secretary to the Bengal government in the late 19th century, wrote 
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elaborately on this policy, known in local parlance as posa. This involved supply of 
human labour and grains from plains to the hills, in order to put a stop to the inroads 
of the hill peoples into the plains; in return for these privileges, Akas, Duflas, Miris 
and Abors had to refrain from making inroads into Ahom territory (Luthra 1971, p. 
1144). 
 
The posa system has also been documented elsewhere in the region. In order to 
control the movement of hill peoples to its bordering territories, Konyaks, Aos and 
Lotha Nagas living on the borders of Lakhimpur and Sibsagar (north Assam) were 
granted revenue-free lands at the foothills called khats (Luthra 1971, p. 1144). 
Tablungia Nagas were granted access to fishing waters in the plains, along with 
services of fishermen and a supply of dried fish (Devi 1968, pp. 33-34). The 
Singphos, inhabiting the hills now located on the Assam-Arunachal Pradesh border, 
often established settlement areas in the lowlands on the Ahom side of the Patkai 
range; the latter acquiesced to the rule of Singpho chiefs in these areas in the period 
when the Ahom dynasty was being considerably weakened (Barpujari 1970, pp. 19-
20). 
 
In the most extreme circumstances, as Barpujari (1970, p. 16) cites the Buranjis 
(the official chronicles of the Ahom court), the Ahom government sent ‘punitive’ 
expeditions, such as one against the Nagas, Daflas and Miris. The Ahom court had 
frontier officials designated as Salal Gohain, Marungi Khowa Gohain and Sadiya 
Khowa Gohain to keep these groups in check; Salal, Marung and Sadiya were the 
points where Gohains or officials were stationed (Barpujari 1970, p. 16).  
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The relations between plains and hill polities manifested through regimes of 
shared sovereignties. This is evident in the Ahom relations with the hill polities of 
Bhutan and Abors. For example, when the foothills connecting the valley polities 
with the hills, which often acted as trade points, fell under the Bhutanese jurisdiction 
in the 18th century till 1865, communities, such as the Bodos, dwelling on the 
foothills of Bhutan, paid their taxes to the Bhutanese government in grain and cloth 
rather than to the Ahom government (Pommaret 2000, p. 44).43 In his report on the 
relations between the British government and traditional polities in the region, the 
secretary to the Bengal government mentioned the Ahoms conceding rights to the 
Abors to wield power over the Miris of the plains (Mackenzie, 1884). Moreover, 
Abors successfully asserted their right over gold and fish extracted by the Miris from 
the Dihong river. Miris weren’t obliged to pay any form of revenue to the Ahom state 
despite dwelling in areas claimed by the latter (Mackenzie, 1884). These 
arrangements show the existence of a system of shared and competitive rule in the 
region. 
 
Furthermore, networks of tribute and trade have also historically defined peoples’ 
relations inhabiting these geographical spaces. As Schendel (1992, p. 105) observes 
in the case of Chittagong Hill tracts, the hill people had been involved in extensive 
networks “at least as long as states had been rising and falling in southeastern Bengal, 
Tripura and Arakan.” Far from being isolated from the rest of the region, these 
highlanders had continued contact with ‘outsiders’, and this interaction shaped their 
social and political institutions. The duaars in the Northeast region is one such 
                                                        
43 Historically dwelling on the foothills (duaars) of Bhutan, Bodos were traditionally engaged in the 




institution. Historically, Bhutan carried a substantial trade with its southern 
neighbours of Bengal and Assam through these institutions (Pommaret 2000, p. 30). 
Bhutan established political relations with the Cooch Behar royal family and the 
Ahoms in order to acquire and exchange goods. They frequenty held cotton, copper, 
spring salt and silk grand annual melas or haats (Pommaret 2000, p. 30). 
 
Duaars are a testament to the existence of complex relations between wet-rice 
cultivating Ahom/ Koch polities and swidden cultivators in the highlands such as the 
Nagas, Daflas, Abors and Bhutias. Duaar, literally means ‘door’ in Assamese and 
acted as conduit in the flow of people and goods between plains and highlands in the 
region. There were significant ties between the Ahoms and different Naga groups. 
For instance, the Ahoms and Nagas had an understanding of shared ownership of salt 
from brine spring located on the Naga hills (Baruah 1999, p. 31). Nagas also 
exchanged salt for other goods with plains people. There is evidence that the Bori 
Nagas often had internecine strife with the neighbouring Abors in order to control the 
access to the plains to trade with the Ahoms (Barpujari, 1970). As a prominent 
historian of the region HK Barpujari (1970, p. 14) puts it, “Trade had in fact so strong 
a hold amongst the Garos, the Khasis and the eastern Nagas, that the blockade of the 
duaars on the occasion of aggressions was speedily followed by surrender of 
offenders.” These duaars still witness the bi-annual ‘haats’ or market place where 
vegetables and cattle are bought and sold.44 
 
                                                        
44 Haats are an important institution of the local economy in the region. During my fieldwork in 
Assam, I visited the historic Beltola Haat, which has been a traditional trading point between plains 
people and inhabitants of the Khasi Hills (Sharma 2013, p. 8). Traditionally an Ahom protectorate 
under a Borphukan to manage relations with hill-dwellers, Beltola today has emerged as a major urban 
hub in the city (Ibid.). I spoke to a few Garo women traders who pointed out that the Beltola Haat has 
been popular with the locals because of its specialty in hill produce- fruits and vegetables- that aren’t 
available in other market places in the city.  
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The relations between valley polities and hill groups thus formed an important 
element of state formation in the region. Competing for control over trade routes and 
duaars formed a major preoccupation on both sides. What emerged therefore was a 
complex field where tribal organisations, chiefdoms, archaic states and larger state 
systems not only co-existed but also interacted and influenced each other (Sinha 
1987, p. xi). The field of power was defined by dynamics between primary states 
such as the Ahom polity and secondary state formations in the highlands (Wouters 
2012, p. 50). Secondary states were usually based on control of natural resources or 
trade routes. As Wouters notes, the Naga-owned salt wells and the practice of 
terraced wet-rice cultivation marked the presence of state-like structures among 
Angami Nagas (Wouters 2012, p. 50). Naga and Kuki groups often indulged in state-
like activities as warfare, levying tributes from neighbouring tribes and their own as 
well as employing labour. The booty from successful raids on foothills and plains 
often consisted of essential commodities such as grain, weapons, agricultural 
implements as well as manpower, enslaved in agriculture in the hills. Thus in contrast 
to Scott’s thesis, it may be argued that raids on plain polities were not a symbol of the 
self-imposed ‘barbarism’, rather these could be seen as akin to the state-practices of 
the valley polities.  
 
As Wouters (2012, p. 50) argues “the primary state [the Ahom in our case], appears 
to have been careful not to invoke the wrath of strong power centres in the hills.” 
This seems accurate in the Ahoms implicit recognition of the hill Abors’ suzerainty 
and from the intricate system of posa. It would thus be accurate to say that the Ahom 
state’s extraordinary resilience of over six centuries evolved through forging 
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imaginative relations with its neighbours that were institutionalized both at the 
official as well as at an everyday level. 
 
3.3.1 Continuities in state formation processes in early colonial period  
By the late 18th century, the Ahom dynasty was beginning to show cracks as a result 
of palace intrigues, rebellions and increasing strife with its neighbours (Gait, 1926). 
This paved the way for the Burmese invasion, which acted as a final assault on the 
Ahom kingdom and the latter virtually fell into the hands of the Burmese between 
1822–26.  Time and again, the Assam government dispatched embassies to establish 
and strengthen bonds with the British in order to arrest these hostilities. Taking 
advantage of the crises in the region, the British intervened and the Yandabo treaty of 
1826 marked the end of a brief but violent rule of the Burmese (Gait 1926, p. 288). 
Using the local rulers’ ineptitude to govern as a pretext, the colonizers finally 
annexed the Ahom, Cachar and Manipuri kingdoms. This was eventually followed 
with the subordination and ‘pacification’ of ‘turbulent’ hill groups and the 
institutionalization of the eastern frontier of the Empire.  
 
Scholarship on the region has stressed that colonial rule played an all-pervasive 
and decisive role in shaping its politics. A standard historiography on India’s 
Northeast usually marks three historically definitive periods namely, pre-colonial, 
colonial and postcolonial. For example, Baruah (1999, p. 21) articulates, “When the 
Ahom kingdom passed into the British hands, it was the first time in history that the 
Assamese heartland became politically incorporated into a pan-Indian imperial 
formation.” It has been argued that unlike the Ahoms, the British were determined to 
extend their dominion over the ‘frontier’ peoples (Luthra 1975, p. 1145). The period 
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from 1826 to 1858 has been argued to be a formative epoch in the history of Assam 
in that it not only marked the end of the independent powerful polity of over six 
centuries in the Brahmaputra valley, but that it also ushered in a new political and 
economic regime involving radical changes (Baruah, 1999; Misra, 1998; Nag, 1993).  
 
Literature on colonial Assam has emphasized the radical spatial and political 
transformation that the region went through due to British intervention. Scholars 
writing on the region often portray Richard Keating, the first commissioner of 
Assam, who assumed office in 1874, as an enthusiastic advocate of territorial 
expansion of the state into these hitherto unexplored areas (Kar 2011, p. 51). Sanjib 
Baruah (1999, p. 28) has argued that colonial policies actively constructed the 
geography of the region, in that “the landscape of the colonial world evolved as a tool 
of colonial domination.” This is illustrated with the case of the Inner line, a colonial 
administrative demarcation, whose purpose, it is argued, was to sever all links - 
physical, economic and socio-cultural - between the plains and the hills. The Bengal 
Frontier Regulation V of 1873 provided for the marking of an Inner Line along the 
foothills that restricted travel without a license. 45  The rationale behind 
institutionalizing a boundary line separating hills and plains, according to Baruah 
(1999, p. 28) were: one, the plains often provided revenue to these hill rulers and 
depriving them of the plains would make them dependent on the British; second hill 
dwellers were seen as primitive and a paternalistic colonial government deemed it 
necessary to protect them from the ‘advanced’ civilizations of the plains. 
 
                                                        
45Available at: 
<<http://www.mdoner.gov.in/sites/default/files/silo4_content/entry%20restrictions%20in%20NER/Be
ngal%20Eastern%20Frontier%20Regulation,%201873.pdf >>. Accessed on June 5th 2016. 
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While there is much truth to the observation that colonial intervention in the 
region, wittingly and/or unwittingly, instigated many profound changes, this thesis 
argues for a more layered understanding of what bearing this intervention actually 
had on the processes of polity and subject formation in the Northeast. The advent of 
the British administration in the Brahmaputra valley and the neighbouring highlands 
created a complex milieu where existing state practices were enmeshed with new 
changes in the spatial arrangements of the hill and valley inhabitants in a gradual, 
non-uniform manner. As new scholarship on the region (Cederlöf, 2014; Kar 2011) 
has also shown, until the early 20th century, British contact with this region did not 
radically alter relations between state and people nor did the former have immediate 
concerns about establishing complete political and territorial control, in the modern 
sense of the term.  
 
I draw this argument from Herbst’s (2014) provoking thesis about the influence 
of colonial rule on state formation processes on the African continent. As shown 
earlier in the chapter, he contends that like its predecessors, colonial regimes in 
Africa did not involve setting up heavy administrative infrastructure primarily due to 
its failure to physically broadcast the power of the central state apparatus to the 
rural/hinterland. Thus the scramble for Africa by no means yet was synonymous with 
administration.46 
 
It is possible to draw parallels between British colonial Africa and India’s 
Northeast, given comparable political topographies in both cases.  Similar to the 
                                                        
46 This is not to suggest that the long-term use of traditional authorities to administer colonial rule, did 
not loosen the bases of power of the local elites (Apter, 1963). Indeed, as the next chapter will 
demostarte, indirect rule in the Lushai Hills would instigate some profound changes in the way politics 
would be organised in the future. 
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African experience, the thesis argues that earlier British contact with the Northeast 
region, beginning in the late 18th century and early 19th century followed a set of 
policies which were not drastically different from that of the traditional political 
systems of the region. Under the East India Company, colonial intervention in the 
region was contingent on constant negotiations with different groups and polities. In 
contrast to existing narratives that assume the ideas and practices of colonial 
modernity automatically instigating a profound break from the past, it is more likely 
that control and authority was understood from a more pragmatic use of existing 
views on political topography of the region. The colonisers did not aim to establish 
absolute control over the highlands in Assam even in the later periods of rule, given 
the high costs that the region posed in establishing control through tools and 
mechanisms of the modern state. 
 
Earlier contacts with the region were mainly restricted to commercial interests 
of the British East India Company (EIC), who looked upon the region as a crucial 
entry point to Burma and the Chinese markets. The Company’s revenue surveys were 
the first large-scale bureaucratic exercise of controlling people and territory and 
began in 1790 (Cederlöf, 2014). But as Cederlöf (2014, p. 5) points out, on the 
ground it was struggling to cope with the difficult political topography that the region 
afforded to the administrators on the ground. Half a century later, the Company was 
burdened with a malfunctioning administration beset by challenges of heavy 
monsoon, shifting river courses, paddy fields turning into lakes and highly flexible 
livelihood strategies of people (Cederlöf 2014, p. 5). Thus high costs of 
admisnistration vis-à-vis relative ease of human travel posed similar challenges for 
the colonisers in the late 18th and early 19th centuries that its predecesors had faced. 
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Even when the EIC attempted to create some semblance of territorial ‘order’ in 
the early days, such exercises were beset with complications emerging from 
overlapping political regimes. One such example is the case when the Company 
agreed to arbitrate between the kingdoms of Tripura and Cachar with the market 
town of Hailakandi as bone of contention. Hailakandi was strategically located on the 
banks of Dalasuri, control of which would give access to the resource rich hills in the 
south (Fisher, 1840). Cachar claimed it as the southern part of its kingdom while 
Tripura claimed it as part of its northern territories. While the merchant official 
Fisher (1840, p. 815) observed that the town was part of Cachar, he also noted that 
the inhabitants, predominantly Kukis, owed their allegiance to the Tripuri king. It is 
apparent that Fisher failed to establish a boundary between the kingdoms because his 
idea of a boundary line was incompatible in a region characterised by shared 
sovereignties, absence of boundary lines and where boundary zones were products of 
tributes and negotiations between polities or groups. 
 
Recent studies in the cartography of the region reveal that the earliest maps 
commissioned by the EIC seemed to look like trails through blank spaces, intending 
to connect only those points with markets and wealth sources rather than establishing 
territories of a modern state (Zou and Kumar, 2011). The Company’s rule was 
marked by a number of points on the map, densely clustered along waterways and 
spread thinly over open spaces and forested areas (Cederlöf 2014, p. 37). Thus 
territorial control remained limited during the second half of 18th century as the 
Company was more focussed in controlling rivers and specific points of commercial 
interests. It is thus striking how the early colonial outlook in establishing dominance 
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was not very different from the ways in which traditional state systems understood 
political control in the region. 
 
3.3.2 19th century colonial footprint in the Northeast frontier 
At the end of the 18th century, British interests in the region east of Bengal were 
primarily hinged on commercial and security concerns (Ludden 2003, pp. 5-6). This 
strategically located region was important in so far as it acted as the location of 
important trading and commercial points. Even when Assam was officially annexed 
in 1826 after the Anglo Burmese wars, challenges of political topography, which 
involved difficult terrains and sparse population, dis-incentivised direct colonial 
intervention. As colonial records reveal,  
In spite of the great raised roadways, which history shows us had been constructed 
in different parts of the country, its communications generally were exceedingly 
bad, which state, in spite of our having made two so-called Trunk Roads both north 
and south of the Brahmaputra in 1854, may be said to still exist. In 1847 the first 
steamer service succeeded the laborious and slow boat journey, but for many years 
they only plied as far as Gauhati (Shakespeare 1914, p. 67). 
 
A key argument of this chapter is that the greater part of the 19th century saw the new 
rulers significantly adapting some of the existing state practices of the traditional 
polities. Territorial expansion was not seen as a priority in this region at the time of 
establishing control and hence a relationship of non-intervention, conciliation and use 
of local power structures and only in very extreme situations, punitive measures 
marked the colonial policy on the ground. The difficulty and the high costs of 
administering nomadic and semi-nomadic societies were thus evident in the policies 
pursued by the British, especially with regards to the hilly areas of the region. The 
putative aim of the British was far from annexing these areas or governing the 
populations therein; as will be shown below, some of these came under its effective 
 111 
control, other groups remained semi-independent, while a few were not only left 
entirely independent but were even awarded payments in order to prevent raids. 
 
In addition, high costs for administering made the colonial government 
unwilling to expend resources in the region. This was reflected in the light 
administrative footprint of the administration vis-à-vis the inhabitants in the 
Northeast. Relations between the ‘tribes’ and the government in the 19th century were 
managed almost exclusively by combination of a small cadre of political agents, a 
system of Government service through native militia and chiefs and the payment of 
allowances to guarantee good behaviour. As a colonial administrative officer noted at 
the time, control over the Assam valley up to Dibrugarh and some of the 
neighbouring hills was exercised through an Agent to the Governor-General with 
assistance from three military officers (Shakespeare 1914, p. 65). Agreements 
previously made between the Ahom kingdom and other groups were upheld to 
minimize direct governance. For example, the Moran and the Sadiya chiefs were left 
in charge of their areas in upper Assam in the first half of the 19th century 
(Shakespeare 1914, p. 65).  
 
More importantly, the new rulers continued some of the practices that were 
vital for maintaining relations between the Ahom government and its neighbours. 
Contrary to popular and scholarly assertions, colonial rule did not automatically 
rupture, rather only somewhat modified, the institutional arrangements that 
characterized the hill-plains relations prior to its occupation of the region. Like the 
traditional polities and the EIC, the colonial government too realised that regulation 
of these trade centres could ensure political control of the region.  The British 
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therefore attempted to maintain the commercial intercourse between hills and valleys’ 
dwellers by formalising the annual fairs on the foothills and border villages of 
Assam. The hill peoples were encouraged to bring timber and rubber to fairs 
organized at trade marts in Darrang, north Lakhimpur, Margherita and Udalguri. 
Sadiya was transformed into a travel centre for populations inhabiting in the 
highlands (Ray 1997, p. 228). Money was officially introduced in these exchanges 
and in time the government were able to control access to these trade centres to 
ensure compliance and peace from these groups.  Thus tribes that behaved in 
accordance to the colonial law were given access to these fairs and the 
uncompromising ones were forbidden from participating in them. 
 
The posa system was another such practice that marked early British relations 
with the region. The new rulers paid posa vis-à-vis groups such as the Abors, 
Mishmis and Daflas, inhabiting the areas along the Tibetan frontier (Luthra, 1971).  
Similarly, the British government had to buy out the claims on plain areas made by 
the Monpas of Tawang (now Arunachal Pradesh) by payment of an annual sum of 
Rs. 5000 (Luthra 1971, p. 1145). It also brought peace between rival clans of the 
Akas, the Kovatsun and the Kutsun, by granting annual payments of Rs. 536 and Rs. 
164 respectively (Luthra 1971, p. 1145). Even those groups that did not offer any 
major hostility were awarded the posa. The hill Miris, Apatanis, Taraons and Kamans 
belonged to this category.  
 
However, groups that were engaged in hostilities with the local populations or 
against the government were also dealt with force. Though the colonial rulers wanted 
minimum interference in the workings of these societies, encounter with these ‘wild 
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tribes’ earned the latter many a ‘pacification’ expedition as these attacks directly hurt 
British commercial interests in the valleys. 47  The Khamptis and Singphos in the 
Northeast and the Nagas and Kukis in the south were faced with punitive expeditions 
at different times during the 19th century (Shakespeare, 1914; Luthra, 1971).  
 
Thus, following in the footsteps of the Ahom and the Manipuri kingdoms, the 
British in the 19th century were more concerned in maintaining peace in the valley 
rather than extending absolute territorial dominion over the region.  The Ahom policy 
vis-à-vis its highland neighbours was directed to contain them in the hills and there 
was no question of occupying these hills. The British adopted a similar policy 
wherein non-intervention and conciliation underlined the new rulers’ attitude towards 
the region. Hence buying peace occupied a much higher priority than extending 
institutions of administration and governance. Contrary to popular assumptions, a 
more nuanced reading of history would reveal that the institutional grasp of the 
colonial government was rather weak and remained so till the end of 19th century.  
 
3.4 Separating the hills from plains: Assam during late 19th colonial rule 
In what appeared to be a break from the traditional non-territorial practices of state 
rule in the region, this section discusses the system of boundaries and buffer zones, 
introduced by the British since the late 19th century in the Northeast frontier. From 
the late 19th century, a number of regulations were effected in the region that actively 
sought to both administratively separate the province of Assam from rest of India and 
institutionalize varying types and degrees of ‘deregulated’ or ‘non-regulated’ rule in 
                                                        
47 Raids on British territory and counter ‘punitive expeditions’ by the government, in a way marked, 
the first direct point of contact between groups like Lushais and Angami Nagas and the colonial state. 
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hills and plains within the region.48 In effect this meant that laws that were otherwise 
applicable in rest of the country were not implemented or partially implemented in 
this region. For instance, under the first category, Assam was constituted as the 
‘Chief Commissioner’s province’, separate from the administration of Bengal 
followed by the Scheduled Districts Act 1874 which then put the province under a 
specialized non-regulated system of administration (Chaube 1999, p. 17). In practice, 
this Act coupled with the Extent of Local Laws Act (XV) enacted the same year, 
restricted the application of all-India acts and regulations in the ‘scheduled’ district of 
Assam (Chaube 1999, p. 17). In this period, there were other legislations such as the 
Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation of 1873 and the Assam Frontier Tracts 
Regulation of 1880 that separated, within the province, the two crucially linked 
topographies of hills and plains by restricting movement of people, regulating trade 
relations between them and by further de-enacting laws in hills and frontier areas 
otherwise applicable in other parts of the province (Chaube 1999, p. 18).  
 
The Regulation of 1873 provided for the drawing of an Inner Line along the 
foothills that separated some tracts, inhabited by tribes, from the districts of the 
Assam administration. In effect, it prohibited British subjects from entering without a 
license (sub-section 2) and tea planters from acquiring land beyond this demarcated 
line (sub-section 7).49 The regulation empowered “local government to prescribe a 
line to… constitute a definite boundary between the territory within which we are to 
exercise formal and plenary jurisdiction and that within which we are not to interfere 
                                                        
48 While many regions of colonial India were under British indirect rule wherein the colonial state used 
“exisiting political authorities as a means of governing” (Crowder, 1964), deregulated rule in the 
northeast region made it a special case within this regime of indirect rule wherein ordinary laws of the 
country were not implemented. 
49 For an erudite account of how the Inner Line provided a territorial frame to capital, see Bodhisattva 
Kar, ‘When was the Postcolonial? A History of Policing Impossible Lines’ in Baruah (Ed.) 2009, pp. 
49-77. 
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except politically” (Keatinge 1874, p. 15). In other words, the Inner Line represents 
the limit of ordinary administration.50 The line selected thus represented “the limits 
of Deputy Commissioner’s ordinary, as distinguished from his political jurisdiction”, 
and the limit beyond which no revenue was collected (Keatinge 1874, p. 15). 
 
3.5 Reasons for hardening of the hill-plains binary in the early 20th century 
Earlier in the chapter, I gave an account of issues of commerce and security that 
primarily drove early British interests in the province. In this section, I argue that 
these very concerns, rather than a strong desire to establish absolute political control, 
not only continued to shape colonial frontier policies in the 19th and early 20th century 
but also constituted a major reason for the growing rigidity of the oppositional binary 
of hills and plains. 
  
3.5.1 Commercial and revenue concerns 
The argument that the commercial expansion of tea plantations in the Assam valley 
necessitated regulating movement of people between hills and plains is not a novel 
one and has been explained by other scholars (Baruah, 2010a; Nag, 2002). As Baruah  
(2010b) notes, the Inner Line served the purpose of a “security parameter of the 
colonial agricultural frontier.” The discovery of tea and its commercial potential 
marked a new and aggressive economic phase in slopes of the hills,51 wherein “a 
madness comparable in intensity with that of the South Sea Bubble seized men’s 
minds, and normally level-headed financiers and speculators began to scramble 
wildly for tea shares and tea land” (cited in Baruah 1999, p. 45). The government also 
                                                        
50 North Eastern Frontier: Proposals for relaxation of control in the Frontier tracts- The Boundary 
North of Assam 1944, p. 1. 
51 Hill slopes were ideally suited for tea cultivation. 
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encouraged the expansion of the tea industry by offering land for cultivation on rather 
relaxed and favourable terms.52 Land speculation and expansion of tea plantations 
brought the British in direct clash with hill tribes who, in the words of a former 
Governor of colonial Assam, saw the new land-use as encroachments upon their 
hunting grounds (Reid 1893, pp. 6-7; 9).53 These raids became commonplace by mid- 
19th century and between 1826 and 1844, about 150 persons were killed in such raids 
(Nag 2002, p. 47).  
 
In order to put a stop to these violent episodes that could potentially threaten 
peace and stability in the region, the government stopped fresh grants of land to the 
planters. More importantly, the Inner Line was then used as demarcated boundary 
beyond which tea planters were not allowed to acquire land in the hills. The areas that 
were beyond the Line then became “territorial exterior of the theatre of capital” (Kar 
2009, p. 52). This was a compromise that the government had to reach in order to 
pacify the hill dwellers given that it had very little administrative or military grasp 
over these areas to quell episodes of violence and raids. The use of the Line to 
demarcate hills from valleys as an attempt to maintain stability in colonial Assam 
thus fits Herbst’s (2014) scheme where boundaries are enacted as means of control 
when physical reach of the state is minimal. 
 
The Chief Commissioner of Assam had observed about the Inner Line, that it 
represented not only the “the limits of Deputy Commissioner’s ordinary, as 
                                                        
52 Lands granted under the Wasteland Grant Rules of 1838 (also known as 99 Years’ Lease Rule) were 
either wholly or partly revenue free in perpetuity and the owners of these lands had permanent, 
heritable and transferable rights (Handique 2004, p. 40) 
53 Baruah (2007, pp. 83-97) gives a detailed account of the clash of resource use regimes in colonial 
Assam between the government and the population it was administering in the process of commercial 
production of tea in Assam. 
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distinguished from his political jurisdiction”, but also “limit beyond which no 
revenue was collected” (Keatinge 1874, p. 15). This boundary thus also served the 
purpose of identifying those areas that had low revenue prospects and hence high 
costs of setting up an administrative apparatus. The British had to deal with the 
challenges of generating revenue in the difficult political topography of this region. 
In 1928, the total annual deficit for hill administration was about Rs. 6.5 lakhs 
(Chaube 1999, p. 24).  In 1839 suggestions of converting the Naga Hills into a 
separate district was rejected on grounds that “the whole return would have been only 
Rs. 3,000 yearly, against an expenditure of over Rs. 16,000”.54 Similar considerations 
backed the government decision to attach both North and South Lushai Hills into the 
chief commissionership of Assam rather than as a separate unit (Reid, 1942b).  
 
Thus, challenges of revenue generation in the hill areas seemed to be a 
recurring theme in the administrative records as the costs of even the minimal 
presence of the government were producing large-scale deficits. Table 3. 1 showing a 
statement of revenue and expenditure of hill districts of Assam for the financial year 
1917-18 is a case in point.  
 
Table 3.1 Statement of Income and Expenditure of Hill districts in Assam 1917-18 
Name of District Receipts/ Income (Rs.) Net Expenditure (Rs.) 
Garo Hills 2,25,996 2,46,723 
Khasi and Jaintia Hills 3,53,869 10,23,643 
Lushai Hills 1,05,424 2,54,878 
Naga Hills 1,19,689 3,10,848 
North-East Frontier 58,369 4,84,030 
Source: Beaton 1918, p. 14.  
 
                                                        
54 Political proceedings on August 14th 1839. Cited in Mackenzie 1884, p. 105. 
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This concern inevitably found its way in the debate on whether these areas 
should be entirely excluded in the wider colonial governance reform processes 
beginning from 1919. Over the next two decades, this debate sharpened the focus on 
whether these hill and frontier tracts should at all be attached to the province of 
Assam owing to the fact that “these hills are to a considerable extent financed from 
the plains…and the remainder of the province is too small to carry the elaborate 
constitutional superstructure which we have proposed in the case of other provinces” 
(Reid 1942b, p. 2). Furthermore, as the team advising the Government on the 
question of including Assam in the reforms of 1919 observed, the gross revenue of 
the province inclusive of the hills and plains was “only 171 lakhs as compared with 
404 lakhs in Bihar and Orissa, which has the next lowest revenue, and the surplus 
revenue available…would be only three lakhs.” 55  Thus, the high costs of 
administering the province seem to be a crucial element in the government’s decision 
to treat the hills separately from the plains of Assam, thereby sharpening the hills-
plains divide. 
 
3.5.2 Northeast frontier and the geopolitics of the region 
The second reason why the Inner line contributed to making the hill-plains binary 
more rigid is the changing geopolitical situation in the eastern frontier of British 
India. Very few attempts have been made to situate the question of boundary–making 
in the Northeast in a larger geopolitical context involving rival British and French 
colonial powers and the rising political clout of China (exceptions are: Guyot-
Réchard, 2017; Phanjoubam, 2016; Lintner, 2012). Through the 18th and 19th century, 
as British power in India expanded, it faced Russia as a major political force in the 
                                                        
55 Government of India’s 9th Despatch on Indian Constitutional Reforms on Assam and Backward 
Tracts, 1917, p. 1. 
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western frontier of its Empire. They aimed to keep the Russians away from the plains 
of India and hence their attention was directed on the border with Afghanistan, 
beyond which the British believed lay the Russian threat.  
 
In the 19th century, British frontier policy in the Indian subcontinent was driven either 
by what were known as the forward school or the moderate school, varying on the 
attitude of policy makers in London and India. The forward school proposed that 
Britain advance to meet a threat directly and as far from the plains as possible while 
the moderate position held that the limits of British power should be set where they 
could more easily be supported. The latter view hinged on the issue of high costs of 
penetrating (and hence administering) the remote and difficult geography that marked 
the frontier regions (Maxwell 1970, p. 20). While its frontier policy oscillated 
between these two schools, a core idea of this policy, as articulated by Lord Curzon 
(1907, pp. 30-31), was the creation of a buffer state understood by the government as 
“the country possessing a national existence of its own, which is fortified by the 
territorial and political guarantee, either of the two Powers between whose dominions 
it lies and by whom it would otherwise inevitably be crushed, or of a number of great 
Powers interested in the preservation of the status quo.”  
 
In this context, Persia was constituted as a buffer state by guaranteeing its 
“integrity and independence… by the two great contracting parties” while the Durand 
Line agreed upon at Kabul in 1893, and which separated tribes under British and 
those under Afghan influence, became the “frontier of active responsibility” as long 
as Afghanistan retained an independent existence (Curzon 1907, pp. 30-31). In 
practice, this boundary did not entail an effective or absolute control over many of 
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these tribes, as British jurisdiction and penetration was kept minimal in these areas; 
but what it did mean was that they were on the British side of the dividing line and 
hence could not be tampered with by an external Power (Curzon 1907, p. 40). The 
result was that it gave Britain not a single or double but a threefold frontier in the 
northwest, 
1) The administrative border of British India 
2) The Durand Line, or frontier of active protection 
3) Afghanistan’s international border with Russia, which is the outer or advanced 
strategic Frontier 
 
In the same period when the government was so deeply occupied with the 
northwestern frontier, officials in Burma found it impossible to direct the state’s 
attention to the Northeastern frontier (Christian 1941, p. 277), even when the French, 
another colonial power, was steadily expanding its sphere of influence in Southeast 
Asia. Hard pressed on the mainland of India, the French had developed commercial 
interest with Burma and Siam (present-day Thailand) by the end of 17th century. In 
1858 the French had seized Saigon and in a decade Siam was forced to recognize 
French control over Cambodia. During his short tenure (1869-73) as the viceroy in 
the second half of the 19th century, Lord Mayo stated,  
The future annexation of Burma, or any of its adjacent states, is not an event which 
I…desire; … I should view with extreme regret…the necessity of occupation, or of 
assuming, even in a temporary manner, the government of any of the states lying 
adjacent to the province now in your charge (cited in Hall 1932, p. xv). 
 
The maximum that they did was to send to the native states in Southeast Asia a 
number of embassies with the objective of inquiring into the extent of French 
influence in those states (Christian 1941, p. 273). Low priority in the region 
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continued even as the fear of British commercial interests that the French would 
entirely absorb the markets of Yunnan and the neighbouring areas forced Britain to 
reopen trade routes in the region in 1875.  
 
British concerns on its Northeastern frontier however changed drastically with 
the French involvement in Upper Burma, which culminated in the Franco-Burmese 
treaty in 1885. At the time, it was believed that control over the river systems – that 
of the Irrawaddy, Salween, Menam and Mekong - in the region would provide 
shortcuts to China, which was considered ‘the greatest market in the world’ at the 
time (Christian 1941, p. 281; Jeshurun 1970, p. 108). The British saw this treaty as a 
direct threat to its own commercial interests and it became the principal reason for the 
annexation of Burma in 1886. Sudden escalation of Anglo-French rivalry in the 
region and the successive absorption of different portions of Burma 56  had now 
opened the British to a whole new frontier (Curzon 1907, p. 39). It was in this context 
that the British decided to create a multi-buffered system similar to that existing on 
the northwestern frontier. The first layer included areas between the Inner and the 
Outer Line, followed by the State of Burma which had been incorporated into British 
India. The final buffer zone consisted of the protectorate of Shan States57 which fell 
under the Burmese rule between 16th -19th century and were transferred to the British 
in 1888; and the state of Siam58 beyond which marked the French sphere of interest 
of Indo-China and Yunnan.  
 
                                                        
56 British annexation of Assam and Burma took place through three Anglo-Burmese Wars between 
1824-1885. 
57 These were ruled by Shan hereditary chiefs and remained autonomous as a British protectorate 
(Jirattikorn 2008, p. 6) 
58 The Anglo-French Declaration reached in 1896 ensured that both imperial powers would observe a 
mutually agreed upon limit on the extent to which they could encroach upon Siamese territory while 
guaranteeing Siam’s sovereignty over a restricted territory (Jeshurun 1970, p. 106) 
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Another front in which the government’s concerns were being raised was the 
purported advance of the Chinese in east and southeast Tibet, in the neighbourhood 
of the Northeast frontier. C.A Bell (1940, pp. 1-2), the Political Officer at Sikkim, 
wrote to the Foreign Department suggesting the formation of a buffer state between 
Tibet and India.  
 
China is growing stronger everywhere including Tibet and that we have had ample 
evidence of her attempts to intrigue in Nepal and Bhutan… we should take steps to 
prevent these territories [between Tibet and Assam comprising of groups such as the 
Akas, Daflas, Apa Tanangs, Miris, Abors, Mishmis, Khamtis and Singphos; now 
Arunachal Pradesh] coming under the power of China, more especially as they border 
on the fertile rice-fields and tea gardens of Assam, a hitherto backward province.  
 
His diagnosis of the imminent Chinese threat was a result of the fact that the British 
had no effective control over this piece of territory between Tibet and Assam: “I do 
not find that we have any effective treaty rights over the foreign relations of these 
tribes. We have frequently punished their raids, but we do not seem to have made 
them our feudatories” (1940, p. 3). These concerns prompted the government to note 
that “continued Chinese advance in these regions was causing the anxiety locally and 
that in the opinion of the military authorities the existing position was strategically 
unsound” (1940, p. 3). Consequently, a ‘buffer’ zone was created by means of 
extending the ‘outer’ line into the region of tribal territory beyond the existing 
frontier.59  
 
This episode clearly reveals how the British used boundaries to create buffer 
zones in areas where its effective control was weak or negligent, thereby further 
validating Herbst’s (2014) thesis of boundaries as means of control. Similar to the 
northwestern frontier, the British created a three-fold frontier of which the Inner and 
                                                        
59 It may be noted that this boundary is approximately the same as that agreed upon with the Tibetan 
Convention of 1913. 
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the Outer Line constituted important demarcations. Historian Alastair Lamb (1966, p. 
313) put it correctly, “The Inner Line was not the international boundary of the India 
Empire; it was a device to create a buffer zone, as it were, between the international 
boundary and regularly administered territory, a tract which marked the transition 
between tribal hills and the Assamese plains.” 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how political topography played a crucial role in shaping 
relations between polities and populations, spanning from traditional states to the 
modern colonial one. The most crucial insight of this chapter is that control over 
people not territory was the most important form of rule, a feature that seem to have 
continued in the early colonial period, albeit in modified forms. Traditional state 
practices such as the paik and the posa system continued to underline the relations 
between subsequent states and people and among groups. More crucially, the inter-
dependence of the two connected topographies i.e. the hills and the plains continued 
to inform state practices in the region. The chapter marshalled evidence from archival 
and secondary sources to suggest that contact with British colonialism did not lead to 
immediate or drastic rupture in the existing practices of rule and control in the region. 
This is not to say that colonial annexation of the region did not activate far-reaching 
changes eventually. Even with a superficial control over the frontier region, British 
rule initiated profound changes in the social, economic and political processes in the 
region. The most important among these changes, particularly in the region now 
known as Mizoram, was the gradual institutionalization of territorial states with 
marked physical boundaries, a feature that has captured the imagination of myriad 
political entrepreneurs in the region after independence. 
 124 
 
The second half of the chapter brought to bear a sharper focus on the changing 
hill-plains relations in Assam, starting from the late 19th century. This, as the chapter 
argues, was in the continued commercial and strategic interests of the colonial 
masters in a difficult political topography, as opposed to some concerted desire on the 
latter’s part to establish absolute control in the region. As the next chapter will 
demonstrate, there were two important implications of these developments, discussed 
particularly in the context of the Lushai Hills. One, production of boundaries and 
frontiers permanently affected the socio-spatial relations in the region and led to 
newer ways in which people in hills began to imagine their relations with land and 
other groups. The construction of social categories like ‘hill tribes’ and spatial 
categories such as excluded areas/ backward tracts, that emerged from compulsions 
of indirect rule, contributed significantly in the manufacturing of a large reservoir of 
cultural imaginaires (Mbembe 2003, pp. 25-26). As the next chapter will bear out, the 
most significant feature of the indirect rule regime was that it territorialized groups to 
specific locations. This legacy continued in post-independence Assam in that 
autonomous councils within the Sixth Schedule were made territorial because the 
hills and frontier tracts had been divided into areas inhabited by neat categories of 
single tribes. Second, given the colonial discourse of India as a hierarchical 
civilization, it was a daunting task for the state whether to locate these diverse people 
inside or outside the ‘racial’ unity/ caste society of India. The administrative binaries 
of hills/plains more or less coincided with a legal distinction made between ‘tribal’ 
people that were governed by customary law and other colonial subjects governed by 
general law. This perhaps informed the view that while ‘hill tribes’ had to be 
protected from the plains peoples, the ‘plains tribes’, owing to their proximity to non-
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tribal Hindus would eventually assimilate into the Assamese fold. The next chapter 
argues that this distinction would inform claims of many ethnic activists in the hills 
of Northeast India.  
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Chapter 4 Territorialized identity and autonomy in the hills of 
Northeast: The Mizos 
 
4.1 Introduction 
‘Tribal’ identity rests at the heart of modern political subjectivities in Northeast India, 
and has had a significantly high political purchase in the hills around which identity 
politics came to be organized at the time of independence. Political movements based 
on tribal identity have become commonplace in Assam valley too, as is evident from 
the Bodo movement, but articulation of tribal identities has historically varied in the 
two topographies since independence. While both Mizos and Bodos claim tribal 
identity, the former articulated it in territorial terms from the time when constitutional 
negotiations were taking place in the 1940s. On the contrary as chapter 6 will show, 
for Bodos, who have historically resided in the Assam valley, an identity based on 
culture and language remained a vehicle for political mobilization for a dominant part 
of the movement.60 The question therefore to ask is, why and how Mizos and Bodos 
in the Northeast, despite their official categorization by the post-independence Indian 
state as Scheduled Tribes, nevertheless mobilized two different types of tribal 
identities, one based on territory and the other on culture and language only. This 
chapter examines the historical processes that allowed for territorial identities to 
emerge in the Mizo hills. 
 
The preceding chapter gave an overview of traditional state formation practices 
that were historically prevalent in India’s Northeast. The chapter demonstrated that 
                                                        
60  Bodos of course go on to mobilize a territorial identity, but much later in the course of the 
movement primarily due to intra-group rivalry and other factors. I discuss this in Chapter 7 and 
attribute this as one of the causes for the continuaton of the Bodo conflict. 
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traditional state practices began to unravel from the late 19th century onwards due to 
putative aims of the colonial state to maintain political influence through a system of 
boundaries and indirect rule. This chapter gives a detailed account of the form of 
indirect rule that the British in the Lushai Hills - later called the Mizo Hills - and the 
implications it had for issues of identity formation and social relations therein. One of 
the major changes that may be attributed to British administration in the Lushai Hills 
was the regulation of movement for these hitherto semi-nomadic groups. These 
groups were made to settle in particular spaces, which were then converted to places 
with names derived from a dominant group. This facilitated the formation of 
territorialized identities; and given the hilly terrain, it formalized the relatively neat 
group settlement patterns in the hills.  
 
Second, while the colonial administration maintained indirect political 
relations with the hills, the role of the Christian Missionaries in the hill socities was 
one of direct intervention. The Lushail Hills, often at the displeasure of the colonial 
officers, witnessed some profound social changes as a result of proselytization 
activities. Most significantly, it manifested in the loosening of traditional hold of 
power and the creation of a section of modern elite that challenged the chieftain 
system. This Christian, English-educated elite would then be instrumental in shaping 
the trajectory of Mizo politics in the period immediately before independence and 
thereafter. This analysis follows the idea that processes of subject formation are at 
once embedded in local geographies and state structures and are also restructuring 
them (Shneiderman and Tillin, 2015). As the chapter will show, processes of state 
restructuring that the region underwent starting from late 19th century directly 
affected the emergence of territorialized identities in the Lushai Hills. This 
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restructuring, as chapter 3 has shown was taking place in the form of an increasingly 
rigid separation of the hills from the plains of Assam.  
 
The second half of this chapter then deals with the ways in which the crucial 
shift in the hills-plains relations were manifesting and its implications for post-
colonial federal institutions in the hills. It will be demonstrated that the colonial 
lexicon used to justify this geographical separation since the late 19th century, was 
couched in a language of ‘civilizational’ difference between inhabitants of the hills 
and the plains of Assam, informed as they were by colonial anthropology and mission 
activities.61 While reports of the External Affairs or the Political departments of the 
colonial government discussed matters of geopolitical and revenue concerns, 
provincial officials since the late 19th century predominantly used the language 
available to them, shaped by colonial anthropology, to weigh in on the question of 
why the hills had to be separated from the plains. The developments over the last 
decade of the 19th century and early decades of the 20th century thus emerge as key 
moments in shaping the constitutional negotiations deciding the fate of these groups 
and the region. As the last section discusses, this is reflected in the special form of 
territorial group rights mandated in the hill regions of Northeast after independence. 
 
4.2 Formation of territorial identities and new class of elite: Lushai (Mizos) hills 
4.2.1 Territorial identities 
Present day Mizoram comprises of numerous groups, belonging to the cognate 
category of Kuki-Chins, who came to settle in the region in successive waves of 
                                                        
61 Here, I draw on Skinner’s (2002) contextualist methodology, which argues that political texts can be 
understood only by locating them within their intellectual context. I show that the British 
administrators used a vocabulary embedded in colonial ethnology to justify the need for separating the 
hills aform the plains. A similar method was used by Travers (2007) to argue how colonial masters in 
18th century Bengal deployed particular concepts to explain their actions. 
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migration from further east, beginning from about the 15th century (Choudhury 2013, 
p. 7). The groups settled in the northern Mizo Hills (or North Lushai Hills as the 
British initially named it) include the ‘Old Kukis’ comprising of clans like Hmars, 
Baites and Raltes, who were followed by stronger ‘New Kukis’ such as the Thadou 
and Lushei clans (Hassan 2007, p. 81). Old Kuki clans have been historically pushed 
northward by the latter such that at the time of colonial contact with the region, clans 
like Hmars were spread across present day north Mizoram, Manipur and North 
Cachar Hills in Assam; Thadaos settled in Mizoram and Manipur, and Lushais 
occupied central regions of present day Mizoram (Hassan 2007, p. 81). These were 
followed by other groups such as the Lais and Maras who settled in what came to be 
known as the South Lushai Hills. The Lais (earlier known as Pawis) were known to 
extend their rule by continuously raiding Lushai villages, and the latter had moved 
westward, while the Lais populated the southeastern parts bordering Burma (Doungel 
2010, p. 16).62  
 
As in many highland societies, these clans also preferred settlements on hilltops 
and slopes. These settlement patterns were affected both by topography and inter-clan 
dynamics.  High degree of slope and rugged topography of the hills or the 
“recalcitrant landscape” as Scott (2009, p. 1) terms it, played an important role in the 
relatively dispersed and isolated settlement patterns of these clans. Furthermore, hill 
settlement allowed for better defense organization, given inter-clan warfare formed 
an important basis for polity formation. By early 19th century, the Sailos within 
Lushai clans began to wrest control in the central and northern hills (McCall 1949, p. 
35). As Hassan (2007, p. 82) notes, the development of a somewhat supra-local 
                                                        
62 While Lais and Lushais had continued raiding each other, they were known to have come to some 
form of understanding by late 19th century where they not only agreed not to raid, but also to exchange 
gifts, agricultural seeds and inter-marry (Doungel 2010, p. 16). 
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authority was perhaps due to the hierarchical nature of Sailo chieftainship. Even as 
villages remained as relatively autonomous units, a collection of village chiefs owed 
some form of allegiance to a more powerful chief, if one so emerged (Hassan 2007, 
p. 82).  
 
Lushai ‘raids’ in the plain areas of Cachar in Assam became more 
commonplace in the second half of the 19th century. Colonial administrative reports 
are replete with detailed documentation of such incidents. For instance, a military 
officer in the late nineteenth century reported, “Since the days of Warren Hastings the 
various tribes whom we now include in this term (Lushais) have, at long and 
uncertain intervals, reminded us of their presence in a manner not calculated to 
inspire mutual regard or confidence” (Reid 1893, pp. 6-7). Though the first recorded 
incident was as early as in 1777, 63  these became frequent only in the mid-19th 
century, mostly targeting British tea plantations as the Lushais saw in the new land-
use “possible encroachments upon their hereditary hunting grounds” (Reid 1893, p. 
9).64 The Bengal government wanted to send an expedition against these ‘outrages’, 
but the Cachar authorities preferred negotiations and even tried to convince some 
Lushai chiefs that tea plantations would be beneficial for them (Nag 2008, p. 14).65 
 
The British finally annexed these hills in what was called the ‘Chin-Lushai 
Expedition’ of 1889-90, under the pretext of preventing further raids on British 
                                                        
63 When the Nawab of Bengal ceded Chittagong to the East India Company in 1760, the latter came in 
contact with groups like Chakmas, Tipperahs and even Lushais in the forested hill tracts adjacent to it 
(Nag 2008, p. 13). 
64 Baruah gives a detailed account of the clash of resource use regimes in colonial Assam between the 
government and the population it was administering in the process of commercial production of tea in 
Assam (Baruah, 2007). 
65 These overtures failed to convince the Lushais who saw these expansions as a prelude to the 
eventual conquest of the hills. The move by the Government of Bengal to raise small militia 
comprising of Kuki as a counter to Lushais further resulted into suspicion and eventually culminated in 
a series of raids in Cachar, Manipur and Tripura between 1860-69 by the latter (Nag 2008, p. 15).  
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territory.66 The expedition involved two columns- north and south- and thus led to the 
creation of two districts of northern and southern Lushai Hills, with the former 
included in Assam and the latter in the province of Bengal. The success of the 
military operation triggered a debate on the nature of control that could be both 
politically expedient and fiscally prudent in an unforgiving, sparsely populated 
terrain (Nag, 2008). While local political agents preferred ‘humanizing’ efforts by 
spreading education and trade networks, higher echelons of authority believed that 
complete subjugation of the hill populations might be necessary to maintain peace 
(Nag 2008, p. 17). A middle ground was however reached with a policy of non-
interference in the internal affairs coupled with aggressive vigil of these tribes along 
the frontiers (Nag 2008, p. 17).  
 
The form of indirect rule that was created in the Lushai Hills seems closer to 
what Naseemullah and Staniland (2016, p. 17) categorize as hybrid governance 
wherein “intervention is often codified in explicit and exceptional legal frameworks 
that differ both from the laws and customary practices of suzerain states and the 
orthodox civil and criminal codes of the state.” The ‘exceptional’ legal system in the 
Lushai Hills allowed tinkering with the territorial organisation of the region but 
discouraged direct intervention in social relations and hierarchy structures of these 
hill societies. At the same time, as the following sections will show, even indirect 
rule had some major implications for the social fabric of the Lushai Hills. Annexation 
                                                        
66 After it was discovered that it was the only piece of territory between the Chittagong Hill tracts and 
upper Burma that was not under British control, the decision to annex these hills was seen as logical. 
Moreover, recurring episodes of famine in the hill tracts, caused due to the periodic blooming of 
Bamboo flower, debilitated resistance efforts of the Lushais to colonial expansion. The famine of 
1881-82 wiped out about 15,000 people (Nag 2008, p.13). The same phenomenon few decades after 
independence would become the proximate cause for Mizo insurgency in 1966.  
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of these hills facilitated processes that would change how power and identity came to 
be organized in the Mizo (Lushai) hills after independence.  
 
In a manner similar to British colonies of Africa (Crowder, 1964), here too, 
indirect rule meant dependence on the existing power structures and institutions. One 
of the major changes that may be attributed to British intervention in the hills was the 
eventual transformation of a largely non-territorial polity into one organized around 
territory with fixed boundaries. 67   These boundaries began to take root with the 
colonial government’s effort to demarcate administrative units in the hills from that 
of the Assam plains for the reasons explained in the previous chapter. First, both 
North and South Lushai hill districts were attached to the province of Assam in 1898 
and then separated from its plain areas by the Inner Line Regulation. Using 
topographical features, boundaries were irrevocably drawn to create an administrative 
unit and for the first time, this territory was officially named Lushai Hills. The logic 
in its naming was the understanding that the land was under one ethnic group called 
Lushais. 68 
 
By 1893, as military officer A. S. Reid (1942a, p. 4) wrote, the boundaries of the 
Lushai Hills had been fixed, “[t]he Chin-Lushai country is said to extend generally 
between latitudes 21° and 24° north, and longitudes 92° and 94° east; to be bounded 
on the north by Manipur and Cachar, on the east and south by Burma, and on the 
west by Arakan and Chittagong Hill Tracts, being some two hundred and sixty miles 
in length, with a maximum breadth of about one hundred and twenty.” Again, river 
                                                        
67 This process began with major topographical surveys of about 6500 sq. miles of hitherto unknown 
and difficult terrain in the hill tracts (Pachuau 2014, p. 92). 
68 The process of doing so was however quite arbitrary, since areas in the south of this territory, 
predominantly under non- Lushias such as Pawis and Lakhers, were also included in the Lushai Hills, 
while those areas in present-day Tripura, that also predominantly had Lushai population, were not.   
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Kolodyne was taken as a ‘natural’ demarcation between Lushais and Chins, and the 
latter ended up becoming part of Burma, as the administration felt that the Chins had 
nothing in common with the Lushais and their “historical connection, tribal 
sympathies and practical interests” were with Burma (Barpujari 1981, p. 90).69 The 
project of fixing people and their identities to a territory was useful and expedient for 
administrative records in colonial Assam.70 
 
Second, though existing institutions of organizing power and society were to be 
upheld with little intervention, significant changes were affected by the 
reorganization of the existing political system of chieftainship on the basis of fixed 
territory, thus marking a clear departure from the traditional system. In 1901-02, the 
Superintendent introduced measures of land settlement in the district. Each chief was 
issued a lease of land (Ramri lehkha in Mizo) for life thereby facilitating stabilized 
village boundaries for the first time. As the government official in charge of the 
Lushai Hills wrote,  “Having ascertained what claims exist to the land within some 
natural boundaries, I cause a draft settlement to be drawn up dividing the whole area 
among the chiefs…Each chief is given two or more contiguous village sites and well-
defined natural boundaries” (emphasis added) (Reid 1942a, p. 39). The idea of 
‘contiguous’ territorial units with ‘well-defined’ boundaries was a clear departure 
from the traditional way of organizing these semi-nomadic societies based on 
movement and overlapping shared rule. Notions of fixed geographical space 
populated by a single group were rooted in concepts of nation and nation-state in the 
                                                        
69 As will be shown later in the chapter, this view would be challenged in the official circuits by 
officers such as Reid the idea that inhabitants of Lushai Hills have a stronger affinity with Burma than 
India. 
70 This emerged as a contentious issue when Mizo-Kuki- Chin groups began making irredentist claims 
in the 1970s for a greater Mizo or Zomi land including areas from India, Burma and Bangladesh. I 
discuss this further in chapter 5. 
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historical context of Europe. What this really did was to formalize an already isolated 
pattern of settlements that existed in the hills. In the traditional set-up, even though a 
cluster of villages was known after a ruling clan, identities of people were not linked 
inextricably to the name of the village. Colonial intervention changed that and 
facilitated processes that not only created ‘places’ but also ended up fixing people to 
these places, thereby formalizing a relatively neat settlement pattern in the hills.  
 
‘Territorializing’ groups not only marked a fundamental change in the land-
holding system but also the power structure in the Lushai Hills. In letter, the colonial 
administration was wary that any attempts to undermine the traditional authority 
structure could cause instability and jeopardize law and order in a region that was 
increasingly becoming geopolitically sensitive from the late 19th century.   In the 
words of Mr. Davies (cited in Reid 1942a, p. 41), outgoing official in charge of the 
Lushai Hills while advising his successor in late 19th century,  
I always held the Chiefs of villages responsible for the behaviours of their people and 
upheld their authority to the best of my ability…this policy will be consistently 
followed, and that, as long as they behave themselves as they should, their orders will 
not be interfered with, even though the orders may appear to us at times a little high-
handed, and not quite in accord with the abstract ideas of justice. 
 
It was in the utmost interest of the administration to uphold the traditional power 
structure.  As Davies emphasized in the same note,  
any course of action which tends to discourage litigation amongst a people like the 
Lushais is worth persisting in or they would soon become like the Kukis, in the Naga 
Hills, who, having been, by neglect on our part, practically emancipated from the 
control of their hereditary chiefs, are the most litigious tribe in that district (Reid 
1942a, p. 41). 
 
Though chieftaincy was recognized as the legitimate local authority, British colonial 
intervention was gradually doing away with some of the traditional rights and 
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privileges of chiefs, by restricting their territorial mobility and criminalizing 
headhunting. As Hassan (2009, p. 213) has argued “Colonial state-building policies, 
thus, built on the pre-existing state-like tendencies of the Sailo chiefs to consolidate 
the authority of the state by penetrating society…and by successfully becoming the 
main provider of rule systems for people.” Furthermore, a new office, that of the 
Circle Interpreter was created as a liaison between the traditional and the colonial 
authorities (Pachuau 2014, p. 96). The Circle Interpreter’s office was a salaried 
government position and was responsible for creating a nascent middle class distinct 
from the traditional elites. As the next section discusses, this neo-elite backed by 
missionaries would go on to threaten the traditional power structures in the Lushai 
Hills. There were concerns that Interpreters were using the Circle System to their 
own advantage, as a government official noted, “it is necessary to maintain vigilance 
so that the (Circle) Interpreters do not usurp the positions of the Chiefs” (Reid 1942a, 
p. 44). They had to be removed from their respective locations in the hills and posted 
at Aizawl so that they could be held in check directly by the local administration 
(Reid 1942a, p. 44).  
 
Thus indirect intervention as a form of maintaining colonial rule in the Lushai 
Hills eventually facilitated processes that would weaken the hold of traditional 
system of chieftainship. At the same time that these changes were taking root, the 
traditional rulers would receive a more direct blow from the proselytization activities 
of the Missions. As the next section will demonstrate, this would not only pose a 
serious challenge to the Bawi system, a central principle of organizing this highland 
society so far, but the gradual spread of modern education and Christianity would 
also give rise to a nascent elite who would question the authority of the chiefs. 
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4.2.2 Proselytization, class of new elite and construction of an inclusive Mizo identity 
Interestingly, the first major challenge to the status quo came not from the hill 
dwellers themselves, but from a section of Christian Missionaries in the Lushai Hills, 
who demanded abolition of the Bawi system. Missionaries were first invited to the 
hills by the local government when a series of violent expeditions had failed to yield 
the desired results of ‘pacification’. The Lushai Hills had been formally adopted as 
part of the Mission Field of the Presbyterian Church of Wales in 1892, about the 
same time the hills were being brought under political control (Morris 1930, p. 80). 
Naturally, efforts of proselytization were met with sharp opposition by two groups of 
the traditional structure that stood to lose from these developments i.e. chiefs and 
traditional priests. For the chiefs, conversion of bawis directly affected the social 
structure on which their authority rested; the chieftainship was hostile to the 
possibility of drastic changes that proselytization and hence freedom of bawis would 
entail for such hill polities crucially dependent on their labour. Dr. Fraser (1913, p. 
60) from the Presbyterian Mission concluded that the bawis represented a system of 
slavery and exhorted in his note to other Missionaries,  
As to the present system of slavery in Lushai I cannot help feeling that the only 
remedy for the evils of the present system is to proclaim deliverance to the captives by 
the government, announcing to the chiefs, their slaves and the people of Lushai the 
right to freedom which every British subject possesses.  
 
On the other hand, the position of the local officials differed,  
And when we come to examine this iniquitous so called slavery, what do we find? 
We do not see men caught and chained or sold in the market place, but men who 
are in despair as to a means of livelihood, putting themselves voluntarily under 
contract to work for a chief. It is not a final contract…if a man wished to be 
independent again, he could do so, I understand by paying Rs 40 (cited in Fraser 




The concerns of the administration regarding this issue becomes stark from the 
following excerpt, extracted from a correspondence between a local official and a 
Pastor in the Lushai Hills: 
 
I am responsible for the peace and tranquility of the district and in my opinion Dr. 
Fraser’s attitude of pronounced hostility against certain Lushai customs constitutes 
a serious risk to the public and may lead to grave consequences. It is therefore 
incumbent on me to receive satisfactory assurance that Dr. Fraser will avoid on his 
part and discountenance on the part of others over whom he may have control 
either direct or indirect any action which may be opposed to the established custom 
and policy (cited in Nag 2016, p. 108). 
 
Even as the debate on abolition of the Bawi system created many a moment of 
friction between the government and the missionaries, missions continued 
proselytizing activities that eventually contributed to a major transformation in the 
Lushai hills. In 1897-98 missionaries under the newly named Welsh Calvinistic 
Methodists Foreign Missionary Society compiled a Lushai primer in Roman script 
thereby formalizing the status of the Lushai dialect, Duhlian, as a lingua franca 
among majority of the groups in the hill district. Despite these services, the 
proselytization efforts of the two major denominations (Welsh Missionary and 
Baptist Missionary in North and South Lushia Hills respectively) yielded minimal 
results initially. The Census of 1901 showed only 45 Christians (0.05 per cent) out of 
82,436 persons, which increased to only about 2.69 per cent by the next decade. 
 
This however changed with the famine of 1910-11 and relief work by 
missionaries helped establish penetration in the Lushai Hills (Nag, 2008). Relief 
efforts during subsequent famines coupled with Revival waves 71  in the region 
accelerated the conversion rates so much so that by 1931, 47.52 per cent of the 
                                                        
71  ‘Revivalism’ is increased or renewed spiritual interest in Church congregations and activities, 
usually following a decline. Mission activities of the Welsh Presbyterian Church in the Lushai Hills, 
following on the footsteps of Welsh revivalism (1904-05) proselytized under these revival waves. 
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population of the Lushai Hills declared themselves Christians. In 1930, 257 churches 
had been formed in the Lushai Hills and 289 preaching stations opened; 13 native 
ministers ordained and 47 evangelists licensed and over half the population (38,550) 
had become adherents of the Christian faith (See Table 4.1) (Morris 1930, p. 86). 
 
Table 4. 1 Rise in Percentage of Christian population in the Lushai (Mizo) hills 1901-51 
Year Total Population Christians Percentage (%) 
1901 82,434 45 0.05 
1911 91,204 2,461 2.70 
1921 98,406 27,720 28.17 
1931 1,24,404 59,123 47.52 








Source: <<http://blog.cpsindia.org/2016/08/religion-data-of-census-2011-xxviii.html>>. Accessed on 
September 13th 2015. 
 
 
Evidently, the ruling Sailo and Lushai clans did not accept these rapid changes 
meekly and these developments were meted out with active resistance. Missionary 
reports of the time, though difficult to corroborate factually, nevertheless give us a 
sense of growing tensions between traditional elites and new converts from other 
clans,   
The same year which marks the beginning of the rapid advance of the work, marks 
also the beginning of the persecution of the Christians, which, in some villages, 
became exceedingly severe. The preachers were subjected to ill treatment being 
stoned and beaten, and in some instances narrowly escaping with their lives. Young 
converts who refused to join in the village dances were cruelly beaten, and strong 
drink forced down their throats. Villagers who attended the services, or listened to the 
preaching were heavily fined by the chiefs, driven out of their homes and villages, and 
boycotted in the markets, no one selling them even the necessities of life (Morris 
1930, p. 82).  
 
Notably, the clans that were first to take to modern education and convert to 
Christianity were mainly non-Lushais. These were groups like Raltes, Hmars and 
 139 
Paites who also formed the bulk of the population in the Lushai Hills, and came to be 
informally designated as Commoners by colonial authorities.72 A nascent educated 
class of Commoners drew sustenance by direct access to employment in the district 
administration and church organisations. As Hassan (2009, p. 214) details: “The 
consequence was that by the end of the colonial rule, the social set-up in the district 
was such that though the dominant power remained in the hands of the Lushai chiefs 
(supported by colonial administration), the district’s economy was rapidly being 
monopolized by the newly educated and mobilizing Commoners.” This growing 
schism and the hope that they stood to gain in the event of introduction of democracy 
in the district led the Commoners to begin organsing politically by founding the Mizo 
Commoners Union (MCU) party in 1946.  
 
The most remarkable feat of social engineering was however that of the creation 
of the Mizo identity to represent the interests of the Commoners. Instead of naming 
the party after the constituent sub-tribes or clans (Hmar, Ralte or Paite), the 
Commoners’ leadership opted for an inclusive umbrella identity ‘Mizo’ to signify the 
general population of the district (Hassan 2011, p. 215). The term Mizo is devoid of 
ethnic value and is derived from the phrase ‘mi-zo’ meaning ‘man of the hills’. What 
is notable is that the category ‘Mizo’ didn’t belong to that of the colonial census 
repertoire (See Table 4.2) which showed distribution of population in constituent 
groups such as Lushais, Hmars, Raltes and so on.  
 
  
                                                        
72 The missionaries being sympathetic to their cause, even challenged the government in a court of law 
to abolish the prevalent system of ‘bonded labour’ among the Lushais and other tribes / clans in the 
district, an issue the government was otherwise willing to ignore under the non-interference policy. 
For a detailed exposition of this subject, see Nag (2016). 
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Table 4.2 Colonial Census 1901 showing some categories in Lushai Hills 





              Source: Hassan (2011, p. 218) 
 
Thus, Christianity and standardization of language created an enabling environment in 
which the Commoners’ exercised political agency to forge a common identity in their 
struggle against traditional chieftainship.73 As Table 4.3 shows, after indepedendence, 
with the recognition of Mizo as a census category, earlier categories such as Lushai, 
Paite become redundant and many inhabitants of the Mizo Hills began recognizing 
themselves as Mizo. 
 
Table 4.3 Difference in Census categorization in Lushai (Mizo) Hills 1901 and 1961 
Tribe/ Year 1901 1961 
Lushai 36322 - 
Paite 2870 - 
Ralte 13827 - 
Hmar 10411 - 
Mizo - 13261 
Source: Hassan (2011, p. 218). 
 
 
Having detailed the processes of the modern identity formation in the Mizo Hills, I 
now turn to the related issue of tribal autonomy in the hill areas of the Northeast. 
 
                                                        
73  The Presbyterian Mission made considerable efforts in standardizing language by using the 
dominant Lushai tongue, known as Duhlian. Duhlian was given a Roman script and renamed as Mizo 
language. Despite this, many of the constituent groups still continue to retain words of their own 
dialects or languages.  
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4.3 Genesis of territorial autonomy in the hills of Northeast 
The genesis of the modern discourse on territorial group autonomy lies in the 
twentieth century discussions on the future of the separate treatment of hills areas 
from the valleys and the desired constitutional status of these areas of Assam. The 
colonial discourse in the Northeast frontier did not necessarily manifest as a top-
down homogenous one and it would be inaccurate to suggest that the government had 
fixed and unanimous views about the future of the Northeast frontier region. Rather, 
the views of the government depended to a great extent on individual officers at the 
local levels. Views on this issue may be largely divided into two schools: one, 
advocated by officials like Hutton, Parry, Reid and Mills, was that of the complete 
separation of the hills not only from Assam but even potentially from independent 
India; and the second view, supported by officials like Clow and Adams, saw gradual 
integration of hills and plains of Assam as the necessary and inevitable course. These 
two schools informed the ways in which the region was viewed in the overall 
constitutional negotiations of the 20th century leading up to independence and the 
way autonomy for these groups was understood.  
 
4.3.1 Separating hill ‘tribes’ from plains peoples: A caste-tribe divide 
John Hutton, the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills District in his 
memorandum to the Indian Statutory Commission suggested that the interests of the 
tribal areas were in direct conflict with those of the Assam plains. He (1928, p. 116) 
prescribed, “the gradual creation of self-governing communities, semi-independent in 
nature…for whose external relations alone the Governor of the Province would 
ultimately be responsible.” They could either integrate with Assam or remain as 
independent units of the federation, once it is felt that these hill tribes could stand on 
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their own feet (Syiemlieh 2014, p. 8). Similarly, N.E. Parry, who had experience in 
both Lushai Hills and Garo Hills offered two formulations: (a) a Hill Division under a 
Commissioner directly under the Governor; (b) a North-East Frontier Province to 
comprise backward tracts, both of Burma and Assam, under a Chief Commissioner 
(Syiemlieh 2014, p. 122).74 These ideas then formed the basis for the model to create 
a Crown Colony by combining the Backward Tracts of Assam and Burmese Frontier 
into a single unit of administration. Hutton in a later note agreed with Parry’s 
formulation,  
From the Arrakan Hill States northwards Maghs, Mros, Kukis, Lakhers, Chins, Nagas 
of all sorts, Khamptis and Western Kachins are found on both sides of the so-called 
watershed, having common customs, common languages and living under precisely 
similar social conditions. All these tribes, at present divided between two 
administrations would gain enormously by consolidated treatment, and sentiment, 
which is at present parochial as a result of divided administration, would easily be 
transformed into a tribal consciousness covering a much greater area (cited in Reid 
1942b, pp. 5-6).   
 
As opposed to earlier periods, the idea that hill tribes were ‘racially’ more akin to the 
Burmese tribes and thus should be separated from rest of Assam and India found 
some takers in this period. For example, Robert Reid (1942b, pp. 14-15), who took 
office as the governor of Assam in 1937, noted, when one “emerges from the hills 
into the plains of Assam one enters a different world, whereas the boundary between 
our hills and the Burma hills, is artificial as it is imperceptible.” Based on these 
views, the government expressed its concern regarding the future of the region,  
[The future administration] cannot be left to Indian political leaders with neither 
knowledge, interest nor feeling for these areas…We have no right to allow this great 
body of non-Indian Animists and Christians to be drawn into the struggle between 
Hindu and Muslim…Throughout the hills the Indian of the plains is despised for his 
effeminacy but feared for his cunning…The people of the hills of Assam are eager to 
work out their own salvation free from Indian domination as are the people of Burma, 
and for the same reasons (cited in Reid 1942b, p. 16). 
 
                                                        
74 Both these formulations, to various degrees, gain political saliency among tribal elite and political 
entrepreneurs in the hill region, after independence. 
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In a Skinnerian tradition of contextualist methodology, it is possible to see that 
colonial officers deployed particular concepts to explain action in a number of 
contexts. Hence, the ‘separatist’ views of Hutton and Reid need to be situated in the 
colonial knowledge system through which social categories were understood at the 
time. In order to understand why some colonial administrators were keen on 
constitutionally separating the hills from the plains of Assam, therefore a discussion 
on the knowledge system and the categories it produced is relevant. The notion of 
‘tribe’ as an official category did not emerge in isolation but was usually understood 
against another major category, i.e. caste. 75  Many of the early monographs by 
colonial writers continued to display this overlap. 76  This was because, as an 
epistemological reality, the tribe/ non-tribe or the tribe/ caste distinction was far more 
permeable, thereby making collective subjectivities heterogeneous and overlapping 
(Béteille, 1986; Kapila, 2008).77   
However, the category ‘tribe’, (and later Scheduled Tribe), gained currency and 
an analytical value in a context where the state was transforming from merely a 
‘revenue state’ to an ‘ethnographic state’ since mid-19th century (Dirks 2001, p. 17).78 
As has been rightly pointed out, keeping in line with the positivist methods of 
                                                        
75 This is not to argue that the British invented tribes and castes; rather as Dirks (2001, p. 5) succinctly 
points out, “…I do not mean to imply that it was simply invented by the too clever British…But I am 
suggesting that it was under the British that “caste” became a single term capable of expressing, 
organizing, and above all “systematizing” India’s diverse forms of social identity, community, and 
organization.”  
76 Some examples are: Risley’s (1892) Tribes and Castes of Bengal; Thurston’s (1909) Castes and 
Tribes of Southern India; Ethnoven’s (1920-22) Tribes and Castes of Bombay; Crooke’s (1896) Tribes 
and Castes of Northwestern India. 
77 In Assam, this was particularly evident for groups inhabiting the plain areas and is discussed in the 
next chapter with reference to Bodo identity formation.  
78 Dirks (2001) argues that the formation of the early colonial state involving the East India Company 
was hinged on the relationship of revenue to land. However policies of steady and, at times, aggressive 
acquisition of land came to a grinding halt after the Great Rebellion of 1857, and were being replaced 
policies of indirect in continuation with the project of colonial rule (2001, p. 56). The Rebellion 
necessitated prioritizing the knowledge of peoples and cultures over that of histories of land control in 
order to assess ‘loyalty’ and patronage. Dirks concludes that ‘after 1857, anthropology supplanted 
history as the principal colonial modality of knowledge’ in India (Ibid.).  
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ethnology that dominated academia at the time, the colonial state viewed ‘tribes’ as 
‘non-state’ societies which included other categories like ‘bands’ and ‘chiefdoms’, 
and were differentiated from state-societies or civilizations, in our case the Hindu 
civilization (Beteille, 1986).79 Viewed from an evolutionary approach, tribes were 
posited as pursuing a linear development from chiefdom to a kingdom, a clan to a 
territory. Particularly in the case of nomadic or semi-nomadic societies or groups 
inhabiting highlands, colonial modernity came to view them as existing in isolated 
habitats (Fletcher 2015, p. 8). In Emmanuel Marx’s (2006, p. 89) words,  
They [the state] imagine them [nomadic societies in the Middle East] as a closed 
society, as tribesmen who should be allowed to preserve their traditional culture and 
to run their affairs independently, with little governmental interference. They are 
allocated a territory…The tribe is then an administrative division of the state…The 
state may either turn the tribe into a deprived ethnic enclave or may gradually 
extend full citizenship to its members. 
 
Moreover, in colonial India, caste came to be viewed through a religious 
determinism in that it began to be seen as emanating from the Hindu ritual order. 
Indeed as scholars (Guha, 2014; Cohn, 1987) attest, this ‘book view’ of caste since 
late 19th century was different from those of the earlier periods of colonial rule. This 
new way of imagining caste varied from the earlier views of castes as bounded kin or 
political units, based on a ‘field view’ of practical experience and contact with social 
actors at local levels. Framing caste as a distinct Hindu phenomenon and as the 
primary organizing principle of Indian society, and ‘tribe’ as a social formation came 
to be measured on a civilizational scale using caste as the yardstick.  
 
                                                        
79 This tradition continued in the post-independence period in the works of scholars like Kosambi 
(1955) broadly working within Marxist historical anthropology, saw the tribe as a pre-state stage of 
social organisation compared to the agrarian order of imperial states such like the Maurya. Even 
Scott’s (2009) work on highlanders of Zomia showing them as peoples live in simple, stateless 
societies, even if by their own political choice, has been critiqued. See Wouters (2012).  
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Several scholars studying colonial societies have argued about production of 
knowledge of its ‘subjects’ as a tool used by the colonial state to not only command 
authority but also to justify that authority (Dirks, 2001; Pels and Salemink, 1999; 
Pant 1987; Béteille, 1986). Colonial rulers were said to justify control over colonies 
by construction and ordering of difference (Metcalf, 1997). The construction of the 
ideology of difference helped the British to tide over dilemmas of how a nation 
symbolizing liberalism and democracy could subjugate other nations (Metcalf, 
1997).80 Colonial knowledge was premised on the assumption that all rational and 
progressive human endeavors had their origin in the West and was in direct 
opposition to the irrational belief system and practices of Indian society. Hinged on 
this premise, the colonial government legitimized its domination over India (Inden, 
1986).  
In a diverse linguistic and ethnic setting of the Northeast, a similar exercise of 
the knowledge production ensued from the mid-19th century. Owing to the prevailing 
ignorance about the interior regions of Assam, Lord Cornwallis directed that 
immediate efforts be made to undertake extensive surveys to acquire information on 
the population, customs and manners, natural production and opportunities of trade 
and commerce. The responsibility of administering the region was often given to 
officers who were also anthropologist by training. Anthropologists such as Risley, 
Hutton and Mill were all active in government service when their academic works 
were published. 81 
                                                        
80 The seminal work from which this idea centrally emanates is that of Said’s (1979) Orientalism. 
Said’s central argument is that western knowledge of the near and far east was contingent on the 
political context in which the East was transformed as the object of knowledge in the exercise of a 
specific form of power, colonial power. After it was physically conquered, it was concomitantly 
‘contained and represented by dominating frameworks’ (Said 1979, p. 40).  
81  Risley after retirement from the ICS in 1908 briefly presided over the Royal Anthropological 
Institute; Hutton, a Cambridge Anthropologist had conducted the Census of India in 1931 while Mills 




A review of anthropological monographs on Assam reveal a narrative 
portraying the colonial government as a benevolent and altruistic force vis-à-vis these 
‘pre-civilised’ groups. Hill-dwellers were particularly being constructed as objects 
without history, living in isolation from each other and from plains people (Misra, 
1998). Elwin (1959, pp. xv- xvi), an Oxford-trained anthropologist, who was 
influential in the design of post-colonial territorial autonomy for ‘tribes’ in Northeast 
had remarked,  “European travellers were under no illusions about the Noble 
Savage…their opinion of the tribes was a low one and their attitude was all too often 
patronizing and scornful. The only idea which most men had, with reference to the 
hills and forests [of Assam], was that they were the habitat of savage tribes, whose 
bloody raids and thieving forays threatened serious danger to the cause of tea.” 
 
Perhaps, Elwin was over-stating the case, as it is indeed true that coercive force 
was somewhat minimal in the case of hill tribes of Assam. Yet it is also true that a 
process of cultural construction was gradually transforming the social fabric of the 
region (Misra, 1998). The positivist and evolutionary approach to ethnographic works 
in Assam not only viewed ‘tribes’ inhabiting the highlands as people about whom 
‘objective’ knowledge was possible but it also posited them at the extreme end of 
hierarchy in the caste-tribe continuum. As Kapila (2008, p. 122) puts it, “[o]ne key 
feature of tribal society was its supposedly undifferentiated and egalitarian nature, 
which was thought to be under threat from surrounding caste-and class-based 
groupings.” This view resonated favourably with a majority of administrators 
regarding inhabitants of the hills of the frontier region of Assam who found a suitable 
justification to separating the hills from the valleys. 
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For example, the Indian Statutory Commission Report on the future of the hill tribes 
noted,  
They (i.e. the inhabitants of the Backward Tracts) do not ask for self-determination, 
but for security of land tenure, freedom in the pursuit of their traditional methods of 
livelihood, and the reasonable exercise of their ancestral customs. Their contentment 
does not depend so much on rapid political advance as on experienced and sympathetic 
handling, and on protection from economic subjugation by their neighbours… 
nowhere in India is the contrast between the life and outlook of these wild hillmen and 
the totally distinct civilization of the plains more manifest.82 
 
Similarly, the Secretary of State observed during the examination of witnesses on the 
need for ‘exclusion’ of the hills from constitutional negotiations in the early 20th 
century, 
 My anxiety is to prevent politicians, British Indian or any one else interfering with 
people whose conditions are so different as to make the political conditions really 
inapplicable to them…the natural inclination of any democratic legislation is to 
attempt to impose uniformity upon everybody else and it is just this attempt to impose 
uniformity that does make the trouble with people who are really living in quite a 
different world. 83 
 
 It is not a surprise then that these views dominated in the over-arching 
constitutional negotiations that were taking place in the early decades of the 20 th 
century when Hutton and Reid occupied office. The Government of India Acts of 
1909, 1919 and 1935 all subscribed to the view that the hill tracts of Assam “clearly 
call for special treatment.”84 These political reforms were aimed at dealing with the 
question of gradually introducing representative government in India. These started 
with enlarging legislative councils created earlier in 1861(Morley-Minto reforms of 
1909); diarchy or a system of two-tier governance whereby a number of subjects 
                                                        
82 Report of the Indian Statutory Commission Volume One Survey 1930, p. 75. 
83 Secretary of States evidence, Part II, 1946, p. 178. 
84 9th Despatch on Indian Constitutional Reforms (Assam and Backward Tracts) 1917, p. 4. 
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were transferred to Indian ministers answerable to the provincial legislature 
(Montford reforms of 1919) and; the 1935 Act whereby provinces for the first time 
were recognized as separate entities, exercising executive and legislative powers. 
While these reforms were introduced in other provinces, it was felt in the context of 
Assam, that its “constitution... cannot be identical with those of its richer, more 
populous and more homogenous counterpart neighbours.” 85 These Acts subsequently 
provided institutional recognition to the “division of the province [Assam] into two 
distinct portions, one composed of plains and the other of hill districts”86 as the 
prevailing view was that “there are no links of race and religion between the hillmen 
and the plains people of Assam, and little understanding of one another’s needs and 
aspirations.”87 The Act of 1919 declared the hill areas as ‘backward tracts’ and the 
Act of 1935 further categorized the hills into ‘partially excluded’ and ‘excluded’ 
areas. As shown earlier in the chapter, a non-regulation system was put in place such 
that provisions of general law and administration, as enforced in other provinces, 
were not made applicable to the hills.88  
 
In the next section, I discuss the second school of thought represented by 
colonial officials like Clow who proposed the integration of the hills with Assam 
with special provisions for their protection and preservation, a constitutional position 
that would be officially accepted while transferring of power from the British to the 
                                                        
85 9th Despatch on Indian Constitutional Reforms (Assam and Backward Tracts) 1917, p. 5. Assam 
Association, an influential group of caste-Assamese Hindus, leading the cause of Assamese language 
and identity (and members of which were absorbed in Assam Congress) had protested against to the 
differential treatment that the province was to be given under these reforms (Ibid.). 
86 9th Despatch on Indian Constitutional Reforms (Assam and Backward Tracts) 1917, p. 5. 
879th Despatch on Indian Constitutional Reforms (Assam and Backward Tracts) 1917, p. 4. 
88  This pattern of administration was also applied in ‘tribal’ areas of Chota Nagpur, Jalpaiguri, 
Darjeeling, Chittagong hill tracts of Bengal, Kumaon in the North West Province and in some districts 
of Sindh (Syiemlieh 2014, p. 4). However the first three, unlike the excluded and partially excluded 
areas of Assam, were not made part of the Sixth Schedule but rather the Fifth Schedule post-
independence.  
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Indians. Despite these efforts, the hill-plains cleavage had already acquired salience 
among the nascent tribal elite in the region.  
 
4.3.2 Protection of hills and their gradual integration within Indian body politic 
As opposed to the views held by Hutton and others, Andrew Clow, Reid’s successor 
found these ideas about crown colonies and protectorates ‘grandiose’ and ‘fantastic’ 
and held that the plains and hill districts of Assam were mutually dependent units and 
their separation would harm both units (Syiemlieh 2014, p. 17). His position becomes 
clear when he remarked (Syiemlieh 2014, p. 17): “It seems most unlikely…the 
British Government which is prepared to set India and Burma on a self-governing 
footing should now undertake the administration and financial responsibility for a 
patchwork of sparsely populated hills lying where these hills do.”  
 
In contrast to the earlier pronouncements of the government, the Cabinet 
Mission Proposal of 1946 were clearly influenced by Clow’s views. In agreement 
with Clow regarding the constitutional arrangements for the hills in Assam, it noted,  
 
[there is a need to] find means by which hill tribes of the North East Frontier can be 
welded in to the body politic of India, bearing in mind the need for protection of tribal 
institutions and way of life, for full scale development and for maintaining the integrity 
of an external boundary (cited in Syiemlieh 2014, p. 32) 
 
This view, which ultimately prevailed in the constitutional scheme regarding the 
Northeast, was an acknowledgement of the old problem that the British faced in the 
region, namely that of extending and maintaining power in sparsely populated 
territories with challenging topography. Being aware of the costs that establishing 
future British protectorates in the region would entail, Clow had prescribed a merger 
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of the hills and the plains of Assam, that nevertheless took cognizance of 
demographic, cultural and topographical differences. Similarly, Philip Francis Adams 
(1947, p. 1), assistant commissioner of the Naga Hills District, while endorsing the 
integration of the hills with India, suggested that constitutional arrangements would 
have to recognize the cultural and ‘racial’ differences that these areas had with those 
of the plains of Assam.  
 
At the same time groups inhabiting the hills of Assam themselves did not have 
unanimous views about this issue. Both Clow and Adams recognized that hills tribe 
should be considered individually before designing a policy.89 This was a pertinent 
observation, for it challenged the myth of homogeneity inherent in categories like 
‘hill’ tribes. Views of the nascent hill elite, which had emerged among different 
groups since 1920s, often depended on how far the new arrangements would benefit 
them. This elite was not a result of the freedom struggle, since the Indian National 
Congress wasn’t allowed access in the hills nor were the ‘excluded’ areas allowed to 
send in representatives to the provincial council (except Shillong which became the 
capital of Assam after independence).90 Rather, as detailed above, this class was a 
direct result of proselytization efforts in the hills.91 Nagas were the first to engage in 
political mobilization with the establishment of the Naga Club in 1918; in 1934, the 
Khasi states were formed as a result of the political activities of the Khasi National 
Durbar, set up in 1923; and among the Mizos, political consciousness was initiated as 
                                                        
89 In the case of the Lushai Hills, colonial administration hadn’t yet given official recognition to over-
arching categories like Mizo. This was one of the reasons why even local minorities such as the Lais, 
Maras and Chakmas who historically resided in the South Lushai Hills were considered individually 
and separate from the dominant Lushias when the question of autonomy arose. This point is detailed in 
chapter 6 when I discuss why Mizo peace settlement worked. 
90 As argued in chapter 3, Inner Line regulations in the excluded areas prevented any kind of outside 
political activity  
91 Their political consciousness was whetted further after their participation as in the First World War. 
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a result of ‘commoners’ (backed by the Mission) rallying against traditional chiefs, 
the latter’s interest being preserved by the colonial government. 
 
Among the hill groups, it was Rev. Nichols Roy, a Khasi minister in the Assam 
government who had returned on a Congress ticket from Shillong, who vociferously 
took the position of integrating the hills with Assam. While rejecting outright the 
prospect of the hills being treated as a British protectorate, he wrote in his 
memorandum to the Cabinet Mission, “The people of these hills who are educated 
and who have had experience in this political rule are greatly against such a 
rule…When the whole of India will get Independence, the hill people of Assam 
should be connected with the Province of Assam” (cited in Nag 2002, p. 90). On the 
other hand, Rev. Gatphoh from the Jaintia Hills hoped his hills would become part of 
the Crown colony (Syiemlieh 2015, pp. 11-12). The Mizos of the Lushai Hills also 
turned down the proposal for separation and favoured some form of autonomy for 
their hills within the province of Assam. The Mizo Union that was formed in 1946 
had mobilized smaller groups within to abolish traditional chieftainship and were 
afraid that if a British protectorate of the hills materialized, their movement would 
receive a major blow since the British would continue to rule indirectly through the 
traditional leadership.92  
 
Since this debate was taking shape at a critical juncture of formalizing the 
Indian nation-state, the views of the Assamese leaders of the plains contributed 
equally if not more to the future of the hill areas after colonial rule ended. The 
Assamese elite that was actively engaged in the freedom movement viewed the 
                                                        
92 This point is elaborated further in chapter 6 which discusses post-independence Mizos politics. 
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excluded hill areas as ‘protective enclaves’ designed to stall the nationalist movement 
from spreading in these areas. The Indian National Congress had condemned the 
Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas Order of 1936 in its Faizpur session and 
called it “yet another attempt to divide the people of India into different groups and to 
obstruct the growth of uniform democratic institutions in the country” (cited in Jafa 
1999, p. 1). Assamese Congress leaders, particularly felt that these arrangements had 
put brakes on the ‘natural’ process of assimilation of these tribes into the Indian 
society or nation. As an ICS member noted at the time, “The Assamese suspected that 
this discrimination was part of a mischievous scheme to keep the hill areas 
permanently separate from the plains as the exclusive monopoly of the British. Why, 
they protested, should a foreign language (English) and a foreign script (Roman) be 
encouraged amongst a people whose lingua franca was a form of simple, pidgin 
Assamese? This could be no less than a stratagem for diverting the Nagas from their 
true and natural cultural roots, which had affinities with the Assamese, to an alien and 
anti-national outlook” (Rustomji 1983, p. 83).93  
 
Under the Cabinet Mission Plan, Assam was grouped with Bengal in the process of 
deciding upon the provincial constitution in the Constituent Assembly (Guha 1977, p. 
310-11). This had raised fear of the Assamese elite that a majority of Muslim 
population in Sylhet (a predominantly Bengali speaking district of Assam) 94  and 
other districts of lower Assam might tie the province’s fate to Pakistan. In this 
                                                        
93  This is interesting because the emerging Assamese nationality was in reality limited almost 
exclusively to only those people who lived in the Brahmaputra Valley (Baruah, 1885; Gohain, 1985; 
Misra, 1999). A leading Assamese intellectual in the late 19th century had scathing about the insular 
and even xenophobic attitudes of his fellow countrymen towards their hill neighbours (Baruah 1885, 
pp. 95-100).  
94 In July, 1947 Sylhet voted to join East Bengal, which was soon to join Pakistan and become East 




context, it was also in the interest of the hill tribes to join Assam and the Naga 
National Council and Mizo Union leaders passed resolutions in 1946 desiring a union 
with free India. 
 
4.4 Territorial autonomy after independence: Sixth Schedule for the Hills  
At the cusp of freedom, when it was clear that the hills were to integrate with India, 
the hills and the plains people (mainly Assamese) of Assam had to negotiate the 
future of their relationship, one that was now conditioned by decades of sharpened 
hill-valley schism during the period of late colonial rule. At the heart of this 
negotiation were ambiguities and anxieties about the relation that these hitherto 
excluded areas and the people inhabiting them would have with the Indian body 
politic. Would they be vigorously assimilated or given enough ‘autonomy’ to practice 
their own traditions and preserve their land rights? These assimilationist–protectionist 
debates with regards to ‘tribes’ in India were shaped by views of two eminent 
scholars of the day. On one hand, Indian sociologist G.S. Ghurye (1959) advocated 
policies based on assimilation. Just as he wanted Scheduled Castes to assimilate into 
the Hindu society, Ghurye was of the opinion that Scheduled Tribes also needed to be 
‘integrated’ into the Indian society. He differentiated the tribes of Central India from 
those of Northeast India and suggested that the former could be integrated through 
‘Hinduisation’ while the latter were to be politically incorporated through 
administrative measures (Ghurye, 1980). On the other side of the spectrum was 
British ethnologist V. Elwin (1941), who championed special provisions for 
‘protection’ of tribals. 
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After independence, the constitution makers in India faced a dilemma with 
regard to the incorporation of diverse tribal populations into the Indian ‘nation’. The 
Constituent Assembly set up the Northeast Frontier (Assam) Tribal and Excluded 
Areas Sub-Committee to make an assessment of the demands and aspirations of the 
hill tribes. The Sub-Committee was headed by the Assam Premier, Gopinath 
Bordoloi, Khasi leader Rev. J.J.M Nichols-Roy, plains-tribal leader Rupnath Brahma 
and A.V. Thakkar, a social worker among central Indian tribes; it also co-opted two 
members from tribes of each of the districts visited. 95  It submitted its 
recommendations for setting up of Autonomous District Councils (ADCs), which 
were accepted and incorporated into Article 244 (2) of the 6th Schedule of the 
constitution. However, these provisions were reached upon only after intense debates 
and consternations in the Assembly and though the concept of territorial autonomy 
finally received patronage and constitutional recognition, the questions of the nature 
and degree of the autonomy were fraught with many complexities.  
 
The most important concern was whether special forms of autonomy tailored to 
the needs and aspirations of minorities would lead to accommodation or further 
demands that could threaten the territorial integrity of the nation. Those who were 
critical of the Schedule were generally opposed to the principle of self- determination 
and were advocates of political centralization. It was argued that ‘to vest wide 
political powers into the hands of tribals is the surest method of inviting chaos, 
anarchy and disorder’ and that under this scheme of things, “some areas of Assam 
shall remain beyond the control of Parliament forever…the separation will take a 
                                                        
95 All the co-opted members except those from the Naga Hills fully endorsed the report of the Sub-
Committee, Khasis and Lushai chiefs expressed resentment at what they considered to be inadequate 
representation in the Committee (Chaube 1999, pp. 84, 97). 
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permanent character and it may lead to the division of the province itself”.96 It was 
also argued that even if such differential autonomy arrangements were to be made, 
these should be time-bound, after which “these people should become absorbed in 
and become part of the normal population of the province”.97 The bloody legacy of 
partition also seemed to weigh on the minds of members who were opposed to 
differential group rights based on territory. “If you see the background of this 
Schedule, you will find that the British mind is still there. There is the old separatist 
tendency and you want to keep them away from us. You will thus be creating a 
Tribalistan just as you have created a Pakistan.”98 
  
Second, a section of Assamese leaders saw in the Schedule a design to 
completely rupture the relationship between the Assamese and the tribal population, a 
process, they argued, that was a direct fallout of colonial rule in the region.  For 
instance, Assamese leader, Rohini Kumar Chaudhuri argued, “these tribal areas were 
kept as a close preserve by the British people…The British wanted to keep the people 
of these areas as primitive as possible.”99 He further remarked,   
…you will be surprised to learn that before the advent of the British, these Nagas were 
friendly with the Assamese. They had adopted the Assamese language. This was so till 
about ten years ago when the Roman script was introduced forcibly by the British 
officers... I do most regretfully observe that what Dr. Ambedkar is doing in regard of 
this Schedule VI is that he is closely, absolutely closely, following, except in some 
cases, the British method…so far as tribal areas are concerned.100 
 
                                                        
96 Constituent assembly debates, Volume IX, 1949, p. 27. Available at: 
<<http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol9p27a.htm>>. Accessed on March 12th, 2015. 
97 Constituent assembly debates, Volume IX, 1949, p. 27 Available at: 
<<http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol9p27a.htm>>. Accessed on March 12th, 2015. 
98 Constituent assembly debates, Volume IX, 1949, p. 27 Available at: 
<<http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol9p27b.htm>>. Accessed on March 12th, 2015. 
99 Constituent assembly debates, Volume IX, 1949, p. 27. Available at: 
<<http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol9p27b.htm>>. Accessed on March 12th, 2015. 
100 Constituent assembly debates, Volume IX, 1949, p. 27. Available at: 
<<http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol9p27b.htm>>. Accessed on March 12th, 2015. 
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He also highlighted that tribal areas also had sizeable non-tribal populations who 
would be put at a disadvantage were the Schedule came into force. He complained,  
‘So much so, that I living in Shillong cannot purchase property from any Khasi 
except with the permission of the Chief of the State or with the permission of the 
Deputy Commissioner…I am not allowed to associate with tribal people; the tribal 
people are not allowed to associate with me’.101 Those endorsing this position argued 
that local self-government, as present in other parts of India was enough with regard 
to the question of autonomy.  The Municipalities Act of Assam and the Local Self-
Government Act by virtue of which District Boards and Local Boards are formed 
were not in force in the hill areas. It was contended at the Assembly debate, ‘If you 
really want to educate the people of the tribal areas in the art of self-government, why 
do you not introduce this Act in those areas. Why do you want autonomous districts 
for these Municipal purposes?”102  
 
A third strand, that received support from Nehru, Ambedkar and Bordoloi, the 
chief architect of the Sixth Schedule, however prevailed in the Assembly. Bordoloi 
(1949, p. 27) who was known to be more sympathetic towards the cause of autonomy 
for the hills, reasoned during the debate, “People of this area were already fully 
suffused with these ideas of isolation and separation. The most important fact that 
presented itself before this Committee was whether for the purpose of integration the 
methods of force should be used, or a method should be used in which the willing co-
operation of these people could be obtained for the purpose of governing these 
areas.” He spoke in great favour of the tribal institutions, 
                                                        
101 Constituent assembly debates, Volume IX, 1949, p. 27. Available at: 
<<http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol9p27b.htm>>. Accessed on March 12th, 2015. 
102 I Constituent assembly debates, Volume IX, 1949, p. 27. Available at: 
<<http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol9p27b.htm>>. Accessed on March 12th, 2015. 
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certain institutions among these hill tribals which, in my opinion, are so good that, if 
we wanted to destroy them, I consider it to be very wrong. One of the things which I 
felt was very creditable to these tribals was the manner in which they settle their 
disputes…and again take the instance of their village administration…take again the 
case of Ao Nagas who distributed the entire functions of the society through different 
age groups of people in their society…most of these provisions are nothing more than 
translating something which already prevails in the tribal societies, and therefore we 
are not giving too much as has been pointed out by some of my friends.103 
 
Others such as Nichols Roy also in support of the Schedule proffered,  
If you want to win them over for the good of India you will have to create a feeling of 
friendliness and unity among them so that they may feel that their culture and ways of 
living have not been abolished and another kind of culture thrust upon them by 
force…The village councils in the autonomous districts and the District Councils will 
enable the hills people to rule themselves in their own way and to develop themselves 
according to their own methods…This measure of self-government will make them 
feel that the whole of India is sympathetic with them and India is not going to force 
upon them anything which will destroy their feeling and their culture.104 
  
Ambedkar in fact compared the position of tribes in Assam to that of Native 
Americans in the United States where “what they did was to create what was called 
Reservations of Boundaries within which Red Indians [native Americans] lived.”105 
 
In his foreword to Elwin’s A Philosophy for NEFA, India’s Prime Minister, 
Nehru (1957, p. i) observed, “…I felt that we should avoid two extreme courses: one 
was to treat them as anthropological specimens for study and the other was to allow 
them to be engulfed by the masses of Indian humanity.” Thus, in the context of the 
assimilation – integration debate of the Constituent Assembly, Nehru’s tribal policy 
of integration prevailed as it was recognized that assimilation was likely to occur on 
                                                        
103  Constituent assembly debates, Volume IX, 1949, p. 27. Available at: 
<<http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol9p27a.htm>>. Accessed on March 12th, 2015. 
104  Constituent assembly debates, Volume IX, 1949, p. 27. Available at: 
<<http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol9p27a.htm>>. Accessed on March 12th, 2015. 
105 Constituent assembly debates, Volume IX, 1949, p. 27. Available at: 
<<http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol9p27a.htm>>. Accessed on March 12th, 2015. 
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the basis of an unequal power relation that would put tribal populations in a grossly 
disadvantaged position (Stuligross, 1999). The Indian Constitution of 1947 not only 
recognized diversity but also institutionalized representation of the diverse 
collectivities in the democratic structures of the polity in order to overcome the 
‘assimilationist individualism’ inherent in the liberal conception of citizenship (Dev, 
2004). The ADCs in the tribal regions of Assam were to be governed by their own 
elected council. This constitutional provision sought to build ‘autonomous’ 
administration in the hill areas of undivided Assam (United Khasi-Jaintia Hills 
District, Garo Hills District, Lushai Hills District, Naga Hills District, North Cachar 
Hills District and Mikir Hills District) to enable the hill tribes to ‘preserve’ their 
traditional way of life and land. These autonomous councils were given far-reaching 
rights over law making in areas such as land use, forest management (except 
‘reserved/ protected forests), customary laws of property, inheritance, marriage, 
taxation and establishment of village committees. 
 
4. 5 Conclusion 
This chapter brought a sharper focus to the specific ways in which colonial indirect 
rule affected the Lushai Hills. While the colonial state intended minimum 
interference in the hills due to the challenges that the political topography of the 
region posed, the regime of indirect rule nevertheless instigated some profound 
changes in the Lushai Hills. It facilitated processes that transferred a hitherto non-
territorial society into one defined by fixed boundaries and territory. This had 
implications for the way identities came to be imagined and mobilized, and 
formalized the relatively isolated and dispersed settlements in the Lushai Hills. 
Secondly, proselytizing activities further augmented changes in the social relations in 
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the highlands. The traditional social and political structure was dealt with a major 
blow with the abolition of the Bawi system, which had so far provided a system of 
organizing people in the hills. But more importantly, it gave rise to a new and 
vociferous class of elite, discussed in chapter 6, on whom the political fate of the 
Lushai Hills would be dependent in the period immediately before and after 
independence.  
 
The indirect rule based on the hills-plains binary not only shaped territorialized 
identities, but also contributed to the territorialized understanding of group rights for 
the hill dwellers, as accounted in the latter half of the chapter. The hill-plains binary 
was not only topographical distinction but it also manifested as a civilizational 
hierarchy in the context of the ethnographic state. Because hill dwellers, or hill tribes 
as the British called them, were viewed as distinct from caste-based societies of the 
plains, they were either to be separated from the future Indian state or otherwise 
given enough ‘protection’ within the Indian union to preserve their ‘tribal’ 
characteristics from the onslaught of caste-based Indian society. When the fate of 
hills became tied to the Indian Union, constitutional makers intensely debated the 
relationship that the two topographies and their inhabitants were to have. Despite 
deep reservations among some members of the constituent assembly, territorial 
recognition of group rights to protect tribal groups in the hills became part of the 
Indian constitution. However, the story was very different in the Assam valley. 
Despite the presence of ‘tribes’ in the plains, these were not give protection based on 
territory. The next chapter then traces the identity formation among the Bodos, the 
largest plain tribe in the Assam valley and how politics of recognition and autonomy 
in the plains were different from those of the hill tribes. 
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Chapter 5 Identity formation and autonomy in the Assam plains in 
the early 20th century: The Bodos 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter brings into sharper focus the processes of identity formation of the Bodo 
community from the early decades of the twentieth century till independence. 
Chapter 4 gave an account of how colonial indirect rule in the Lushai hills facilitated 
processes that embedded territorialized group identities. This was reflected in the 
federal institutional design and recognition of group rights in the hills of the 
Northeast. In contrast to these policies, the Assam valley was at the receiving end of 
another, more direct social and economic transformation that was symbolic of an 
extractive colonial regime. Assam was a low revenue state but commercial potential 
of tea and oil had led to a scramble to create a ‘resource frontier’ (Baruah, 2016). 
Whereas in the hills, the British remained dependent on the existing system of rule, in 
the plains of Assam, colonial rule led to some rapid and drastic socio-economic 
reengineering starting in the late 19th century.  
 
As in the hills, inhabitants of the Assam valley did not passively receive these 
changes.  Parallel to the efforts of the colonial state to define and govern Assam, 
there were efforts by these communities to identify and locate themselves in the 
social and political milieu of the colonial state. Developments in colonial Assam 
valley were thus linked and products of political struggles among local elites.106  For 
                                                        
106 Boone (2003, p. 2) makes a similar argument when she gives an endogenous explanation for 
institutional differences in post-colonial African states, “institutional differences… and the extent of 
core-periphery powersharing are products of political struggles and bargaining that goes on within 
African society between rulers, their rural allies, and their provincial rivals.”  
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our Bodo story, it is pertinent to understand its relations with the Assamese 
community since both had historically inhabited the same space in the Assam valley. 
Unlike the dispersed and relatively isolated settlement patterns of groups in the hills, 
fate of minority groups in the plains were inextricably tied to that of the dominant 
Assamese community and later to its subnational movement. A small upper caste, 
Assamese middle class was leading a nationalist movement, at the centre of which 
lay protection of the Assamese language and culture. They believed that minority 
groups like Bodos, Lalungs, Rabha living in the plains would organically assimilate 
into a composite Assamese identity. On the other hand, Bodos, who have historically 
shared their home with other communities in the Assam valley, were one of the first 
communities in the plains to challenge the Assamese hegemony. Under a broader 
appellate of Bodo-Kachari, they galvanized a political movement, mobilizing a 
separate identity from the caste- Hindu Assamese community. They rejected the 
historical processes of Sanskritisation that had so far been the only means to gain 
relative status and power. This movement not only challenged unequal membership 
in the caste hierarchy but also more importantly, directly questioned what they 
considered the dominance of the Assamese community in the valley. It was in this 
charged and polarized atmosphere that minority communities like the Bodos were 
operating and trying to find a voice of their own. 
 
The question of identity was then linked with the way autonomy was 
understood in the plains. Hence, the second half of the chapter brings to the fore the 
discourse on autonomy within this political topography. The question of autonomy 
was tied to issues of indigeneity and protection of land in the Assam valley, and 
unlike the hills, it was the Assamese elite who was dominantly responsible for 
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shaping the terms of this debate it in the plains. The debate was a response to what 
they saw as an alarming rise in the number of new entrants into the Assam valley as 
agricultural labourers from East Bengal. The key difference with regards to the 
discourse on autonomy was that in the hills, it was an issue primarily initiated by the 
British as the nationalist movement was not allowed to organize in these ‘excluded 
areas’ owing to the Inner Line regulation. In the valley, however, the nationalist 
movement played a key role in mobilizing around the issue of protecting land and 
identity of the Assamese community rather than specifically that of ‘tribal’ 
communities. Consequently, the form of protection that ‘indigenous’ communities 
received was based on economic backwardness rather than ethnic or more 
specifically ‘tribal’ identity.  
 
5.2 The making of the modern Bodo-Kachari identity 
5.2.1 Identities and social relations in 19th century Assam valley 
When the British came in contact with the Assam valley, they encountered a 
complex social structure characterized by relatively fluid, non-territorialized 
identities and shared rule. Even as political dynasties - Cachari and Koch polities in 
lower Assam valley and the later periods of Ahom polity in upper Assam valley - 
largely practiced variants of Hinduism, non-Aryan or indigenous religions continued 
to flourish among the population. This led to fusion of religious practices as seen in 
the worship of Siva among Bodos as Shibrai; in the female form as Ma Kamakhya or 
mother goddess among followers of Saktism and Shiv among the ‘Aryanised’ 
Assamese. The argument that the malleable nature of Hinduism aided its spread 
across the subcontinent is not a new one (Goswami, 2014; Swatos, 1998). In the 
Assam valley in particular, religious and social practices were an amalgamation of 
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Saktism, Bhakti, Buddhism, Animism and Brahmanical Hinduism. Thus among 
groups in general and the Bodo-Kacharis in particular inhabiting different areas of 
the Assam valley, there were those who were practitioners of traditional religious 
systems known as Bathou; those that underwent processes of Sanskritization and 
were assimilated into lower-rungs of the caste structure; and many more whose 
socio-religious practices involved a combination of both.  
 
A relatively fluid structure of social relations and identities led the colonial 
officers in Assam valley to observe about their religious practices, “in religion, the 
Assamese affect Hindooism (sic), but… are lax in observance of religious rites” 
(Cooper 1873, p. 101). The ‘lax’ in ritual practices was perhaps a result of the 
valley’s proximity to the highlands and a vastly diverse ethnic setting because of 
which the Assamese society evaded neat social stratification when compared to 
Hindu societies in other parts of the subcontinent. Both popular and official 
narratives about Assam have forwarded the notion of a less stringent social 
stratification. However, as this chapter demonstrates, it is also pertinent to note that 
identities in the Assam valley have been inextricably related to the historically 
segmented and unequal field of power characteristic of the caste Assamese 
society.107  
 
The group that in present-day Assam calls itself Bodos has traditionally been 
concentrated in western (or lower) Assam, on the northern banks of River 
Brahmaputra and surrounded by foothills of Bhutan in the north. Since the 16th 
century Bhakti movement of Xankardev, the only plank of social mobility to a Bodo 
                                                        
107  Very few scholars have explored the caste-dimension of various ethnic movements in Assam 
(Bordoloi, 2014; Guha, 1984). 
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was to be initiated into the caste system as a Sarania (literally in Assamese: one who 
takes refuge). Sanskritization among this community is recorded in colonial 
descriptions as, “The majority call themselves Sarania-Kacharis, that is purified 
Kacharis, to indicate that they have adopted the custom of the Hindus and abstain 
from forbidden food. The Saranias keep fowls, but not pigs, and will not eat beef” 
(Dalton 1872, cited in Choudhury 2007, p. 55).  
 
Srimanta Xankardev, a 16th century neo-Vaishnavite reformer of Assam, 
brought large sections of people otherwise considered outcastes- such as Bodo-
Kacharis, Sootiya, Koch- within the Hindu fold. His Bhakti movement denounced 
elaborate and esoteric rites, idol and image worshipping and asserted that the dignity 
of human soul was independent of the accident of birth or social rank (Boruah, 
2014). Despite its egalitarian philosophy, in practice the neo-vaishnavism of 
Xankardev still operated within the caste hierarchy. In order to be accepted into the 
caste-fold, individuals had to undergo purifying rites of passage, a process that 
colonial anthropologists thought facilitated their rapid ‘detribalization’ (Gait, 1926). 
However, the social space that these communities occupied as a result of 
Sanskritization, which assigned them a low position within the social hierarchy, may 
be seen as one of ‘liminality’ (Turner, 1969).108 
 
A network of decentralized monasteries known as Xattras, oversaw this 
process of Sanskritization; and this institution became the hallmark of the neo-
                                                        
108 As Turner (1969, p. 95) notes, “[t]he attributes of liminality or of liminal personae (“threshold 
people”) are necessarily ambiguous, since this condition and these persons elude or slip through the 
network of classifications that normally locate states and positions in cultural space. Liminal entities 
are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, 
custom, convention, and ceremonial.” 
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vaishnavite movement in Assam (Guha 1984, p. 4). By 19th century, several hundred 
of these monasteries, each representing a group of villages, dotted the Assam valley. 
Interestingly, these Xattras had come to be dominated by Brahman gurus - Mahanta, 
Goswami or Satradhikar- who managed to concentrate social power, not only 
through ritual hierarchy but more importantly through royal patronage in the form of 
grants of land and man-power.109 On the other hand, the most non-conformist order 
of these monasteries, known as the Kala-Samhati Xattra, which largely had a 
following of members from lower-most rungs of the hierarchy were continuously 
persecuted by the Ahom state for their radical stances on social issues (Guha 1984, 
p. 11).110 In other words, Xattras over time had lost some of their principle liberal 
teachings as espoused by Xankardev and his disciples and had emerged as an 
oppressive system, exacting exorbitant amounts from those they sought to initiate.  
 
Thus though it is true that the caste structure in medieval Assam valley was 
more adaptive to the peculiarities of the geographical location and demographic 
composition, yet it remained the centering as well as the contesting point around 
which a multi-ethnic society existed in the valley (Bordoloi, 2014). Indeed, 
boundaries between ‘tribe’ and caste identities were in continual flux in the plains of 
Assam. Goswami (2014, p. 63) even describes the people inhabiting the 
Brahmaputra valley as having a “broad synergy” and manifesting an “inter-ethnic 
Axamiya identity.” Despite this, unequal social relations continued to remain a 
marked feature of the Assamese society.  
                                                        
109 Interview with A. Chodhury, historian of the Koch communtiy, Bongaigaon, Assam, 10th April 
2014 
110  This monastic order was a direct challenge to Ahom state power that relied on organizing 
manpower through the Paik system (discussed in chapter 3). Moamaris, belonging to this order had 
rebelled against the Ahoms three times by refusing to offer their labour in the service of the state, 




The proximity of a multiple groups in the valley so far had meant that 
boundaries between identities were fuzzy. This began to change in the late 19th 
century with the emergence of a nativist Assamese identity and the classificatory 
exercises of the colonial ‘ethnographic state’ (Dirks, 2001). As Dirks (2001, p. 5) 
argues, central to the development of the ethnographic state was the construction of 
caste as a “single term capable of expressing, organizing, and above all 
“systematizing” India’s diverse forms of social identity, community, and 
organization.”111 Moreover as argued in the last chapter, caste came to be viewed 
through a religious determinism in that it began to be seen as emanating from the 
Hindu ritual order. Framing caste as a distinct Hindu phenomenon and as the 
primary organizing principle of Indian society, other social formations like ‘tribe’ 
came to be measured on a civilizational continuum using caste as the yardstick. It 
was in this context of caste claims of the Assamese, as the next section shows, that 
the formation of the modern Bodo-Kachari identity was actively distanced from the 
modern Assamese caste-Hindu identity.  
  
5.2.2 Opposing the caste-tribe continuum: constructing the (Bodo-) Kachari 
identity 
The contemporary Bodo identity has its antecedents in the early 20th century Kachari 
identity. By the late 19th century, a small class of Bodo gentry drawn from landed 
families mostly attached to the erstwhile Koch or Cachar royalty began to emerge in 
the valley.112 Despite their relative privilege, commensurate social recognition would 
                                                        
111 This particular evolutionary notion of ‘tribe’ in India may be situated in a historical context where 
the colonial state was transforming from merely a ‘revenue state’ to an ‘ethnographic state’ (Dirks, 
2001) since mid-19th century. 
112 Interview with Paniram Borgiary, Village Headman, Dotma, Korajhar, Assam, 15th Dec 2013. 
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still only come to them after their initiation into the Hindu-fold as Saranias. As an 
elderly Bodo headman said during field-interview, “I remember as a child, even as 
Saranias we were never invited into the house of a Mahanta (upper caste Assamese) 
but were made to sit outside in the courtyard.”113  As discussed in the previous 
section, until the late 19th century, social mobility was derived from the logic of 
Sankritisation where Bodos somewhat rose within the hierarchical system rather that 
opting out of the caste-structure. This began to change in the early 20th century. 
 
Resentment against a hegemonic caste society was articulated in the form of 
the socio-religious Brahma movement, which was successful in organizing the 
burgeoning elite section among the Bodos in the early 20th century. The religious 
movement of Kalicharan Mech 114  (later Kalicharan Brahma) acquired a more 
political element when he, along with other leaders, started convening annual mass 
meetings, modeled on traditional public gatherings or Raij-mel (in Assamese: Raij- 
public; mel- meeting) in villages. 115  This new wave of political consciousness 
provided an environment conducive to the formation of a political identity among 
Bodos, when ‘tribal’ groups (Morans, Sootiyas, Koch, Lalungs) of the Assam plains 
were brought together into a larger corporate Bodo-Kachari identity. 
 
                                                        
113 Interview with Paniram Borgiary, Village Headman, Dotma, Korajhar, Assam, 15th Dec 2013. 
114 Based on the principles espoused by the Brahmo Samaj, Kalicharan Mech led a reform movement 
to discard some of the traditional practices of rearing pigs, brewing and consumption of rice beer and 
animal sacrifices common to the traditional religion called Bathaou. More significantly, this 
movement emphasized on the need for modern education, since Kalicharan, belonging to a class of 
Kachari families under the patronage of the Koch aristocracy, was himself educated in Calcutta. The 
Brahma movement was the first to create a modern intellectual and political elite among Bodos 
(Discussion with family members of Upendranath Brahma, stalwart of the Bodo agitation, Dotma, 
Kokrajhar, December 12th 2013). 
115 Raij mels have also been associated with peasant movement in 1861 in colonial Assam (Goswami, 
1989). 
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It must be noted here that the modern Kachari identity was taking shape in 
opposition to the articulation of an increasingly rigid Assamese identity in the same 
period.116  In other words, the ethnic boundaries of the Kachari identity were in 
formation simultaneously with the growing rigidity of boundaries of the Assamese 
identity. Caste-Hindu Assamese identity was solidifying in a larger discursive 
framework of civilizational hierarchy that the colonial government was affecting 
through ordering and separating groups in the Indian society. As chapter 4 has 
demonstrated, the caste-tribe classification had acquired a far more rigid distinction 
when applied between hills and plains of Assam. This development in turn had two 
major implications for the Assamese society in the plains. First, it implied that unlike 
the hills, the plains of Assam were an extension of a “larger Indic schema” (Sharma 
2005, p. 45). This resulted in the emerging Assamese elite actively tracing group 
antecedents of high ritual status to ‘mainland’ regions like Kannauj, now in the 
Indian state of Uttar Pradesh and Gaur in West Bengal.  
 
The attempt by the Assamese to claim a high caste status was itself a response 
to the dominance that Bengali migrants had come to acquire in the province. Since 
the late 19th century, Bengali (Hindu) migrants occupied offices in Government and 
other middle class occupations in the province.117 Bengali was the court language as 
well as medium of instruction in new government schools of Assam from 1837 to 
1873 (Baruah 1999, p. 58). From 1905 to 1912, when Assam and East Bengal were 
                                                        
116 As cultural theorist Stuart Hall (2000, p. 17) notes about identity construction, “they emerge within 
the play of specific modalities of power, and thus are more the product of the marking of difference 
and exclusion, than they are the sign of an identical, naturally constituted unit.”  
117 Contrary to popular belief, Assamese subnationalism wasn’t a direct result of the movement and 
settlement of rice-cultivating (Assamese came to call them Mymensinghias, as migrants mostly came 
from the Mymensingh district, now in Bangladesh) into the wastelands of Assam. This issue became 
politically salient only in the 1930s-40s and then later in 1970s during the Assam anti-foreigners 
agitation.  
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clubbed together into one province with its capital in Dacca, the intra-provincial 
movement became even wider in scope. British loyalist and first Assamese tea-
planter, Maniram Dewan, submitted a petition on behalf of a number of members of 
the Ahom royalty and aristocracy, complaining how in the present system of revenue 
collection, Marwaris and Bengalees were appointed as Mouzadars and “for us 
respectable Assamese to become ryots of such foreigners is a source of deep 
mortification” (cited in Baruah 1999, p. 59). It was in this context that the Assamese 
were claiming common heritage with the Indic civilization as a counter to Bengali 
dominance in the province. 
 
Second, because identities were much fuzzier in the plains, this classification 
took the shape of a caste-tribe continuum in the Assam valley rather than a rigid 
caste-tribe binary as seen in the hills. The continuum allowed for the colonial state 
(and hence the Assamese) to consider groups like Kacharis in an evolutionary stage 
until they were finally incorporated into the Hindu Assamese identity. This is 
evident in the state’s classification of Kacharis as ‘Hinduised’ or ‘backward Hindus’ 
in colonial censuses. Thus for the first time plains-dwelling groups like the Kacharis, 
who had until now evaded neat classifications and had an ambiguous, liminal 
relationship with the caste society of Assam, were assigned a fixed position vis-à-vis 
the Assamese. In this situation, Bodos began to increasingly rally around a group 
identity outside the caste structure, with an aim of rejecting any kind of association 
with the caste-Hindu society of Assam. The Assam Kachari Jubok Sanmilani, led by 
a small Bodo elite, was at the forefront of this movement. 
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The early 20th century political landscape in the Assam valley was dotted by 
associations such as the Assam Association, the Assam Students’ Conference, the 
Assam Sahitya Sabha, led by the upper-caste Assamese elite with an avowed aim of 
propagating Assamese nationalism.118 As opposed to these, bodies organized loosely 
along caste lines also made their appearance in the region. Associations like 
Depressed classes of Assam Valley, Kaivartta Sanmilan, Sut Sabha, Das community 
of Sylhet, Goalpara Prantic Kshatriya Samiti, Ahom Sabha dotted the politically 
landscape of Assam, articulating concerns and aspirations of specific castes vis-à-vis 
upper caste Hindus.119 These did not directly challenge the caste order but behaved 
as the Rudolphs (1960) have argued in another context, more like interest groups. 
However, Bodos not only posed a challenge to the caste structure but also directly 
questioned the idea of a hegemonic Assamese identity and culture in the Assam 
valley. Contesting the census report categorization of the group, the Sanmilan sent a 
memorandum to the Simon Commission,  
 
The Kacharis are divided into several sub-races. The Ravas, Sonowals, Maches, 
Thengals, Lalongs, Saranias, Dimachas and Husai etc. all form different ramifications 
of the same community e.g. the Kacharies. The census report does not show the whole 
community under one head Kachari. The number of people shown under the head 
Kachari is misleading.120 
 
The absence of inter-dining and inter-marriage restrictions among Kacharis was an 
indication of an incomplete process of Sanskritisation and Hinduisation, a factor that 
                                                        
118 The setting up of the Asamiya Bhasha Unnati Sadhani Samiti in Calcutta in 1888 by Assamese 
students inextricably tied Assamese nationalism to the demand for official recognition of the 
Assamese language (Chauhan 2014, p. 5). This organization was the predecessor of the Assam Sahitya 
Sabha, an important voice in contemporary politics of the state. 
119 These may be understood as caste federations as explained by Kothari and Maru (1970, p. 72) in a 
different context, “The concept of caste federation refers to a grouping together of a number of distinct 
endogamous groups into a single organization for common objectives, the realization of which calls 
for a pooling together of resources or numbers or both.” 
120 Memorandum of the Kachari community in Assam by their representative Sreejut Jadab Chandra 
Khakhlari, the Secretary of the Kachari Sanmiloni, 1928.  
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became socially conducive for mobilization of a collective identity outside the 
existing caste structure.121 As mentioned earlier, the Brahma movement went a step 
further and rejected altogether any association with the caste-Hindu Assamese society 
and began to claim a separate history and cultural identity. The Bodo leadership 
contested the census classification of these groups as low caste Hindus. Kalicharan 
Brahma in his memorandum to the Commission noted, “The Bodos have a distinct 
civilization of their own. There should be a separate category as the ‘Bodos’ in the 
Census Report.” 122  Similarly, the Assam Kachari Jubok Sanmilan said in their 
memorandum,  
Numerically the Kacharies are a strong community…Socially they are regarded as 
untouchable. To call them Hindu will be a misname in as much the Hindus do not 
receive them into their society, do not dine with them and are mostly unsympathetic 
with their ideals and aspirations…This community as has been alluded to above, does 
not bind itself to the chariot wheels of the big Hindu community but prefers to take its 
stand alone and independent of them and earnestly hopes that the Commission would 
be pleased to class them under a separate headings (sic) altogether.123 
 
Similarly, when the Assam Temple Entry Bill was introduced in the Assembly in 
1940, Bodo leader Rupnath Brahma, then a minister in the provincial government 
made it amply clear that “they [Bodo-Kacharis] are quite independent of the Hindu 
society…and they do not care if they are allowed to have entrance in the temples.”124 
The idea of forging a greater Kachari tribal identity was strategically important for 
the new class of ‘tribal’ elite in their struggle against caste-Hindu Assamese 
                                                        
121 Rev. Sidney Endle (1911, p. 29) in his monograph had observed about Kachari groups, “restrictions 
on marriage seem to have passed away long since” and “Kacharis occasionally take wives from the 
cognate tribes known as Rabhas (Totlás), Koches (Madáhis), and Saraniyas.” 
122 Memorandum- Bodo community of Goalpara District by Sreejut Kalicharan Brahma, 1928. 
123 Memorandum of the Kachari community in Assam by their representative Sreejut Jadab Chandra 
Khakhlari, 1928. 
124 Assam Legislative Assembly Proceedings, February 29th, 1940. This could be seen to represent 
what M.S.A. Rao (1984, p. 191-2) noted as the creation of alternative social imaginaires by 
disadvantaged groups, i.e. “establishing a new identity- the kind of image that they want to protect in 
order to gain self-respect, honour.” 
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leaders.125 This was because they hoped to gain from community-based reservation 
and separate electorates that the government discussed introducing at the time. Using 
a vocabulary drawn from the colonial state’s repertoire on the status of communities 
as socially and educationally ‘backward’, Bodo associations demanded reservation of 
seats for the Bodo/Kachari students in all government colleges, high schools and 
hostels in Assam.126 Memoranda to the Indian Statutory Commission showed support 
for separate electorates and demand for a separate Bodo representative to the 
provincial council. The refrain was that Bodos could not enjoy the advantages of 
reforms as other communities did in an environment of a mixed electorate.  
 
Attempts at mobilizing a collective Kachari identity comprising ‘tribal’ groups 
in the valley may be comparable with the MU’s construction of the inclusive Mizo 
identity. However, the category ‘Kachari’ did not receive any official patronage as a 
means of classification in the census and was eventually replaced by the term ‘Plains 
Tribe’. This category had entered the colonial administrative lexicon in the 1930s in 
order to resolve the problem that groups like Bodos had posed to the idea of neat 
classifications. In 1933, the Bodo leadership under the aegis of the political party 
Assam Tribal League embraced the official category of plains-tribe so created. 
Corresponding to the Tribal League’s own efforts of projecting a unified tribal 
identity, the 1941 Census classified communities of Assam with reference to race, 
tribe and caste and not religion, as it was in the case of the 1931 Census (Fuller, 
                                                        
125 This may be seen as ‘ethnicisation’ of identity (Jaffrelot 2003, p. 149), in a fashion similar to the 
development of lower caste associations in South India, who rejected Sankritisation and “prepared the 
ground for an ethnicisation process.” Sub-castes were successfully united to adopt the same name in 
the Census while also being encouraged to expand endogamy in newer territories. This led to ‘caste 
fusion’, as seen among Nadars and Kontaikkatti Vellalars of Tamil Nadu (Ibid., p. 150). The relevant 
unit then was no longer the original jati but groups of caste, which represents the “transition from caste 
to ethniclike regional caste blocs” (Ibid.).  
126 Proceedings of the Assam Bodo Chattra Sanmilan, 10th Convention, Roumari, 1929. Accessed at 
All Bodo Students’ Union Library, Kokrajhar 
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2014).127 In the earlier censuses, a category like religion would subsume tribes living 
in the plains as their socio-religious practices involved forms of Hinduism. Once 
religion as a classification was removed, groups like Bodos had to be classified as 
tribes. This evoked strong criticism from the Assamese elite, who wanted to conflate 
the figures by including plain tribes to maintain the demographic balance (Pathak 
2010, p. 65) in what they believed was an onslaught of Bengali Muslims immigrants 
shown by census data. 128  The Tribal League, on the other hand, jumped at the 
opportunity because it enabled them to present Bodos as distinct from Hindus and 
give it official credence. Here was an opportunity for an official recognition of their 
attempts to create a greater tribal identity; numerical strength was important in order 
to make claims for power in the future- a challenge Bodos have been perennially 
posed with, in their claims for a separate territory in post-colonial Assam.129 The 
League organized a campaign and issued bulletins with instructions about how 
‘tribal’ people could enumerate themselves in the census (Pathak 2010, p. 65). 
 
 The Tribal Leagues’ definition of ‘tribal’ was very broad and included even those 
who have been classified as ‘Hinduised’ in various censuses. Rupnath Brahma, a 
prominent Bodo leader of time, argued in the provincial assembly,  
 
As regards the tribal people of the plains they have their own Tribal League and there 
is a feeling, and indeed there has been a solemn resolution of that League to the effect 
that tribal people should be shown together irrespective of any religion and they feel 
that unless and until that is done their future is doomed (cited in Pathak 2010, p. 66).  
 
                                                        
127 Earlier, the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 had introduced separate electorates and they feared 
population figures for religious communities had become politically sensitive Census commissioners 
Gait and later Baines were skeptical about the censuses definition of religion; they believed that it was 
difficult to create neat boundaries between Muslims and Hindus and the latter itself implied no 
uniformity (Fuller, 2014). 
128 The figures of Census 1921 suggest that the population growth of Assam by migration in the period 
between 1911-1921 was 44.3 per cent (Baruah 1999, pp. 57- 58). 
129 Bodos constitute only about 33 per cent of the total population in the current Bodo Territorial 
Autonomous District (BTAD) (Saikia 2015, p. 9). 
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Even as the League tried to portray a unified tribal identity, it was quite evident that 
Bodos were its most dominant component (See Table 5.1 for current ST population in 
Assam). Other groups in the tribal category such as the Morans and Chutiyas had 
opted for de-recognition of their tribal status after independence, leaving Bodos, 
Miris (now called Mishings) and Lalungs (now called Tiwas) in the Scheduled Tribe 
category. In comparison to the latter groups, the Bodos had greater numerical 
strength and political clout and the Bodo elite was keen to take advantage of these 
factors in the new democratic set-up.  
 
Table 5.1 Population of major ST groups in Assam, 2001 Census 
Name of the Scheduled Tribes Total Population % of the total Scheduled 
Tribes population 
All Scheduled Tribes 3,308,570 100 
Bodo 1,352,771 40.9 
Miri 587,310 17.8 
Rabha 277,517 8.4 
Lalung 170,622 5.2 
Total Poulation of Assam: 26,6555,528. Total percentage of STs: 12.4 (23 notified ST groups 
in Assam). Source: <<http://censusindia.gov.in/Tables_Published/SCST/dh_st_assam.pdf.>> 
Accessed on September 13th 2015.  
 
 
5.3 Autonomy in the theatre of Assamese subnationalism and partition politics 
The discourse on autonomy and protection of ‘indigenous communities’ rights over 
land was in stark contrast with that in the hills. While the colonial masters initiated 
the idea of protection of the hill dwellers from those living in the plains, in the valley 
it was the Assamese demanding protection of their culture and land from the 
government induced immigration and settlement of East Bengali peasants in the 
plains. What began as a sub-nationalist movement due to resentment against the 
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dominance of Bengali (Hindus, primarily) in the province had soon widened to 
include the question of land settlement policies of the government. A popular leader 
of the non-co-operation movement in Assam had decried at the time, “our national 
identity will disappear’ under the onrush of the alleged ‘foreign settlers” (Gohain 
1985, p. 47). Assamese Congressmen moved a resolution in the provincial legislature 
which said, “A piece of land is the only source of wealth for the ordinary people…If, 
however, no provision is made for preserving lands for future development, our 
future generations will be jeopardized for lack of new avenues” (Gohain 1985, p. 41).  
 
It is here that the difference in the treatment of the two topographies - hills and 
plains- by the colonial state become sharper. Unlike the hills, where high costs of rule 
prevented the British from excessive intervention, in the Assam valley the colonial 
administration went to great lengths to increase the state’s revenue prospects. The 
British had laid down a land revenue administration through the Assam Land and 
Revenue Regulation 1886 and unlike policies in hill areas of Assam, this regulation 
did not provide safeguards to ryots (lessees) or tenants belonging to tribal groups/ 
‘backward’ classes. The reason stated was that  
land in this part of the country was still not scarce and population relatively 
sparse…there was no need to demarcate villages or territories exclusively for the 
backward communities or impose any sort of statutory or other restrictions, on land 
transactions.”130 
  
On the other hand, the government tried to change the land titles of peasants from 
annual leases to decennial leases aimed at establishing long-term hereditary and 
                                                        
130 Land Administration in Protected Belts and Blocks Assam (1990, p. 2). 
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transferable rights in land and a continued source of revenue for the administration 
(Baruah, 2009).131  
 
Earlier in 1915 rules for land settlement were published which intended to 
empower the District Commissioners (DC) to make settlements, subject to the Chief 
Commissioner’s orders, on an annual patta basis which conferred on the settlers only 
the right of users and no right to inheritance (Baruah, 2009). Further, the DC was 
empowered to eject, with three months notice, persons who had not acquired 
appropriate right on a piece of land. This was met with loud protests and the issue of 
land settlement became the rallying point for a nascent Assamese nationalism. A 
resolution of the time stated,  
That this meeting views with alarm the grant of huge areas of wasteland to foreign 
capitalists and adventurers indiscriminately in different parts of Assam which has been 
detrimental to the interests of the children of the soil and strongly urges on the 
Government to grant lands to the bona fide Assamese applicants” (cited in Kar 1997, 
p. 18). 
 
 Furthermore, what began as a British policy of increasing revenue generation 
by encouraging East Bengali peasants to come to Assam and cultivate vast swaths of 
‘wasteland’, acquired a deeply political dimension with the realities of settling these 
peasants on these lands.132 The issue of the migration of Muslim peasants from East 
Bengal started gaining a fierce momentum in Assam politics in late 1920s.133 The 
                                                        
131 In effect it eliminate the access of shifting cultivators and hunter‐gatherers of the Brahmaputra 
Valley to natural resources. The main beneficiaries of the land settlement were the British tea planters 
(Baruah, 2009). 
132 The government was expecting this migration to be spontaneous but soon realized that economic 
forces alone were insufficient push factors for movement of population (Baruah 1999, p. 55). “The 
coolies (sic) for tea gardens come to Assam because they are…specially recruited and brought to the 
province at the expense of the persons for whom they are to labour. No such inducements exist to 
bring ryots (cultivators) to Assam to take up land for cultivation and they therefore do not come” (Gait 
quoted in Baruah 1999, p. 56). 
133 Migration was slow and imperceptible till the first decade of the century. Earlier in 1874, about a 
hundred signatories of the Assamese middle class community expressed to the Viceroy Lord 
Northbrook a desire in increasing the population of Assam by importing people from outside 
(Rafiabadi 1998, p. 21). The powerful Assamese landed gentry initially stood to gain from 
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figures of Census 1921 suggest that the population growth of Assam by migration in 
the period between 1911-1921 was 44.3 per cent (Baruah 1999, pp. 57- 58).  
However, it was as early as in 1911, even before Assamese leaders took this issue up, 
that the Census Commissioner first observed, “a peaceful invasion of Assam by the 
advancing hordes of Mymensinghia army” was taking place (Baruah 1999, p. 17). 
The following decade saw a dramatic increase in migration rates as reported by the 
Census Report of 1921.  Growth rate in Assam for the decade 1911-21 was 20.48 per 
cent against an All-India growth of -0.03 per cent a variation of 20.78 per cent 
(Baruah 1999, p. 51). In the Brahmaputra valley, growth of population by migration 
was 55.6 per cent (Baruah 1999, p. 57). Census Superintendent C.S. Mullan predicted 
that in the following decades, “Sibsagar district (upper Assam) will be the only part 
of Assam in which an Assamese will find himself at home” (Baruah 1999, p. 57).  
 
5.3.1 The Line System   
Apprehending the possibility of friction between the Assamese and the ‘immigrants’ 
in a communally charged environment, the administration inaugurated the ‘Line 
System’ in 1923 under which villages in certain areas were specially demarcated for 
the purpose of settling ‘newcomers’ only. Villages were thus grouped under different 
categories such as, Assamese villages, Muslim villages, mixed villages, unsettled 
villages reserved for Assamese and unsettled villages reserved for Muslims (Kar 
1997, p. 21).134 A fear of being outnumbered by Mymensinghias in terms of land 
                                                                                                                                                              
immigration as it promised more income and even supported British policies of settling Bengali 
Muslim peasants in Assam (Gohain 1985, p. 41).  
 
134 In Nowgong district particularly, with a high Muslim population, the term ‘Mymensinghiyas’ was 
substituted with ‘immigrant’ to include all persons from Bengal and Surma Valley by an issue ordered 
by the DC in 1924.  Not surprisingly, there were no separate categories of villages for Bodos or other 
‘tribal’ groups in the plains. 
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ownership and being swamped by Bengali Hindus in middle class occupation became 
the focal point of the nascent Assamese sub-nationalist movement.  
 
Electoral compulsions emanating from the provisions of greater self-government 
under the Government of India Act 1935 deepened the existing schism between the 
Assamese and the Bengalis. In 1937, the Assam Legislative Assembly constituted of 
47 general, 34 Muslim, 9 European, 5 Hill tribes, 4 plain tribes and 5 labour seats 
(Gohain 1985, p. 46). The debate on the Line system played out in the context of 
electoral competition for seats in the assembly (Gohain 1985, p. 46). Assamese 
leaders in the assembly not only argued for maintaining the Line system but they 
further pressed that all available wastelands in the province should be settled with 
Indians only, with a certain amount of preference to the Assamese for the next five 
years (Kar 1997, p. 35).  There was even a sentiment to replace the words ‘Indians 
only’ by ‘natives of the province only’. Time and again Assamese leaders expressed 
fears that the current system of land settlement would result in a situation where there 
would be no land left for ‘children of the soil’ in a decade’s time (Kar 1997, p. 36-
37).  
 
On the other hand, European and Bengali Muslim members of the assembly 
opposed these protective measures for the Assamese. Attempts were made to 
question the parochial nature of the discourse on indigeneity; A.H.W Bentink said,  
So far as the Assam Valley is concerned, the Assamese other than Ahoms came from 
the west, the Ahoms came from the East, the Kacharis came from the North, the 
Sylhetis, Bengalees and Mymensinghias came from the south…which of these have 
the best right to be called the children of the soil” (cited in Kar 1997, pp. 36-37).  
 
Another Muslim leader raised a related point on assimilation when he argued, 
“Bengalees would be assimilated quickly in the Assamese speaking population. They 
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would become Assamese, not domiciled Assamese…but Assamese in fact as much as 
the Ahoms and the Kalitas had become’ (cited in Kar 1997, p. 40). Sylheti leaders 
like Dewan Muhammad Wasil Choudhury and Khan Bahadur Alauddin Ahmed 
Choudhury proffered that if there were any amendments made to the rules of land 
settlement, “the bogus claimants from the children of the soil may frustrate the just 
claims of outsiders intending to come settle in Assam who may possibly require the 
settlement of land more urgently” (cited in Kar 1997, p. 37). It was argued that the 
present system effectively hindered assimilation of the immigrants with the Assamese 
thereby indefinitely delaying the former’s rights as citizens as it was based on 
principle of segregation and inferiority. It was also argued that the Line system 
“discriminated in favour of Hindu immigrants who were free to settle on Government 
lands…their number had grown more than the number of the East Bengal 
immigrants. Yet their invasion is not objected to probably because they are 
Hindus…it is not at all fair nor desirable that the settlement rules should be harsh as 
regards one set of settlers and quite easy as regards the others” (cited in Kar 1997, p. 
43). Proponents of abolition of the Line system also put forth economic arguments to 
suggest that halting settlement of immigration would lead to an economic suicide as 
the immigrants, who were more industrious, brought along with them improved 
methods of cultivation. 
 
The fear among the Assamese leaders was also a result of the prospect that 
Assam could be incorporated in the new state of Pakistan. The Cabinet Mission Plan 
provided for Assam’s representatives to the Constituent Assembly to sit separately 
with Bengal representatives to frame the Zonal constitution for Group C, which 
included Muslim majority provinces. Though there was a balance of General seats 
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(34) and Muslim seats (36), the Plan provided for a simple majority to decide on the 
issues of zones and groups. So the fears of Assamese elite were twofold- on one hand 
of new possibility of being overwhelmed by Muslims and on the other, the old fear of 
Bengali domination over the Assamese (Gohain 1984, p. 50). The fear became 
palpable when in January 1946, Liaquat Ali Khan addressed a meeting at Gauhati to 
campaign for Pakistan. As Gohain argues, “this sense of external danger unites the 
Assamese as never before, disarms the Bengali intellectuals whose misguided early 
cheers for grouping fall silent…and gives a fresh momentum to further advance of 
popular Assamese nationalism” (Gohain 1984, p. 51). In its election manifesto of 
1946, Congress put forward all the basic demands of Assamese nationalism: 
 
Unless the province of Assam be organized on the basis of Assamese language and 
culture, the survival of the Assamese nationality and culture will become impossible. 
The inclusion of the Bengali-speaking Sylhet and Cachar (plains portion) and the 
immigration of importation of lacs of Bangali settlers on wastelands had been 
threatening to destroy the distinctness of Assam, and has, in practice, caused many 
disorders in its administration. For an appropriate solution and redress of this big 
problem, the Congress party should be installed as the Majority party in the Assembly 
(cited in Bhuyan and De 1980, p. 303). 
 
 
Thus the public discourse on protection of land for ‘indigenous’ or ‘plain-tribal’ 
communities was completely subsumed in the electoral politics and sub-nationalist 
narrative of the dominant Assamese. In the name of cultural nationalism, the 
Assamese had sought to iron out the complexities that a political loaded term like 
‘indigenous’ entailed in an inherently multi-ethnic setting. This term would become 
deeply contentious in the post-independence era when Bodos would claim that they, 
and not the Assamese, are historically ‘more indigenous’ or the ‘original 
autochthones’ of Assam. At the same time, as the post-colonial chapter on Bodos will 
also show, many of the early plains tribal leaders were co-opted into the Congress, 
which weakened the Bodo claims in this period. Thus the dominance of the Congress 
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party in the political landscape of the Assam valley mark a crucial difference from 
the politics of the hills. As the above discussion indicates, the Assam Congress and 
the subnational movement overshadowed the discourse on autonomy and this would 
be reflected in post-colonial institutions in the valley. 
 
5.4 Protection as ‘Belts and Blocks’ after independence 
In a context where identities, languages and cultures have historically overlapped and 
coexisted with each other, it is not difficult to fathom the view that Bodos are a part 
of a composite Assamese identity. As Gopinath Bordoloi (1949, p. 27), the Premier 
of Assam and a chief architect of the Sixth Schedule, said at the Constituent 
Assembly,  
 
There are the plains tribals- men who were the original inhabitants and who have a 
culture and civilization of their own. They were gradually absorbed into the folds and 
the culture of other plains people to put more appropriately the Aryan culture. These 
people have now been classed with the minorities, just as the Scheduled classes and 
they have been granted the same rights as the other minority community.135 
 
Bordoloi, who was among the few Assamese leaders sympathetic to the issue of tribal 
autonomy, nonetheless believed that the plains-tribes were a part of the dominant 
Assamese community, owing to their absorption into the valley cultures of Assam. 
Furthermore, unlike the hills, the British in the Brahmaputra valley did not and could 
not physically demarcate tribes from non-tribes given the close proximity in which 
these groups have historically lived. The master narrative of hills and plains as 
distinct geographies and hence distinct cultures also informed the dominant caste-
Hindu Assamese view that all plains people may be homogenously categorized as 
Assamese. However, what the latter had failed to recognize was the fact that even as 
this might be the case, it still put those communities categorized as ‘tribes’ or 
                                                        
135  Available at: <<http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol9p27a.htm>> Accessed on 
March 20th, 2016. 
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‘Hinduised’ in a relatively disadvantaged position due to the historical discrimination 
they faced in a caste Assamese society.136  
 
Overlapping demography entailed an additional practical problem to the 
prospect of plain tribes being granted territorial recognition. Again Bordoloi was 
aware of this and argued that the Sixth Schedule could not be implemented since the 
plain tribals of Assam lived in much closer proximity with others than the hill tribes. 
He (1949, p. 27) remarked, “It was difficult even at the time to carve out any viable 
region where the habitation of the plain tribals would have justified creation of a 
district demographically.” 137  Contrasting settlement patterns in the hills and the 
plains was another factor that affected the institutional design in the two topographies 
after independence. Heterogeneous demography in the valley in the form of 
Scheduled Tribe –non Scheduled Tribe population as opposed to a more homogenous 
tribal population in the hills thus would become an additional factor explaining 
varying conflict outcomes among Bodos and Mizos. I discuss this factor in both Mizo 
and Bodo cases in chapter 6 and 7 respectively.  
 
Thus, instead of the Sixth Schedule, the Assam government after independence 
instituted a system of ‘Tribal belts and blocks’ as a measure to protect land belonging 
to tribal and backward classes. Following the pattern set by the Line system, a 
Committee was set up in 1936 that recommended for enlargement of the protected 
areas for ‘backward classes’. It must be noted here that the criterion to be a 
beneficiary was based on socio-economic terms, rather than by virtue of a particular 
                                                        
136 This point was made emphatically by Pramod Boro, the president of the influential Bodo Students’ 
Union, during field interview on February 20th 2014, Kokrajhar. 
137 Such an argument about heterogeneity was also used against the Jharkhand movement over time 
where the proportion of STs in the census declined over time as a result of in-migration and census 
reclassifications. 
 183 
ethnic group. Acting on this report, the Congress coalition government in 1939 
decided that whole or compact parts of the mouzas predominantly inhabited by tribals 
and other backward classes to be constituted as protected areas. This was followed by 
a Government Resolution dated 13th July 1945 that laid down that all villages in 
which the population of tribal classes exceeded 50 per cent of the total population in 
the village should come under tribal belts or blocks.  
 
After independence, Congress Ministry led by Bordoloi amended the Assam 
Land and Revenue Regulation Act 1886 by adding Chapter X in 1947. Two sections 
of this chapter are significant. Section 160 authorized the State Government to 
specify the ‘classes of people’ whom it considers entitled to protection under Chapter 
X. Section 161 authorized the State government to constitute ‘compact areas’ 
predominantly peopled by the classes notified as ‘backward’ in the previous section. 
When the amendments to the Act was tabled in the state assembly, one of the points 
of debate was whether beneficiaries should be selected on an economic basis or by 
virtue of their ‘tribal’ status. The final Act read as “those classes who on account of 
their primitive condition and lack of education and material advantages are incapable 
of looking after their welfare in so far as their welfare depends upon their having 
sufficient land for their maintenance” (The Assam Gazette, Part IV, 1947, p. 72). 
Thus section 160 of the Act leaves it open for the state government to decide which 
communities could be included under the protective measures and does not include 
‘tribal’ identity as a strict qualification. What this implied was that right to land was 
not by virtue of inalienable right of individuals due to their tribal identity. Rather, 
rights to land demarcated as belts and blocks were based in the idea of economic and 
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social backwardness. Thus unlike in the hills, protection of land rights in the Assam 
plains was not directly based on tribal identity. 
 
 This is evident from the fact that many non-tribal categories were part of the 
protected class at different times. The first 1947 list included a wide range of group 
categories including Santhals (who do not have a ST status in Assam), Scheduled 
Castes and Nepali cultivator/grazers. Since there wasn’t a permanent list of groups in 
the Act, it left enough scope for demands by other groups to be included as protected 
classes.138 The Nepali grazing community which was included in the first of 1947, 
excluded them in 1971 as it considered continuation of the community in the list of 
protected classes of people was “unwarranted and not justified any longer.” 139 The 
community was reinserted in the list in 1996 when the regional party AGP came to 
power again  (Bhandari 2003, p. 121).  
 
The other point that makes Chapter X contentious is that it aimed to create 
compact areas for protective measures in a region that is inherently multi-ethnic in 
nature. Though the Act itself did not mention a fixed percentage of population in that 
it only said ‘regions predominantly peopled by the classes of people notified’, the 50 
per cent mark was based on the Government Resolution of 1945 (The Assam Gazette, 
Part IV, 1947, p. 73). On surveying the areas to be constituted as belts and blocks, it 
became evident that those villages with a 50 per cent population categorised as 
                                                        
138 Take the case of Koch Rajbongshis in lower Assam who have coexisted with other plain tribes such 
as Bodos. Koch Rajbongshis were given the OBC status in 2011 though they have been leading a 
concerted movement for the ST status. But even before they were enlisted as OBC, the Rajbongshi 
people of the Goalpara, Dhubri and Kokrajhar districts, were included in the Section 160 of Chapter X 
of the Act as a protected class. This was done by the Congress government in 1985 as a last ditch 
effort to win over communities at a time when Assam movement had completely delegitimized 
Congress’ government. Interview with All Assam Koch Rajbongshi Student Union leader, May 10th 
2014 Bongaigaon. 
139 Notification No. RSD 26/64/PT/15, dated 27th June 1969, Shillong: Assam Secretariat. 
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protected class were not always contiguous. In order to keep the compactness and 
continuity of the proposed belts and blocks, villages with population belonging to 
general, non-protected had also to be included (Bordoloi 1999, p. 10).  The 
population that was already residing in these villages on the date of the creation of 
these belts and blocks were to be treated on the same footing with the enlisted groups 
in regard to future settlement of wasteland and transfer of patta-land. But after the 
creation of these belts and blocks, none other than the enlisted protected classes could 
get settlement of land. At the time the Bill was discussed in the Assam Assembly, an 
amendment was moved to change the 50 per cent to 75 per cent i.e. a village could 
become a part of belts and blocks only if consisted of 75 per cent of the population of 
protected classes. The amendment, though later withdrawn, was introduced by a 
Muslim MLA who was of the view the Bill if put into operation would result into a 
situation where,  
all districts of Assam will be divided into some compartments. There will be states 
within states and districts within districts…I know some classes of people will suffer. 
There will be a lot of eviction under orders of the Hon’ble Revenue Minister, who has 
specialized himself in the art of eviction and I hope that he will carry on his eviction 
campaign in such a manner that injustice is not done to any class of people while 
trying to do justice to another class.”140  
 
 
These ‘protected areas’ would form the basis on which Bodos would begin to 
demand for a Union Territory and later a state decades after independence. This is a 
contentious issue even today in what constitutes the BTAD areas, created out of the 
belts and blocks on the north bank of river Brahmaputra in lower Assam. The Bodos 
constitute only about 33 per cent of the population of the BTAD but have become the 
ruling elite as a result of the creation of the BTC under the Sixth Schedule of the 
                                                        
140 Assam Assembly proceedings on The Assam Land and Revenue Regulation  (Amendment) Bill, 
1947, Assam Gazette, October 22nd 1947, p. 1473.  
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Constitution (Saikia, 2015). The tenuous relations between Bodos and other groups 
are discussed in detail in the next chapter.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, an attempt was made to locate the modern Bodo identity in a larger 
and complex social setting of the Assam valley. Unlike in the hills, identities in the 
valley continued to remain fuzzy and overlapping, though there also existed a caste 
hierarchy placing the Assamese at the top rung. Bodos, as a result of reform 
movements within the community, began to question their unequal status in the 
Assamese society thereby giving rise to newer forms of collectivities in opposition to 
an increasingly hardened Assamese identity. Even as Bodos were mobilizing a 
separate identity, the Assamese elite viewed the community as part of a composite 
Assamese identity, albeit with unequal membership.  At the same time, the autonomy 
discourse in the Assam valley was being shaped by Assamese sub-nationalism based 
on issues of language and land. Thus in the plains, not just ‘tribes’ but the indigenous 
population of Assam in general were thought to be in need for protective measures. It 
is for this reason that the Assam government instituted a system of belts and blocks to 
preserve land on the basis of economic and educational backwardness of 
communities rather than by virtue of their Scheduled Tribe (ST) status. Territorial 
recognition of tribes in the Assam plains was perhaps also not practically possible 
due to the extremely overlapping settlements patterns of groups. Chapter 4 and 5 thus 
show us the contrast with which identities and discourses on autonomy emerged in 
the two topographies as a result of historically divergent processes of state formation. 
Keeping in the mind these two crucial elements, the following two chapters, 6 and 7, 
trace the trajectory of the Mizo and Bodo politics since independence in the hills and 
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plains of Assam respectively to explain the variation in conflict outcomes between 












So far the thesis has shown that there was nothing natural or predetermined about the 
political trajectory of the Mizo Hills and the decisions of the new group of elites on 
the eve of independence. Concomitantly, the nature of the Mizo identity that was 
forged by elite members of the non-ruling clans under the political body Mizo Union 
(MU), and its decision to join India was also a result of, in Sack’s terms (1984), a 
strategically conscious act. As chapter 4 demonstrated, asserting one form of 
territorial structure - that of the Lushai/Mizo Autonomous Hill District within India- 
and not another, such as joining the Burmese or demanding a sovereign nation like 
the Nagas, was a result of the historical processes of state formation that the Lushai 
Hills had undergone. In this chapter, I elucidate on this very ‘territorial framework’ 
that was institutionalized in the hills as a result of the constitutionally mandated 
territorial group rights in post-independent Northeast India.  
 
By territorial framework, I am alluding to two important mechanisms in a 
dialectical relationship. The first one is, using Vollaard’s (2009) phrase, the 
‘institutional logic of territoriality’ set in motion by these historical processes. In 
other words, territory became an important axis around which politics in the Mizo 
Hills came to be organised. The second mechanism, as a result of this institutional 
logic of territory that enables and constrains political behavior, is the active and 
conscious use of a territorial strategy by elites in political competition. The 
persistence of varying territorial demands ranging from territorial councils within 
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Assam to sovereign Mizoram indicates the salience and hence imprint of territory on 
politics and political behavior.  
 
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first section traces the politics of the 
Mizo Hills in the period immediately after independence. It traces the phenomenal 
growth of the moderate Mizo Union party, only to be overshadowed by a more 
radical party MNF in the 1960s. In this phase, competing political forces attempt to 
‘outbid’ each other using the politically salient issue of territorial autonomy. The 
second part gives an analysis of the conflict itself, i.e. political actions of the MNF 
rebels, moderate Mizo leaders and the Indian government. It takes a closer look at 
some of the counter-insurgency measures and how it affected the dynamics of local 
politics. The third and final section discusses the peace process that ultimately 
culminated in the creation of the Mizoram state with the MNF chief Laldenga at its 
helm. It argues that the solution reached upon reflected that the Centre’s decisions 
were also conducted within the territorial logic that was institutional to Mizo politics. 
Furthermore, it argues that additional and crucial factors of the homogenous 
settlement patterns of Mizos and local minorities and the active civil society role of 
the Church helped the peace to endure. This chapter will draw on interviews 
conducted during fieldwork in Mizoram to substantiate claims about the Mizo case. 
 
6.2 Territorial Politics in Mizo Hills leading to the conflict  
As Figure 6.1 shows, political competition among rival groups of Mizo elite 
manifested in various territorial demands at different points between independence 
and 1987, the year when the state of Mizoram was carved out of Assam.  
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This section then takes a look at the phase of territorial politics in the Mizo Hills 
before the outbreak of the rebellion. 
 
6.2.1 The Rise of the Mizo Union 
A modern form of political strategy came to characterize the politics of the new class 
of elite within the emergent institutional structure of the Northeast. The model of 
territorial recognition of group rights embedded in the Sixth Schedule became a tool 
for this new class of leaders to democratically challenge the traditional set-up and 
firmly establish itself as a viable political alternative in the Mizo Hills district. The 
party of the Commoners, Mizo Commoners Union (later Mizo Union or MU) that 
presented itself as that alternative, cemented the political trajectory that the district 
would embark upon in two specific ways. One, this small but articulate English-
educated Christian class, belonging mostly to non-ruling clans, was aware that it 
would benefit most by opting to integrate with India. Second, it felt that they would 
Party (year formed) 
 
Issue 
Mizo Union (1946) Integration with India; Separate state within Indian 
Union (1963) 
 
United Mizo Freedom 
Organisation (1946) 
 
Unification of Lushai Hills with Burma 
 
Eastern India Tribal 
Union (1955) 
 
Separate hill state within India by combining all hill 
districts of Assam 
 
All Party Hill Leaders 
Conference (1960) 
 
Opposed the Official Language Bill; demand separate 
hill state called Eastern Frontier State 
 





be able to consolidate a majority of non-ruling clans by forging a wider identity 
against those of the chieftain clans. Both strategies helped the party to consolidate its 
power in the immediate decades after independence.  
 
The political struggle between traditional authorities and the emerging modern 
elite in then Lushai Hills at the time of independence needs to be situated within the 
debate of the future of these hills in relation to independent India. On the eve of 
independence, the MU led by a non-Lushai leadership opted to join India rather than 
demand independence or join the British arrangement of a Crown Colony. As veteran 
Mizo leader aptly remarked during field interview, “If they [MU] had demanded an 
independent Mizoram like the Nagas, it would have only reinforced the dominance of 
the traditional chieftain leadership.”141 This decision to be part of a federal polity of 
India was thus largely driven by the internal power-struggle that was unfolding in the 
Lushai Hills at the time of independence. A Hmar leader of the MU had presented to 
the Bordoloi subcommittee, “If the Lushai Hills choose to be independent, it means 
eternal severance with the Mizo countries outside the Lushai Hills. If it goes to 
Burma, the same is the case. So the best interests of those living in the Lushai Hills is 
(sic) to be connected with India” (Bordoloi Subcommittee Report: Evidence, Part 1, 
p. 33).  
 
The moderate leadership of the MU mainly comprised of Hmars and other non-
Lushai groups who were not only from the Lushai Hills but also from a larger region 
comprising of adjoining areas of Manipur, Tripura and the Cachar district.142 Since 
                                                        
141 Interview with Congress leader Z. Pachunga, March 2, 2014, Aizawl, Mizoram. 
142 The old guard of the Mizo Union was led by Pachunga, a Hmar and its second president Lalheima, 
a Lushai was replaced by another Hmar Khawting Khuma from Tripura (Interview with t Congress 
leader Z. Pachunga, March 2nd  2014, Aizawl, Mizoram).  
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the top rank of the leadership was from areas adjoining the then Lushai district, it is 
not a surprise that they were the strongest advocates of its integration with India 
(Chaube 1999, p. 176). The contours of political competition in the Lushai Hills were 
thus being shaped in the larger context of federal restructuring of Assam. The new 
section of elite thus used a ‘territorial strategy’ to legitimize their access to power and 
to actively diminish the powers of the chiefs. 
 
More importantly, the territorial strategy of the MU had a direct bearing on the 
nature of the identity constructed to mobilize those demands. This strategic move was 
aimed towards political, and hence, electoral mobilization and consolidation of the 
numerically dominant non-Lushai population in the district.  Later, by removing the 
qualification ‘Commoner’, the party expanded its constituencies to claim 
representations of all inhabitants of the Lushai Hills including those of the erstwhile 
ruling clans. MU’s attempt to forge a cohesive political identity helped its electoral 
performance. The consistency of MU’s electoral performance in district council and 
village council elections, as shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, in the first two decades 
after independence is a testament to the effectiveness of its political strategies. The 
other political force in this period, United Mizo Freedom Organisation (UMFO) 
patronized by traditional ruling clans of Lushais and Sailos, barely made a mark in 
the electoral fray due to the strong anti-chieftainship sentiment that was actively 
stoked by the MU in its electoral campaigns. Furthermore, riding into power on an 
anti-chief plank, the MU swiftly dismantled the traditional chieftain system, and the 
District Council instituted village councils to look after administration at the village 
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level (Hassan, 2011). 143 As a veteran Mizo politician said in field interview, “ This 
move was obviously resented by the Sailos and Lushais, the erstwhile dominant clans 
who saw this as complete political disenfranchisement.” 144 The MU thus remained 
the dominant political force in the Mizo district through the 1950s and early 1960s. 
 
 
Table 6.1: Performance of MU relative to other parties in Mizo District Council 
Elections 
Party 1952 1957 1962 
MU 17 13 16 
UMFO 1 7  
PLTU*  2 2 
Total 18 22 22 
Source: Hassan (2011, p. 218) and Nunthara (1996, pp. 131-137). 




Table 6.2: Performance of MU relative to other parties in Mizo Village Council 
Elections 
Party 1952 1957 1960 
MU 381 381 280 
UMFO   12 
Total 381 381 381 
Source: Hassan (2011, p. 218) and Nunthara (1996, p. 77). 
 
 
Having acquired a politically dominant position within the Lushai Hill District 
Council (LHDC), the MU then backed a series of institutional changes that further 
helped consolidate its power. Its attempt to formalize the Mizo identity was 
successful when the Census Commission, a centrally appointed body, recognized 
                                                        
143 Unanimously backed by the Mizo District Council, the Assam Lushai Hills District (Acquisition of 
Chief’s Rights) Act 1954 was passed in the Assam Legislative Assembly wherein the land under 
chiefs was vested to the state. 
144 Interview with Pu Chama, former General secretary, MNF, March 13th 2014, Aizawl. Eventually 
they would lend support to the Mizo National Front (MNF) to lead a rebellion against the Indian state 
in 1966 in order to ‘outbid’ the MU.  
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Mizo as one of the tribal categories in the Scheduled Tribe list of Assam. As census 
figures show, by 1961 categories such as Lushai, Ralte and Paite were returning nil 
and people recognized themselves as Mizos (See Table 6.3). The ‘Lushai’ in the 
Lushai Hill District Council was also replaced by the term ‘Mizo’.  
   
Table 6.3: Census categorization of population in Lushai (Mizo) Hill District 
Tribe/ Year 1901 1951 1961 
Lushai 36322 162665 - 
Paite 2870 3368 - 
Ralte 13827 - - 
Hmar 10411 - - 
Mizo - - 13261 
Source: Hassan (2011, p. 218); Census of India 1951. 
 
 
The strategy of constructing an inclusive and broad Mizo identity was also a result of 
the fact that the leadership of the Mizo Union came from a larger geographical area in 
the Northeast than just the Lushai district which was advantageous for electoral and 
political success. The Mizo Union’s memorandum (1947) to the Bordoloi Sub-
committee on the question of the future of hill tracts of Assam makes this quite clear: 
The memorandum seeks to represent the case of the Mizo people for territorial 
unity and integrity of the whole Mizo population and full self-determination within 
the province of Assam for the realization of which an appeal is made to His 
Majesty’s Government, the Government of India its constituent assembly to make a 
special financial provision from year to year for a period of ten years or until such 
time as the Mizo shall assert that they can maintain their self-determination without 
this financial provision. 145 
 
The theme of territorial autonomy, albeit in different forms would continue to shape 
strategies of different sections of Mizo elite and the corresponding ethnic boundaries 
of the Mizo identity. The Commoners Party’s demand to review the arrangement of 
                                                        
145 Memorandum cited in Chawngkunga 1998, p. 305 
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autonomy within the Indian Union after a period of ten years was made part of their 
political agenda in order to deliberately undercut the relatively more radical 
organizations at the time such as the UMFO whose main political plank was the 
integration of the Mizo hills with Burma. However, irredentist claims of uniting 
people belonging to the cognate Mizo- Kuki- Chin group across Northeast India and 
Burma and the ‘ten years’ clause would later be used by more extremist organisations 
like the Mizo National Front to challenge the dominance of the MU electorally and 
politically at large. 
 
6.2.2 Demand for a Hill state  
Post-independence politics in the hills of Northeast was unfolding at two levels: one 
was at the individual district council level and the other at the level of the Assam 
state. On one hand, as the preceding discussion shows, the working of the Mizo 
district council was rife with internal power struggles between groups like MU and 
UMFO. On the other hand, local leaders in the hills were engaged in constant 
negotiations with state level leaders in Guwahati. Often the two worlds would 
overlap when local leaders tried to consolidate their position in the district council 
using a strategy or issue at the state level, and the reverse was also true. Given that 
territory was a salient issue in these hills, the demand for a separate hill state was 
born out of such consternations among sections of local leaders, who were losing out 
in the political competition at the district council level. The demand for a hill state by 
combining all the hill districts in Assam began as early as 1952, first as a result of 
internal rivalry among elites in the Khasi Hills, but also facilitated by the unequal 
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power equation that existed between the United Khasi-Jaintia Autonomous District 
and Guwahati.146 Political groups from other hills also joined in.147  
 
The issue took centre-stage in the context of the first round of states 
reorganization in India, when leaders from five hill autonomous districts in Assam 
came together to demand a separate Hill State carved out of Assam. Under the 
political banner Assam Hills Tribal Union (AHTU), these political entrepreneurs 
wanted “to include any other area or areas geographically contiguous to these 
districts and predominantly inhabited by the tribal people of the same stock as those 
living in the autonomous districts, and whose inhabitants are anxious to be included 
therein.”148 Obviously the hill-valley binary was deployed here to make a case for 
this separate hill state, 
the hills people in the autonomous districts have always felt among themselves that 
they are one people different from the people of the plains. It is also claimed that the 
people who dwell in the hills have had their own distinct territorial areas and lived in 
their own territories ruling themselves in their own way until they were brought under 
the British administration.149 
 
The Mizo Union, in the meanwhile wasn’t very keen on this demand for it felt that 
realization of a hill state would diminish its own influence in the Mizo hills, and it 
maintained relatively cordial relations with the Assam Congress. On the contrary, as 
an MNF leader stated during field-interview, “Lalsawia who was leading the MU and 
the Mizo district council at the time wanted the autonomy of the council expanded by 
                                                        
146 Some of the grievances with Assam government included the fact that Shillong located in the Khasi 
Hills was not included in it owing to its status as the capital of the Assam; the local elite also took 
umbrage of the grant of mining rights to the Assam government over the hills. For a detailed 
discussion on the Khasi Hill politics, see Chaube (1999, pp. 117-135). 
147 Garo Hills, United Mikir and North Cachar Hills, United Khasi and Jaintia Hills, Lushai Hills and 
Naga Hills 
148 Supplementary Memorandum to the States Reorganisation Commission, 1956, p. 1. This is about 
the same time the Plain Tribal territory movement, spearheaded by the Bodos began. 
149 Supplementary Memorandum to the States Reorganisation Commission, 1956, p. 1 
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an amendment of the Sixth Schedule.”150  The States Reorganisation Commission 
(SRC) rejected these proposals and refuted AHTU’s claims that the hills and plains 
people lived in absolutely water-tight compartments; that the hills people themselves 
“are not a people but a collection of peoples” and underlined the anxieties that this 
demand was causing to the smaller tribal groups as well as non-tribal groups in the 
region (Supplementary Memorandum to the States Reorganisation Commission, 
1956, p. 4). Furthermore, it highlighted, 
the United Mikir and North Cachar Hills and the Lushai [Mizo] Hills are not in favour 
of a separate hill state and the district council in the Lushai Hills and Karbi Durbar 
[Mikir National Council] are in favour of the status quo. The agitation in favour of a 
hill state is, therefore, confined virtually to the Garo and Khasi and Jaintia Hills 
(Supplementary Memorandum to the States Reorganisation Commission, 1956, p. 4).  
 
Even as the demand for a hill state was rejected in the first round of reorganization of 
states, it wasn’t compensated with a concomitant expansion in the powers of the 
district council. Both the issues of a separate hill state and more autonomy for Sixth 
Schedule districts were kept alive through the 1950s, especially with the formation of 
the Eastern India Tribal Union (EITU) in 1955 at a conference hosted in Aizawl. 
While the MU remained steadfast on its position about the hill state issue, rival Mizo 
groups such as the UMFO and a breakaway MU faction decided to join the EITU 
campaign. Given the persistence of this issue, the Assam Congress under Chief 
Minister Chaliha, as was the usual Congress strategy, made an attempt to co-opt the 
EITU by offering one of its prominent members from the Garo Hills, Captain 
Williamson Sangma the charge of the state department of Tribal Areas (Chaube 
1999, p. 127). Moreover, each autonomous council was now represented in the 
government either by a Deputy Minister or a Parliamentary Secretary, thereby 
allowing the co-option of the EITU into the Congress-fold. This was seen as a 
                                                        
150 Interview with Pu Chama, former General Secretary, MNF, March 13th 2014, Aizawl. 
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successful strategy in the overall scheme of things, but it left the MU feeling 
betrayed, who so far had maintained a friendly alliance with the grand old party. 
Matters came to a head when a UMFO member became the parliamentary secretary 
representing the Mizo district council in the Assam government. In this period, a 
more radical party, the Mizo National Front, would capitalize upon the brewing 
tension between the Congress and the MU. 
 
6.2.3 MNF’s extremist brand of politics to counter MU 
After the abolition of chieftainship, the chiefs-commoners cleavage had lost its 
political currency within party politics. At the same time the traditional ruling clans 
were on the lookout for new political constellations and alternate political agendas in 
order to contest the dominance of the MU. With the rival party UMFO unable to 
make significant dents in MU’s popularity, the formation of the Mizo National Front 
(MNF) and its radical posture began to appear as a possible alternative force in the 
Mizo hills. An organization fully endorsed by erstwhile chieftain clans, the MNF had 
come into being in 1959 as a relief group to support Mizo farmers struck by the 
periodic famine in the Mizo hills. It later became a political party in 1961 and 
contested elections in the Mizo Hill District in then undivided Assam. Interestingly, 
some erstwhile members of the underground MNF outfit reiterated during field 
interview, “Chaliha [the then Assam Chief Minister] favoured Laldenga’s Relief 
Front with a view to weaken the ruling Mizo Union party”.151 Indeed, there was a 
growing perception at the time that Chaliha was encouraging the Famine Front to 
convert into a political party to undermine MU’s dominance in the district council, as 
                                                        
151 Interview with an ex-general secretary, MNF and another ex-MNF member, Aizawl, April 20th 
2014.  
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evidenced in the Assam assembly discussions (Hluna and Tochhawng, 2012).152 In 
the 1964 by-elections, MNF candidates were returned in two assembly constituencies 
thereby reflecting their growing political clout vis-à-vis MU. 153  The by-election 
results portended the death knell that it was going to face at the hands of this new 
‘upstart’ leader Laldenga and his party in the following years.  
 
From the beginning of its career, the party adopted a radical stance similar to 
that of the Naga leader Phizo. In 1965, it presented its demands to the Indian 
government regarding the self-determination rights of the Mizos. In 1966, it declared 
Mizoram as a sovereign, independent nation and went underground. Its main aims 
were to “struggle for independence of Mizoram as a sovereign state and to unite all 
Mizo clans under one political umbrella” (Zama 2014, p. 8). Before I discuss the 
conflict itself, it is pertinent to look at the strategies that MNF used to outdo MU 
within the democratic politics. Even as a political party, MNF made it clear that its 
agenda, though non-violent, was separatist and irredentist in nature. In effect, MNF’s 
political agenda was a direct evocation of the desire of the traditional chieftainship to 
keep the Mizo Hills separate from India. While the latter failed to accomplish it, the 
MNF patronised by this same class, was able to capitalize on it by using two issues to 
typically ‘outbid’ the MU.  
 
The first was a direct targeting of the MU’s moderate politics. MNF campaigns 
accused the MU of being a ‘sellout’, having betrayed the Mizo people by allying with 
Indian parties like the Congress. In its memorandum to the Prime Minister in 1965, 
                                                        
152 Supporting a faction at the cost of another dominant one has been a common Congress strategy of 
expanding political capital. Congress’ support to the extremist Bhindranwale to undermine the 
moderate leadership of the Akali Dal in Punjab in the 1980s is a similar example (Brass 1995, p. 195). 
153At the time, Mizo hills were represented by 3 seats in the Assam legislative assembly. 
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MNF declared, “Due solely to their political immaturity, ignorance and lack of 
consciousness of their fate, representatives of the Mizo Union, the largest political 
organization at the time…submitted their demand and choose (sic) integration with 
free India.” 154 In reality, as the chapter has already shown, MU’s decision to join 
India was a strategic one rather than out of any political immaturity or ignorance.  An 
ex- MNF activist recalled during field-interview, “The MU-MNF rivalry was so 
serious that many youth joined the MNF in the initial period to contest MU’s 
dominance rather than inspired by love for the Mizo nation.”155 In the course of the 
uprising, about 300 MU cadres were killed by the MNF (Hassan 2011, p. 221). 
 
It is evident that by taking an extreme position on the future of the Mizo Hills, 
the MNF was making an attempt at ‘outbidding’ MU. Outbidding, as discussed in the 
literature review, takes place in a situation where a party portrays itself as a true 
defender of the group position, thereby undercutting the legitimacy of a within-group 
rival. Such claims and counter- claims result in an ‘ethnic auction’ where parties not 
only take extreme stance vis-à-vis a rival party, but also accuse the latter of treachery 
and betrayal (Gormley-Heenan and MacGinty, 2008). The outbidding thesis argues 
that intra-group competition can often condition and foster inter-group conflict 
(Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972). Challenges within the group are deflected by 
redefining the fundamental fissures of conflict as intergroup and confrontations with 
‘outsiders’. This was true in the case of the MNF as well, in the manner that it 
deployed the hill-plains or the Mizo-Assamese/Indian distinction in order to shift the 
conflict pivot from chiefs versus commoners to Mizo versus non-Mizos. By 
highlighting fears of subordination of Mizos in a largely non-tribal Assam and India, 
                                                        
154 Memorandum Submitted to the PM of India by the MNF, Oct 30th 1965 (cited in Chawngkunga 
1998, p. 316). 
155 Interview with ex-MNF General Secretary, M. Colney May 11th 2015, Aizawl, Mizoram.  
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it successfully countered MU’s hold over power. This was the second strategy. A 
year before declaring independence from India, the MNF harped upon this distinction 
in its memorandum to New Delhi,  
During fifteen years of close contact and association with India, the Mizo people had 
not been able to feel at home with India, nor have they been able to feel that their joys 
and sorrows have really ever been shared by India. They do not, therefore, feel 
Indian.156 
 
Assam’s relation with the Mizo elite had a mixed record and the MNF was able to 
capitalize on the souring relations between MU and the Assam government. After 
independence, Mizo Union’s relations with the Assam government began on a cordial 
note as it benefitted from setting up of the Mizo district council under the Sixth 
Schedule, a key architect of which was Bordoloi, the Chief Minister of Assam 
himself.157  However, relations began to sour, even with the MU, as a result of certain 
decisions on the part of the state government that were seen as rather highhanded. For 
instance, the Assam government had neglected the Mizo District Council’s request 
for precautionary measures to mitigate any effects of Mautam – famine induced by 
bamboo flowering that the Mizo elite believed would soon hit in the hills. Chaliha’s 
(the then Chief Minister of Assam) government dismissed these warnings as merely a 
“superstitious raving” (Hluna and Tochhawng 2012, p. 3). Relations with the Mizos 
thus began to sour in the aftermath of the famine of 1959, particularly when the relief 
was partly directed through the District Commissioner, and had somewhat bypassed 
the District Council which was under the Mizo Union. Secondly, the Official 
Languages Act that the Assam Assembly passed in 1960 making Assamese the only 
official language was not received well by Mizos in general. Interestingly, many of 
                                                        
156 Memorandum Submitted to the PM of India by the MNF, Oct 30th 1965 (cited in Chawngkunga 
1998, p. 317). 
157 Interview with BJP party member and ex MNF MLA J.V. Hluna, Aizawl, April 20th 2014. 
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the former MNF underground leaders I interviewed reiterated that these grievances, 
besides their bitter rivalry with the MU, which strengthened their resolve to declare a 
rebellion.158 As a former MNF member recalled, 
 
We could not bear the callousness and the humiliation that our fellow Mizo 
people would face in the hands of Assamese leaders and officials. Mizo Hills 
was one of the most neglected districts- we didn’t have road connectivity 
beyond Aizawl and electricity was a rarity. Despite these challenges, some of 
us got educated in elite colleges in Shillong and Calcutta and aspired to join the 
civil services.159 But in the end we decided it was a bigger goal to fight for 
Mizo pride and nation.160 
 
Thus the party was successful in not only outbidding the MU, it also portrayed itself 
as the true champion of the Mizos in their struggle against the onslaught of Assamese 
and Indian culture at the behest of the Assam government. 
 
Even as the MNF led an extremist agenda, it is rather interesting to see how it 
mobilized the Mizo identity to fuel its separatist campaign. The MNF not only 
capitalized on the Mizo identity that the MU had consolidated over the decades, it 
went a step further to appropriate it as a larger nationality comprising of clans spread 
across Assam, Manipur, Tripura, Bangladesh and Myanmar. In the same 
memorandum MNF claimed,  
 
                                                        
158 This was despite the fact that there was growing perception at the time that Chaliha, the then CM of 
Assam, favoured Laldenga’s Relief Front with a view to weaken the ruling Mizo Union party. In 
assembly discussions, Chaliha was accused of encouraging the Famine Front to form a political party 
to undermine Mizo Union’s dominance in the district council. This point was highlighted during an 
interview with academic and ex- MNF MLA, Aizawl, April 20th 2014. It also finds mention in Hluna 
and Tochhawng 2012; Chaube, 1999. 
159 The educated members of the underground movement, who came to be known as the Blue MNF, 
were instrumental in bringing the militant group to the table, and were actively supported by the 
Presbyterian Church of Mizo Hill district. Blue MNF was critical of Laldenga for having carried on an 
insurgency for almost twenty years. Interview with ex-MNF General Secretary, M. Colney May 11th 
2015, Aizawl, Mizoram 
160 Interview with ex-MNF General Secretary, M. Colney May 11th 2015, Aizawl, Mizoram. This 
quote underlines the complex matrix of motivations that guide individuals to join a rebellion.   
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The Mizos, from time immemorial lived in complete independence without 
foreign interference…The Mizo stood as a separate nation even before the 
advent of the British Government, having a nationally distinct and separate 
from that of India. In a nutshell, they are a distinct nation, created, molded and 
nurtured by God and nature.”161  
 
The vocabulary that the MNF employed may be interpreted as “everyday 
primordialism” (Fearon and Laitin 2000, p. 848), a strategy often deployed by ethnic 
activists.162 By using this strategy, MNF attempted to ‘reconstruct history’ to portray 
the Mizo identity as a permanent, unchanging one. By positing Mizos as a distinct 
nation separate from India, they reached out to cognate Kuki-Chin groups spread 
across three countries thereby making it a trans-national movement for Greater 
Mizoram. In the course of the insurgency movement, the MNF received active or 
tacit support from these Kuki-Chins groups and the movement, acquiring a much 
wider appeal, began to be called the ‘Zo unification’.163 The movement thus further 
cemented the Mizo identity in the form of a nationality. The imagined homeland, as 
projected by the MNF, of all the Kuki-Chin tribes had an instant appeal. They looked 
forward to a state where all the related tribes and sub tribes would co-exist in a 
sovereign polity. The same was true of the Chin tribes of Tripura and Assam. They 
held several demonstrations, mobilized people behind the irredentist ideology and 
frequently visited Mizo hills. Several such families had actually migrated from 
Manipur, Assam and Tripura and settled in Mizo hills in anticipation of the 
establishment of the imagined Zo land. 
 
                                                        
161 Memorandum Submitted to the PM of India by the MNF, Oct 30th 1965 (cited in Chawngkunga 
1998, pp. 314-15). 
162 They argue that ethnic activists are often unlikely to include a sense of historical construction or 
contingency about their identities and their notions about social categories become natural and 
unchanging facts of the social world (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). 
163 Zo is another term used for these Kuki-Chin groups. 
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This section gave an account of the political landscape in the Mizo Hills in the 
immediate decades after independence. As argued earlier, different political forces 
from moderate parties like MU to the more radical ones like the MNF were 
conducting politics within a territorial framework. In other words, political behavior 
and action primarily revolved around the question of territory. One party tried to 
outdo another by making more extreme territorial demands. Grappling with the rise 
of the MNF, MU decided to depart from its status quo politics to start making 
demands for a separate Mizo state within the Indian Union in the 1960s. Thus the 
terms of the political game was being played out within the territorial template, 
institutionalized in the hills of Northeast as a result of long term historical processes 
of state formation. 
 
What was also notable about the political environment of the hills in the 
decades after independence was the minimal direct presence of the Congress party in 
the Mizo hill district in in other hill districts in the Northeast in the immediate post-
independence era. This, as chapter 4 indicated, was a direct implication of indirect 
rule. The Indian National Congress dominated most parts of India after independence 
with absolute majority in parliament in the first four consecutive general elections. 
As a result, the party system in India had come to be termed as the ‘one-party 
dominance system’ or more famously the ‘Congress System’ (Kothari, 1964). The 
Northeast, barring the valleys, was an exception to this. Discussions in the previous 
section make it evident that the Congress wasn’t a direct player in the local politics of 
the Mizo district council. Regimes of indirect administration in the hills of the 
Northeast during late colonial rule precluded the growth and expansion of the 
Congress-led nationalist movement as well as the party organization. In fact, as 
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chapter 4 showed, the newly emergent class of elite in the hills was a direct result of 
proselytizing and modernizing effects of the Christian missionaries. This feature of 
hill politics constituted a marked difference between the two political topographies of 
the hills and the Assam valley (the latter discussed in chapter 7).  The Congress has 
emerged as a major political force in Mizoram today and has, on many occasions, 
successfully challenged the regional party MNF. This, as I discuss later in the chapter 
was itself a result of the way in which peace that was brokered in the Mizo Hills, 
which ultimately led to the creation of the Mizoram state in 1987. Before I discuss 
the peace process, I turn to the dynamics of the Mizo rebellion in the next section. 
 
6. 3 The Mizo Rebellion, 1966-1987 
The early 1960s was a period in which the MNF not only dabbled in democratic 
politics but also started planning for an insurrection. So, while on the one hand the 
party contested in the district council and by-elections, on the other, Laldenga also 
sought help from East Pakistan to prepare for covert military operations, in a manner 
similar to that of the Nagas (Chadha, 2009). As a senior member of the rebel outfit 
recalled, Laldenga and a few other MNF cadres were arrested by the Assam 
government on their way back from East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) but were 
released after an undertaking of “good conduct”.164 In a letter to CM Chaliha, dated 
February 14th 1964, Laldenga had however denied having met with Pakistani officials 
in order to prevent jeopardizing the outfit’s plans,   
 
We understand that this action [of detaining him and his ‘lieutenant Lalnunmawia] 
was because we were suspected to have gone over to [East] Pakistan and consorted 
both with the military and civil administrations there…We can assure you that we did 
not do so. We have written earlier and we beg to confirm that it was our intention to 
                                                        
164 Interview with Lalkhawliana, Former Finance Minister in the MNF rebel government, June 8th 
2015, Aizawl. 
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meet our Mizo breathren (sic) in Pakistan on the border, but not in any circumstances 
to meet or discuss matters with the Pakistani officials.165 
 
 
Despite these assurances, Laldenga and his men continued to plan for military action 
while simultaneously propagating MNF’s agenda in villages and remote areas of the 
hills. They also continued their forays into the neighbouring country to train in use of 
firearms, munitions, laying land mines and guerilla warfare.166 In the meantime, the 
government received intelligence about the MNF organizing bases in the interiors of 
the Mizo Hills (Chadha 2009, p. 34). Given the ongoing unrest in Nagaland and 
concern’s about foreign support to rebels in the Northeast, the government shored up 
security forces in Aizawl as a precautionary measure. Soon after on 28th February 
1966, the MNF issued a declaration of independence of the Mizo hills from the 
Indian Union. It read thus,  
We, therefore, the Representatives of Mizo people, meeting on this day, the first of 
March, in the year of our Lord, nineteen sixty six…solemnly publish and declare, that 
the (sic) Mizoram is, and…ought to be free and independent, that they are (sic) 
absolved from all allegiance to India…and that as free and independent state, they 
have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce.167 
 
On the night of February 28th, 1966, the MNF launched ‘Operation Jericho’ 
under which about 1000-1500 strong cadres overran Aizawl, Lunglei and Champhai 
districts. The plan yielded some early successes as the well-organized rebels launched 
a series of simultaneous attacks on security installations in these towns, including 
those of the Assam Rifles (ARs), the Border Security Force (BSF) and the local 
police stationed there. Coordinated strikes against government forces and obstruction 
of communication lines into the early hours of March 1st 1966 pushed the local 
administration into a state of paralysis. MNF aimed to cause a breakdown of the 
                                                        
165 Mizo National Front Strategy – An Act of Gross Betrayal. MSA Political File, 266/ 7, p. 1. 
166 Interview with R Zamawia, Former Defense Minister in the MNF rebel government, June 9th 2015; 
(Verghese and Thanzawna, 1997). 
167 Mizo National Front Declaration of Independence. MSA Political File 266/7, p. 2. 
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government machinery by capturing treasuries and headquarters, seize petrol pumps, 
neutralize security officials and take hostage the Vai or non-Mizo officials in the 
Mizo district. “We believed that by isolating the security forces, we would be able to 
convince the local administration to join us in our dream for independence”, the 
former defense minister of the MNF rebel government recalled.168 Thus rather than 
starting with small-scale guerrilla tactics, Laldenga’s men sought to seize direct 
political and military control of Mizoram. Interestingly, the organizational structure 
of MNF also resembled that of a conventional government with ministers of defense, 
finance, communication and an armed wing, known as the Mizo National Army 
(MNA), ironically modeled on the Indian army itself.169 
 
Though Operation Jericho was an immense tactical success for the MNF and 
was a cause of embarrassment for the Indian government, it was soon met with the 
might of the Indian state. Home minister, Gulzarilal Nanda had called for “stern 
action” against the insurgents.170 As an immediate response to re-open the only road 
link between Assam and Aizawl through Silchar and break the MNA’s siege of the 
main Assam Rifles post in Aizawl, the Indian government, under Indira Gandhi, 
employed airpower to strafe MNA positions using not only heavy machine gun fire 
but also incendiary bombs. This constituted the only episode in the history of India’s 
counter-insurgency campaigns where air-assault was used on Indian soil and its 
citizens, leading to killing of innocent people and destruction of large parts of 
                                                        
168 Interview with R. Zamawia, Former Defense Minister in the MNF rebel government, June 9th 2015. 
169 Interview with Lalrinkima, Assistant Professor of Political Science in Kamalanagar College, April 
11th 2014, Mizoram. 
170  Sirnate and Verma (Nov 30th, 2013): From insurgency to electoral democracy. The Hindu. 
<<http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/from-insurgency-to-electoral-
democracy/article5406379.ece>>. Accessed on November 10th 2016. 
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Aizawl.171 Furthermore, within a year, the Mizo hills were declared as a ‘Disturbed 
Area’ and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) was enforced. Under Lt 
General Maneckshaw, the Indian counter-insurgency forces implemented the 
‘grouping of villages’ in the hills. Following the British example in Malaya, this 
concept of “Progressive and Protected Villages” involved moving entire villages to 
new locations in order to comb out the MNF cadres and cut off its recruitment bases 
and supply lines. By 1972, 80 per cent of the population had been ‘regrouped’ in 102 
population centres (Sirnate and Verma, 2013). The Indian state’s counter-insurgency 
approach in the Mizo Hills made it deeply unpopular with the local population, who 
were further alienated and became instrumental in keeping the MNF and its cause 
relevant to the ordinary Mizo citizens. “Grouping had destroyed our village 
economies, halted cultivation and created an atmosphere of fear among our people”, 
the former foreign minister of underground MNF remembered.172 However, one of 
the key turning moments, as he noted, in the course of the insurgency was the Indo-
Pakistan war of 1971, which led to the partition of Pakistan and creation of 
Bangladesh. So far Pakistan had been channelling its support to the MNF through 
East Pakistan and the war had a crippling effect on MNF’s military capabilities. It 
was in this period that the attempts to make serious peace began to be made on many 
fronts.  
 
                                                        
171 Some of these painful, traumatic memories have been poignantly recounted in Zama’s (2014) book. 
Also see the author’s interview with the Reuters, April 7th 2014. Available at: 
<<http://blogs.reuters.com/india/2014/04/07/new-book-describes-crimes-against-civilians-during-
mizo-uprising/ >>. Accessed on January 9th 2017 
172 Interview with R. Thangmawia, Former Foreign Minister in the MNF rebel government, June 9th 
2015. 
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In the debilitating aftermath of the 1971 Indo-Pak war and India’s counter-insurgency 
strategies, the MNF began to experience both military and moral attrition.173 Voices 
of dissent from within MNF soon began to get louder, especially from the ‘Blue’ 
faction, members of which called themselves the group of ‘intellectuals’. On 
interviewing two prominent members of the Blue group, who said they joined the 
movement despite their high educational qualifications and availability of 
opportunities, it was pointed out that they were in favour of a peaceful resolution as 
early as 1967.174 They “not only saw through the futility of an armed insurrection, but 
were also pained by the moral bankruptcy” that had apparently crept into the ranks of 
the organization. 175  Interestingly, both the members were also not hesitant in 
expressing critical views about Laldenga’s character and his leadership. Many 
members of the Blue group decided to take up the amnesty offer that the government 
had offered in 1972, thereby further diminishing the organisational strength of MNF, 
particularly of the more hardliner cadres. Another former cadre noted who was 
opposed to peace talks noted, “Laldenga himself began to make peace overtures to 
the Indian government. Our president was deviated from the cause and the vision of 
the MNF. He even sent a peace mission secretively, and later blamed the Blue group 
for it.”176 What is definitely evident was the weakening internal dynamics of the 
organization in the early 1970s, a situation that various peace brokers were ready to 
take advantage of. 
 
  
                                                        
173 For a detailed account of the relations between MNF and foreign actors see Schendel (2015). 
174 Interview with Pu Chama and R. Thangmawia, former members of the MNF, June 10th 2015, 
Aizawl. 
175 Interview R. Thangmawia, former members of the MNF, June 10th 2015, Aizawl. 
176 Interview with Lalkhawliana, former Finance Minister of the MNF rebel government, June 8th 
2015, Aizawl. 
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6.4 The politics of peace: A territorial approach  
The Indian government had refused to entertain the sovereignty claims of the MNF. 
However, in response to the growing instability in the Mizo Hills, Prime Minister 
Shastri appointed the Pataskar Commission to examine some of the territorial 
demands made by the more moderate Mizo parties. At this point, the MU, following 
the territorial template, also upped its game to stay relevant in the political field by 
making demands for a separate state of Mizoram within India. Commission head, 
Pataskar suggested that the Mizo Hills should be taken over by the Union 
Government as a centrally administered area. He noted that on the grounds of 
“geographical location, political and economic aspirations, ethnic affinity, 
international border and the fact of the neighbouring areas of Tripura and Manipur 
being Union territories” (Bareh 2001, p. 105), the idea of converting the district into a 
Union Territory seemed like a workable solution. 
 
In 1971, the Government of India proposed that the Mizo Hills would be 
constituted into a Union Territory (UT). The North Eastern (Areas) Reorganization 
Act, 1971 was enacted by amending the Indian Constitution under which Mizoram 
was formed into the UT with the thirty three member legislative assembly (thirty to 
be elected and three nominated) and one seat each in each House of Parliament (Lok 
Sabha and Rajya Sabha), consisting of a Council of Ministers and Lieutenant 
Governor as its administrative head. With the upgradation of the Mizo Hills district to 
the status of Union Territory, far-reaching powers were vested in the Mizo Hills. 
More importantly, the legislation provided that no Act of Parliament in respect of 
religious or social practices of the Mizos, their customary law and procedure, 
administration of justice involving decision according to Mizo customary law, 
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ownership and transfer of land and its sources would apply to the Union Territory of 
Mizoram, unless the Mizoram Legislative Assembly by a resolution decided.177 
 
What is important to note here, is the fact that the political response to the Mizo 
crisis by leaders at the Centre also seemed to be taking shape within the framework 
of territoriality. In other words, given the institutional logic of territoriality in the 
hills, governments sought to negotiate with these local actors and the rebellion with 
solutions that were evidently territorial in nature. This, as the next chapter on the 
Bodo case will show, is a key difference in the way conflict in the hills and plains 
have been managed in the Northeast. The upgrading itself was a politically astute 
move that not only legitimized the moderate Mizo parties over the MNF but also 
allowed Congress a direct taste of power in the Mizo hills for the very first time.178 
This happened as the MU merged with Congress and the latter successfully formed 
the government between 1972-77. Thus the story of restoring peace in the Mizo Hills 
overlapped with the story of Congress’ expanding base in the region, historically 
marked by the absence of the grand old party.  
 
Yet, it wasn’t until ten years later, in 1987, when peace would be restored 
completely with the MNF and the Indian government signing the Mizo Accord and 
the creation of  the state of Mizoram. These ten years, marked by intermittent peace 
and violence, show the complexities that peace processes often entail. The Congress 
                                                        
177 Furthermore, the Act empowers the Administrator of Mizoram to carry on a special responsibility 
with respect to Border Security and Maintenance of Internal Law and Order in the territory so long as 
internal problem continued. Again, administration of justice continues to be in the pattern as was in 
force before the formation of the Union Territory of Mizoram. Thus, the Village Council courts, the 
subordinate District Council courts, and the District Council Court continue to be the Court of justice 
in the Union Territory of Mizoram. 
 
178  As Brass (1995) notes, the central government adopted similar strategies to negotiate with 
moderate, non-secessionist leaders during the Punjab and Naga crises. 
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run administration in the UT was confronted by another regional force that grew out 
of a human-rights movement against the excesses committed on innocent civilians by 
the state as well as the rebels in a conflict torn region. Retired army man, 
Thenphunga Sailo, gained prominence as a vocal opponent of atrocities committed by 
Indian Armed Forces in the insurgency-torn Mizo hills of the 1970s. 179  His 
movement, which started as a Human Rights Committee to counter the Indian 
Army’s aggressive counter-insurgency campaign evolved into a political party, the 
People’s Conference (now Mizoram People’s Conference- MPC), and Sailo became 
Chief Minister for six months in 1978, and again for a full term from 1979 to 1984. 
Though Sailo is heralded as visionary with regard to matters of economic 
development and humanitarian work, he was also criticized for refusing to support 
ongoing peace-talks between the Centre and Laldenga since late 1970s. Sailo’s 
government not only seemed an impediment in the peace process, but also in the 
overall scheme of Congress expansion in the region. It was in this context, that the 
regional Congress leadership presented itself as the harbinger of peace by 
emphasizing its new relationship with Laldenga, who himself had a vested interest in 
undermining Sailo’s government (Brass 1995, p. 204).  
 
In the first round of official peace talks in July 1976 between MNF and the 
Centre, Laldenga gave up sovereignty demands, followed by a ceasefire. The 
Congress was thus able to portray itself as a key peace broker and led a pointed 
campaign against Sailo’s own anti- insurgency ‘Special Force’ (SF) that had 
                                                        
179 Son of an erstwhile Mizo chief and a veteran of the Second World War in the British Indian Army, 
Sailo became the first Indian Army officer from among the Mizo community, a fact that many Mizos I 
interviewed seem to take immense pride in. 
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allegedly been unleashing another potent form of lawlessness in the hills.180 In the 
elections of 1984, with support of the MNF, Congress returned to power with 
Lalthanhawla as the CM. The political environment was now seen as conducive to 
conclude the peace talks. Laldenga, who had expressed his desire to become the CM, 
signed the Mizo Peace Accord with Indian PM Rajiv Gandhi in 1987. With 
remarkable foresight and political acumen of the Congress, Lalthanhawla gave up his 
position to allow Laldenga to become the first CM of the state of Mizoram.  
 
Given the internal dynamics of Mizo politics during the crucial period of the 
peace process, it is important to recognize that there was nothing inevitable about the 
Centre’s strategies on the Mizo situation and the creation of the Mizo state. The fact 
that New Delhi was considering territorial solutions to weaken an extremist group 
like the MNF shows it was operating within the same territorial framework around 
which politics and identity came to be organized in the Mizo Hills after 
independence. For Congress to gain a share in power, it had to use the political tropes 
that were salient in the hills. Indeed, in a bid to make a mark in the district council 
election of 1962, its main electoral plank involved the Scottish pattern of 
administration, what later came to be known as the Nehru Plan intended to give “the 
largest measure of autonomy within the framework of maintaining connection with 
Assam”, without antagonizing the Assam Congress (Chhuanawma 2006, p. 231). 
Similarly, in its electoral campaign in the UT elections in 1978 and 1979, the national 
party also made a case for grant of statehood to the Mizo people (Chhuanawma 2006, 
                                                        
180 Politician and academic J. V. Hluna said that the SF was actually a creation of the previous 
Congress-MU government resulting after the assassination of top rungs of the police force in Aziawl 
in 1975. In a manner similar to the Surrendered ULFA (SULFA) in Assam or the Salwa Judum in 
Chattisgarh, the SF included surrendered MNF cadres and police personnel to counter rebels. The 
Mizo Congress leaders I interviewed were vague about the origins of the SF. However, as Hluna 
remarked, “The SF had further turned a Mizo against another Mizo through state-sanctioned violence”. 
Interview on June 8th, 2015, Aizawl.  
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p. 232). Thus, along with other political groups, the Congress party also adopted 
territorial politics. The hills-plains binary leading to a constitutional recognition of 
territorial group rights in the hills of the Northeast (as opposed to the general 
framework of cultural or non-territorial group rights in other parts of the country) 
made available territorial solutions in the Centre’s repertoire of conflict management 
in the Mizo hills.  This is in wide contrast, as the next chapter shows, to the handling 
of the Bodo conflict in which both the Centre and the Assam government were 
reluctant to consider far-reaching territorial solutions through most period of the 
movement. 
 
6.5 Other key factors of state formation  
So far in the chapter, I have argued that the terms of competition among various 
political actors was shaped within an institutional context of territoriality, and it is the 
very institutional logic of territory that allowed competing actors to broker peace in 
the region. There are, however, two additional factors of state formation that may be 
seen as contributing towards the outcome of the Mizo conflict. The first concerns the 
settlement patterns of groups in the Mizo hills, again owing to the political 
topography of the region. The second factor is the role of the Church in solidifying 
the state-society relationship, thereby making it a crucial element in state formation in 
Mizoram. I discuss each of these in the sections below.  
 
6.5.1 Relatively compact settlement patterns and nested identities of minorities 
Mizoram represents a successful case of conflict management using territorial means. 
As the chapter has shown so far, the prevalence of a territorial framework in the Mizo 
hills not only led local political entrepreneurs to make varying forms of territorial 
demands, but the same framework also provided the Centre with a workable model of 
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territorial settlement. Indeed what is striking about the Mizo case is the provision of 
territorial autonomy even for local minorities within Mizoram. Three minority groups 
- Lai, Mara and Chakma - historically inhabiting the southern hills of Mizoram, were 
granted regional councils after independence. Given the salience of territory in the 
hills, the nascent educated class that emerged in the early 20th century among Lais 
(Pawi) and Maras (Lakher) submitted a Memorandum to the then Advisor to the 
Governor of Assam highlighting their minority status within the Mizo Hills,  
 
We, the Pawi, Lakher and Tlanglau have our own distinct customs, culture, practices 
and languages, and our area was separately administered by the British. We together are 
the most backward among the tribes in Lushai Hills…Therefore it is inconvenient for us 
to be under the same Local Government with our Lusei brethren. As such, a separate 
Regional Council should be granted to us.181 
 
Regional councils were introduced as part of the Sixth Schedule to safeguard local 
minorities who might be disadvantaged in the territory in which the autonomy 
arrangement is put in place for one group. The regional council was later trifurcated 
into three autonomous councils in 1972 - for Lais, Maras and Chakmas - at the same 
time when Mizo Hill district became a UT.182 As a former Chakma leader in the 
MNF noted in field-interview, “The Indian government decided to create the 
autonomous councils as a measure to weaken the hold of MNF in the southern 
districts.”183 Again, the Centre used a territorial strategy to contain potential support 
for the MNF. However, what needs to be recognized is that there were two reasons 
why this strategy worked as a means to manage conflict. First, was the fact that the 
settlement patterns of these minority groups were relatively compact allowing for the 
                                                        
181 Doungel 2012, p 32. 
182 The existing political competition between the Lais and Maras within the regional council eased off 
when each group was granted an Autonomous Counicl of their own.  See Doungel (2012) for a 
detailed account of the internal political dynamics of the Regional council and its trifurcation into 
Autonomous Councils.  
183 Interview with Indra Lal Chakma, April 17th 2014, Kamalanagar, Mizoram. 
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creation of territorial councils184 These settlement patterns in the region, as discussed 
in chapter 4, was a result of the fact that the hilly terrain led groups to live in 
relatively dispersed conditions. These settlement patterns were then formalized by 
colonial exercise in boundary making and by settlement of these groups to specific 
villages and chiefs.  
 Second, as McGarry and O’Leary (2013, p. 260) argue, “territorial pluralism 
is more likely when there are ‘nested’ or ‘complementary’ identities among the 
territorially concentrated nationalities. While Chakmas are considered ethnically 
different from Mizos, Lais and Maras belong to the same Kuki-Chin group and 
identify themselves with the Mizo identity along with their respective local identities. 
Both Lai and Mara are Christians and speak the Mizo language. Though there exists 
strong sense of self-identity as Lai or Mara, interviews with members of both 
communities reveal that these identities do not necessarily exist in contradiction with 
a larger Mizo identity. Thus creation of autonomus councils for relatively neatly 
settled local minorities has helped diffuse existing competition with the majority 
Mizos while the ‘Christian identity’ has helped forge a layered system of social 
identities. The salience of an over-arching religious identity due to the influence of 
the Church (discussed in the next section) over other cleavages such as a linguistic 
one has been conducive for the creation of nested identities.185 
 
Thus Mizoram presents itself as a successful case of territorial settlement of conflict 
because it fulfills some of the crucial pre-requisites that such a settlement demands.  
                                                        
184 Comparative studies on territorial settlement of ethnic conflicts have shown that compactness of 
settlement patterns of groups and lower degrees of ethnic heterogeneity are necessary conditions for 
the settlement to work (Wolff 2010, p. 23). 
185 This is in striking contrast with the nature of civil society presence in Bodoland, in the form of 
Bodo Students’ Union, Bodo Sahitya Sabha, as these are divided on the basis of language thereby 
creating singular faultlines between communities. I discuss this further in the next chapter. 
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6.5.2 Role of the Church in the peace process and Mizo politics 
The first thing one notices after landing at state capital Aizwal's Lengpui airport, is a 
giant Cross with “Thy Kingdom Come” boldly written on it. As one gets familiar 
with the political scene in this predominantly Christian state, the role of the Church in 
it is inescapable. Unsurprisingly then, in the Mizo hills, the institutions of the Church 
played a crucial role in the realization of the final political settlement. Mizoram is an 
apt example where the outcome of the conflict was affected as much by structural and 
institutional processes as by the agency of key individuals. Reverend Zairema, an 
important figure in the Mizo Presbyterian Church took an active lead in initiating the 
peace process with the MNF rebel as early as 1966. He personally met Laldenga and 
persisted with him to adopt constitutional means to realize greater autonomy for the 
Mizo people. The Aizawl Peace Committee, set up by Church leaders aimed to cause 
a split among the more moderate cadres from the hardliners in MNF. It is for this 
reason the key actors like Rev. Zairema remained in contact with members of the 
Blue group, who were also most keen to start peace talks. Not only did the 
Committee use a spiritual discourse to condemn violence against both outsiders and 
Mizos, but it also offered guideline for negotiating the settlement. In a letter to the 
MNF chief, the Reverend said, 
We would like to remind you that India herself has never been one nation. The 
Telegus are as different from Punjabis as the Bengalis are from the Mizos, yet, we 
together, are determined to build one mighty nation (cited in Nibedon 1980, p. 128). 
 
 The Reverend’s words and keen involvement in the peace process are 
testimony to the fact that the Church has organically been part of Mizo politics. A 
Mizo scholar pointed out that this was perhaps due to the direct role of the 
Missionaries in taking up the issue of the Bawi system as well as in the formation of 
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an educated modern elite.186 Indeed, as accounts of the colonial period in the Lushai 
Hills in chapter 4 show, the Christian missionaries had played an important role not 
only in the formation of a new class of elite but also in shaping the inclusive 
Christian Mizo identity, thereby making this institution a crucial part of state 
formation in these hills. In present-day Mizoram, it exercises strong influence in not 
only laying down the contents of the Mizo identity, which include a combination of 
traditional cultural practices and Christianity, but also in influencing political 
behavior in Mizoram. The Synod, which is the governing council of the Presbyterian 
Church, has a department that engages with political issues such as checking electoral 
malpractices, political corruption and issues of prohibition.187 In 2006, a Church-
sponsored watchdog known as the Mizoram People's Forum (MPF) was formed with 
an agenda to ensure free and fair elections; it even signed a 27-point MoU with major 
political parties, including the ruling Congress and BJP.188 It is therefore pertinent to 
appreciate the role of the Church in the political landscape of the Mizo hills. In the 
section that follows, I narrate two vignettes from my fieldwork to illustrate how the 
church has a powerful legitimizing presence in social and political life of Mizoram.  
 
 
                                                        
186 Interview with Lalrinkima, Assistant Professor of Political Science in Kamalanagar College, April 
11th 2014, Mizoram. 
187 Though conducting research on the Presbyterian Church has been challenging due to the opaque 
nature of the institution’s functioning, Dr. Halliday, Secretary of the Mizoram Presbyterian Church 
was very kind to give me an interview. 
188 In 2013, the Church had insisted that the Election Commission reschedule polling dates in order to 
accommodate the Presbyterian Church's five day Synod Conference.  Counting was also postponed by 
a day in order for Mizos to attend Sunday mass. Secular civil society activists have accused the MPF 
of virtually usurping the function of election commission. The Church issues a list of do's and don'ts 
for voters and candidates. As a newspaper article observes, apart from the honesty and harmony, the 
list also includes ‘moral’ qualificantions such as "Refrain from voting for those who drink or have 
extra-marital sex" (Agarwala, 2013). With almost 70 per cent of Mizoram following the Presbyterian 






 June 5th 2015, Aizawl. 
I attended an after-funeral program with Kima at his locality. It was a good 
opportunity to witness how the all-powerful Young Mizo Association (YMA), a body 
closely associated with the Church, conducts its influence by active involvement in 
birth and death ceremonies in Mizoram. We reached the residence of the deceased in 
the evening at about 7.30. There was already a gathering, notably, of younger people 
of the locality, who were here to attend the ceremony. The morning ceremony had 
involved the elders of the community. It was visible that the local YMA leader 
occupied a central place in the ceremony with a microphone in his hand. The house 
was a small wooden one with space being divided by partitions to make a living 
room, bedroom and a kitchen. Kima observed that the way Mizo houses are 
constructed is symbolic of the lack of privacy and the excessive communitarian 
tradition of Mizo society, a ‘tribal’ tradition retained and even reinforced by the 
Church and organisations like the YMA. Attending a local funeral was ‘mandatory’ 
and abstention was looked down upon.  
 
Wooden benches were laid for attendees, while at the center of the room a YMA 
member was beating the traditional drum as people sang hymns to its rhythm. At the 
entrance the YMA members guarded the donation box in which the neighbours would 
donate money for the bereaved family. The money is then given to the family at the 
end of the ceremony and they in turn return some back to the YMA for its services.  
 
The program lasted over two hours with prayers and hymns, stopped occasionally for 
speeches. The YMA leader was the main spokesperson at the program and he did not 
miss the opportunity to highlight the importance of attending Church and YMA 
activities. He even made some announcements about the communal coffin-making 
activity scheduled for the next day. The elder brother of the deceased made a brief 
speech and thanked the community and the YMA for reaching out to them in their 
time of grief. 
 
Kima told me that the YMA legitimizes itself in the Mizo society by actively 
participating in social ceremonies. Our discussions revealed that the reason for the 
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omnipotent influence of the Presbyterian Church in Mizo society is because it 
combined certain Protestant ethics with the communal traditions of the pre-Christian 
Mizo society. The Church and its associated organizations provide with a wide range 
of welfare services to the urban and rural community. This not only includes social 
occasions such as weddings, death or births in families, but also through counseling, 
educational and health services and of course, spiritual guidance. Throughout my 
stay in different cities and towns of Mizoram, I witnessed very active participation in 
Church activities, including attendance at Sunday mass. Oftentimes, at the end of a 
service, Church elders or Upas would give counsel on current pressing matters, 
including political ones. In Mizoram, it is difficult to draw a clear distinction between 
political and social life and the presence of the Church as the most influential 




“Alcohol is sin” 
June 6th  2015, Serchhip. 
The previous evening after attending the funeral program, Kima and I visited his 
friend Jacob Rosangliana who works at the Synod Social Front as a campaigner. His 
role is to propagate the Church’s views among the people and speak at ‘awareness’ 
programs regarding important and contentious issues of the Mizo society, although 
he may personally have a different set of views. The Synod gives strict guidelines 
about what viewpoints are permissible in these campaigns. He invited me to 
accompany him and Kima to a KTP (Christian Youth Fellowship) Member’s Meet at 
Serchhip. While he himself was a believer and practiced the faith and even preached 
occasionally, he did not hesitate to cast doubt on the current “revival movement” 
that had gripped the state, leading to mass participation in Church activities.  
 
Early morning, today we drove down to the town of Serchhip, about a little over 
hundred kilometers from Aizawl. Upon arrival, we were given a traditional Mizo 
breakfast and were soon put on the stage for the program. The program began with 
hymns and prayers followed by Jacob’s speech. The KTP leaders also gave speeches, 
which were rather long. It seems at every point authority and hierarchy is reinforced 
and it is difficult to escape the Christian life if one is Mizo.  
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Jacob’s paper was circulated among an audience mostly consisting of young boys 
and girls. The topic under discussion was the Church’s firm opposition to the recent 
legislation passed by the Mizo government of nullifying the total liquor prohibition 
Act. The paper went on to quote colonial texts and missionaries to negate traditional 
Mizo practice of use of wine in commemorating the brave and worthy. The students 
listened to him attentively, habituated as they are, as Kima said, in a society where 
knowledge flow was largely one-sided with the Church and the Church elders at the 
top of the hierarchy. The body language of the youth seemed more subservient as is 
regarded the norm in Mizo society where community and Church elders command a 
very high social position.  
 
The speech was followed by a discussion based on pointers given by the author at the 
end of the paper. In a way, even the contours of the discussion were set out by the 
Synod itself. Some of the questions that Jacob raised to the audience were, “Do you 
think that the Church’s opposition to the Govt’s legislation is appropriate”, “Should 
the youth openly support the Church in this initiative”, “Can a good citizen be 
unworthy to God” and so on. These questions immensely reflect on the tenuous but 
all-powerful role of the church in political and social life of Mizos. It also highlights 
the debate of a secular private citizen in a democracy versus a good Christian in a 
tightly knit and hierarchical society based on communitarian principles. 
 
No one from the audience spoke until the KTP leaders had had their turn. It was a 
given that the discussion has to be initiated by an elder. The KTP leaders gave long 
sermons about how alcohol and the act of drinking are evil; it doesn’t become of a 
Christian to drink; Christians are in the world to fight evil and hence the Church 
supports total prohibition. It is interesting to see the same arguments were being 
repeated in a way to indoctrinate the youth into a particular thinking. The Church is 
indeed very effective in influencing public opinions and space for disagreement is 
small. In these campaigns, appropriated Biblical ideas (evil/sin) are cleverly married 
with scientific information about alcoholism and health. 
 
When some of the students did voice their opinion, it was only to reiterate what had 
been said earlier. One went even a step further to say that the Church should 
“excommunicate” those who drink and preach that drinkers would not go to heaven. 
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He also said that legal permission to drink does not imply that God has granted 
permission too. It seemed students were trying hard to climb the ladder of social 
recognition within their local networks and the only way to do that was to do agree 
with the Church’s views.  
 
In Kima’s speech, he raised the point that the youth should make up their own mind 
about these issues and not depend on the Church and the KTP to indoctrinate them. 
The organisers were visibly displeased with such a reference to individual choice and 
a questioning of the Church’s authority over Mizo society. 
 
 
I narrated two incidents from my experiences with Mizo society to make an 
over-arching point about how the institution of Church has come to occupy such 
significance in bridging the state-society relations in the state. As pointed out earlier, 
the reason for this is the role the Church and Christianity played in the construction of 
the Mizo identity and the modern political class. This is in striking contrast to the 
‘ethnicized’ nature of civil society in the Bodoland wherein each community is 
represented by its own students’ and literary bodies thereby making dialogue 
difficult. I discuss this point further in the next chapter on Bodos. 
 
 
6.6 Conclusion  
This chapter argued that territory acquired an institutional logic in the Mizo Hills due 
to historical processes of state-formation. This meant that the terms of political 
competition played out within this framework of territoriality and political activists 
used varying forms of territorial demands to gain share in power. Post-independence, 
the Mizo Hills were dominated by the MU, a party that had come to power on an 
anti-chief plank by forging an inclusive Mizo identity. Intra-group rivalry among 
Mizos brought to centre-stage a radical group that outbid more moderate parties like 
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MU which finally resulted into the Mizo rebellion. In response, the Indian state used 
both military and political means to deal with the crisis. While using brute force to 
undermine the rebels tactically, the government also started peace talks and designed 
a solution that was also territorial in nature. As the chapter showed, the Congress 
itself used the peace process to gain share in power in a region where it had minimal 
presence. At the same time, it is important to recognize relatively homogenous and 
compact settlement patterns of both Mizos and other minorities in the state and the 
omnipresence of the Church gave Mizoram an enduring peace. In contrast to the 
Mizo case, the Bodos in the Assam plains do not inherit a territorial framework. 
Instead as the next chapter will show, post-independence, the struggle for power 
among Bodo leaders has taken place primarily in the cultural realm. The Bodo 
movement has acquired a territorial dimension later as a result of within-group rivalry 
and concessions given to hill tribes. Furthermore, differences in the ways Assamese 
view the Bodos and the extremely heterogeneous population settlement makes 









Chapter 6 demonstrated that post-independence politics in the Mizo hills played out 
in a context where territory was institutionalized. The rules of the game i.e. the 
contestation and negotiation of power among political actors as well as mobilization 
of the Mizo identity were significantly informed by a territorial discourse. This 
wasn’t the case among Bodos of Assam valley in the first three decades after 
independence. In this chapter it will be demonstrated that unlike the Mizos, the Bodo 
movement started primarily as a linguistic-cultural movement in the early decades 
after independence and transformed to a rigidly and exclusively territorial movement 
only from 1980s (see Figure 7.1). Unlike their hill-counterparts, plains tribes, led by 
Bodo elites did not inherit a territorial template from the colonial and the post-
colonial state in the form of territorial recognition of group rights. Furthermore, Bodo 
language movement was a response to the hegemonic nature of the Assamese 
language movement of the 1950s and 60s.  
 
The chapter will argue that the shift among Bodos from linguistic to territorial 
demands was a result of a combination of factors that include intra-group rivalry, 
change in the leadership ranks and a statehood movement for Hill tribes. The 
movement for a Union Territory in the plains was modelled on a similar campaign in 
the hills of Assam. Further, it argues that the hardening of Bodo demands from 
cultural-linguistic to territorial ones coincided with the shift from umbrella identities 
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such as Kachari or Plain-tribes to an exclusive Bodo identity in contrast to a 
relatively more inclusive Mizo (Christian) identity. Again, this was primarily a result 
of intra-group rivalry among the Bodos where extreme Bodo organisations ‘outbid’ 
the moderate voices over time to foreground a statehood movement by mobilizing a 
narrow Bodo identity.  
 
Figure 7.1 Bodo politics- Identity mobilized, Issues and the Ethnic ‘Other’ 











































































The chapter then traces the dynamics of the violent period that ensued soon after the 
movement took a radical turn. It discusses the nature of the peace that was reached in 
1993 and argues that the failure to sustain it was due to the unsuitability of territorial 
solutions in the multi-ethnic setting of the Assam plains. It further argues that the 
second peace settlement, which was considered a success and led to the formation of 
the Bodo Territorial Council under the Sixth Schedule in 2003, also poses 
considerable challenges with continued episodes of ethnic violence. Given the 
overlapping settlement patterns of Bodos and non-Bodos in the Assam valley, and 
Assam’s reluctance to consider Bodo statehood demands, peace has been elusive in 
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the region. In conclusion, I argue that the historical processes of state formation in the 
Assam valley make it an unfit case for territorial settlement. 
 
7.2 Language as opposed to territorial politics 
Unlike the Mizos, the main political plank that Bodo leaders used in the first two 
decades after independence was linguistic, rather than territorial. A need to 
consolidate a political collective had resulted in the formation of parties like the 
Tribal League and organisations such as the Bodo Sahitya Sabha (BSS) or the Bodo 
Literary Forum. The BSS was modelled on the Assam Literary Forum, a body that 
played a crucial role in Assamese nationalist movement both in colonial and 
postcolonial Assam.189 In this period, Bodos felt the need to create this organisation 
with an objective of promoting and “preserving” Bodo identity through its culture 
and language. The Bodo Sahitya Sabha was founded in 1952 to deal with the 
“growing threat to their survival” (Borbora 2005, p. 203). Among many objectives 
stated in the Forum’s constitution, the one that seemed most striking was the aim to 
standardize the Bodo language as a means to create a corporate Bodo identity in the 
region,  
to unite the languages of Dimasa, Tipperah (Kok-Borok) and other allied languages 
and dialects of different region (sic) both Plains and Hills and thus to make them 
common to all of the Bodos by making proper studies and creating common 
literature.190   
 
With these aims the BSS came to spearhead the Bodo language movement in 
the period between 1950s- 60s. As a former president of the Sabha underlined, 
“Bishnuram Medhi’s [the then Chief Minister of Assam] government came up with a 
                                                        
189 Many parallels can be drawn between the Assamese and the Bodo identity movements in terms of 
techniques for political mobilization. 
190 The Constitution of the Bodo Sahitya Sabha (2005, p. 3). 
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proposal to design a textbook in the Bodo language. We went against this proposal 
for it contained more Assamese words than that of the Bodo language.”191 In the 
1950s the Forum submitted a memorandum to the Assam government demanding the 
introduction of Bodo language in primary and secondary schools in the areas with a 
majority of Bodo population. It wasn’t until 1963 that the government of Assam 
formally recognized the use of the Bodo language in Bodo dominated areas of the 
state and extended up to the secondary level only in 1968 (Borbora 2005, p. 204).  
  
In this period, the Assam Congress did make some attempts to assuage the 
Bodo political and cultural elite by giving a handful of tribal leaders share in power. 
The Congress party in India had instituted an open elite system that facilitated sharing 
of power with aspiring social groups (Weiner 1967, p. 470). Thus unlike the hills 
where its presence was historically minimal, the Congress’ ability to absorb the early 
class of Bodo elites in the Assam valley was reflected in the slow and moderate pace 
of Bodo mobilization in this period.192 In the 1952 general election, Tribal League 
leaders fought under the Congress, and two influential leaders of the Bodo 
community were given positions of power in the new political dispensation in the 
state. Sitanath Brahma Chaudhury became a Congress MP and Rupnath Brahma was 
given a cabinet berth in the Assam government. Perhaps these concessions made it 
easier for the Congress government to implement the Assam Official Languages Act 
in 1960 by virtue of which Assamese became the only official language of the 
state.193 The Bodo Sahitya Sabha expressed its displeasure and even demanded Hindi 
                                                        
191 Interview with Jagendra Kumar Basumatary, Guwahati, Assam, February 10th 2014. 
192 As Myron Weiner (1967, p. 470) argues, “Local village factions and castes that wanted greater 
access to the government were encouraged by dissident groups within the Congress to join the intra-
party struggles. As a result, new social groups and new elites joined the party.”    
193 However, while the Congress system in Assam as elsewhere in India facilitated a form of ‘catch-
all’, consensual politics, the inner logic of this consensus still seemed to be playing out in favour of 
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to be the official language of Assam in an act of protest. However, the president of 
the organization Ranendra Basumatari was also given a Congress nomination from an 
Assembly seat and subsequently made a minister, thereby thwarting any major 
dissent (Choudhury 2006, p. 96). 
 
The co-option of Bodo leaders into the Congress party had halted, albeit 
temporarily, the politicization of the ‘tribal-non-tribal’ (also Bodo-Assamese) 
cleavage in Assam. This is evident from the fact that over a lakh of Bodos still 
returned Assamese as their mother tongue in 1951 and 1961 census.194 The 1951 
Census Superintendent of Assam had remarked, “With the solitary exception of 
Assamese, every single language or language group in Assam shows a decline in the 
percentage of people speaking the same. All this decline has gone to swell the 
percentage of people speaking Assamese in 1951.”195 This was despite the fact that 
an aggressive movement for official recognition of the Assamese language was at its 
peak at the time. The language movement was fuelled by internal power struggles 
within the Assam Congress between the ousted CM Bishnuram Medhi and the 
incumbent Bimala Prasad Chaliha, who replaced him in 1957 with the support of the 
national leadership. It was the Medhi group within the Congress that gave an initial 
impetus for the movement in 1950s, an issue that was already the raison d’être for the 
Assam Sahitya Sabha (Choudhury 2006, p. 101). Loyalty to the Congress dis-
incentivized the old guard of Bodo leaders from openly protesting against the 
                                                                                                                                                              
dominant interests (Yadav and Palshikar 2006, p. 79). It is correct that the plains tribes in Assam 
initially supported the party. However, as Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar argue, “At the same 
time, the party and the Congress system worked to keep the Dalits, adivasis, peasants and workers, at a 
distance from positions of power. The Congress system was based on a trade off: the Congress Party 
would symbolically incorporate the various social sections, but the party’s upper class-upper caste 
leadership should be recognized as legitimate and as representative of the masses” (Ibid, p. 80). 
194 << http://online.assam.gov.in/web/guest%20/people?webContentId=174762. >> [Accessed on 
September 13th 2015]. 
195 Census of India, Assam, Manipur, Tripura, Vol. XII, Part 1-A, pp. 410-414. 
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Assamese language movement; instead, it was mainly interpreted as a collision of 
Assamese and Bengali interests. Thus the Bodo-Assamese cleavage was relatively a 
dormant one when it was playing out on the linguistic and cultural front.   
 
 
The Census of 1961 depicted 93.63 per cent Bodos as Hindus and a decline in 
growth rate of Bodo language speakers seemed to imply their willingness to accept 
the Assamese language. But the antagonistic reactions of the BSS leadership made 
the Assamese elite realize that it was only their wishful thinking. In 1974-75, the 
Sabha launched a movement for the adoption of the Roman script for the Bodo 
language, which until then was being written in the Assamese script. This movement 
made it amply clear that Bodos were neither eager to be part of the process of 
Hinduisation nor that of ‘Assamisation’. The Bodo sentiment was to challenge the 
“unequal assimilation” and “seek differentiation from, and equality with” the 
Assamese (Baruah 1999, p. 183).  For the Assamese, on the other hand, the rejection 
of the Assamese nationality by the Bodos was a rejection much greater than that of 
the Khasis and the Nagas, for they assumed that Bodos, being part of their ‘valley 
civilization’ would organically assimilate into the Assamese identity. In other words, 
the dominant Assamese community was expecting the Bodos to accept the Assamese 
language at the cost of their own language and culture (Prabhakara, 1974). 
 
It is crucial to understand why linguistic and not territorial demands as seen 
among Mizos and Nagas, emerged as the “most visible symbol of the desire to 
differentiate – and one of the most important battlegrounds of Bodo cultural politics” 
(Baruah 1999, p. 185) in the first phase of the movement. This was because there was 
not an alternate discourse on autonomy present in the Assam valley as seen in the 
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hills. As argued in chapter 5, plains tribes like Bodos were not seen as suitable 
candidates for territorial autonomy because of the rigidity that the plains-hills binary 
had acquired since the early 20th century. Bodos thus modelled their identity 
movement on a template that was dominant in valley politics at the time – a linguistic 
one. They were negotiating Bodo interests in a political system where the dominant 
community i.e. the Assamese, were mobilizing a language movement in the 1960s.196 
In post-colonial Assam, the Assamese elite in power began the language 
standardizing process to mark out the distinctiveness of the Assamese nationality and 
culture in opposition to the Bengali nationality.197 The Assamese-Bengali cleavage 
was an old one, acquiring political salience during the colonial period as a result of 
the domination of Hindu Bengalis in jobs and use of Bengali as the court 
language/language of instruction in government schools of Assam. The over-arching 
sentiment of the Assamese elite before independence was that “unless the province of 
Assam is organized based on Assamese language and Assamese culture, the survival 
of the Assamese nationality will become impossible” (cited in Sharma, p. 204). 
Immediately after independence, the demand for formalizing an Assamese public 
identity for Assam began to get more vociferous.198 However, as this section showed, 
language demands of the Assamese ruling class managed to further alienate 
                                                        
196 In India, the official language of the state determines access to state employment and therefore 
access to control of the state. Interestingly, the issue of official languages is negotiable and a language 
can be listed as official through simple majority legislation by the state assembly or through a central 
government directive (Article 345, Constitution of India). This incentivizes people to mobilize as 
linguistic groups and language thus becomes a tool to gain access to power in India (Chandra, 2005). 
197 As Sarangi (2009) argues, language and politics can interact to reproduce social hierarchies and 
inequalities; language often becomes a cultural capital which provides a sense of belonging to 
communities and which may be then integrated within the territorial limits of the nation. However, 
Brass (2009) argues that ethnicity and language are not inherently related and that language is not 
necessarily the primary form of ethnic affiliation. In contrast to Gellner (1983), he suggests that the 
nation-construction process in multicultural societies can begin with any of the central symbols- 
language, religion or any other cultural marker depending on specific socio-political conditions. 
198 These were of course opposed by Bengali organisations in Cachar, who argued for Bengali being 
accorded the status of an official language of Assam along with Assamese. Contestations over 
language culminated into the violent language riots of Assam in 1960-61 and later in 1971, killing 
many people on both sides (Baruah, 1999). 
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minorities in Assam like the Bodos and the latter began to use the same issue of 
language to decry their unequal status in the Assamese society. Thus unlike hills 
tribes such as the Mizos who had a territorial template available to them, the Bodos 
adopted a different set of political repertoire involving cultural and language demands 
that was the dominant and institutionalized mode of politics in the Assam valley. If 
Bodo politics centred on the question of language and culture, how and why did it 
transform into a violent statehood movement? I answer this question in the next 
section. 
 
7.3 Militant phase: shift to territorial demands and exclusive Bodo identity  
The co-option of the older, more moderate Bodo elite into Congress and 
accommodation of some their linguistic demands had slackened the pace of the Bodo 
movement. The status quo was then challenged in the 1960s by the formation of the 
All Bodo Students’ Union (ABSU) consisting of young blood and more radical 
views. It was this new group of elite that would challenge the existing power relations 
by transforming the movement into a territorial one. As among Mizos, internal power 
struggles in the Bodo community were a driving force for the emergence of extremist 
demands and violence. The territorial movement would begin modestly with demands 
for a UT, modelled on the similar demands by their counterparts in the hills. 
However, intra and inter-group rivalry would ultimately harden these territorial 
demands into a statehood movement. Furthermore, as this section will illuminate, 
unlike the MNF who continued to mobilize an inclusive, pan-Zo identity, Bodos in 
the later stages of the movement shed all pretensions of representing all plain tribes 
and began to speak exclusively on behalf of Bodos. 
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7.3.1 The Udayachal Movement 
The dynamics of Bodo politics and identity formation is a result of both inter-group 
and intra-group struggle. While the main political cleavage at the time was Bodo/ 
Assamese, the Bodo elite itself was undergoing internecine rivalry as new political 
aspirants and organisations began to challenge the status quo. The Congress Bodo 
leaders represented an early class of elite from the community. As chapter 5 
illustrated, they were mostly a product of the Brahma movement and belonged to 
landed families and owed their allegiance to the grand old party. By the 1960s, there 
were two categories of Bodo leaders who were increasingly disenchanted by the 
existing political constellation and wanted a direct share in power. These included 
members of the existing Bodo elite who fell out with the Congress and an emerging 
section of elite among the youth.199 Samar Brahma Choudhury, son of the first Bodo 
M.P. Sitanath Brahma and son-in-law of veteran leader Rupnath Brahma was 
groomed to be the heir-apparent of the community (Choudhury 2007, p. 121). But as 
a senior Congress Bodo leader pointed out during a field interview, “Instead, the 
Assam Congress positioned another candidate Ravindranath Basumatari as the next 
Bodo representative, bypassing Samar Choudhury completely. There were other 
Bodo leaders who fell out with Congress and ended up supporting Choudhury to form 
a new political party, the Plain Tribal Council of Assam (PTCA).” 200 In other words, 
Assamese leaders wanted to keep the Bodos as a divided house to allow some room
                                                        
199 Interview with Pramod Boro, President ABSU, Kokrajhar, February 20th 2014. 
200 Interview with ex- Assam Congress MLA, February 20 2014, Guwahati, Assam. 
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for bargaining if the need arose in the future. Assamese elites under CM Medhi were 
certainly not pleased with the Bodo language movement. While Medhi was 
successful in splitting the Bodos leading to the formation of PTCA, internal dynamics 
within the community led to a shift towards a more radical form of politics. This is 
when sections of the Bodo youth came together to form the All Bodo Students Union 
(ABSU), with an aim to seek some form of territorial recognition for the group.201  
By 1973, the Students’ Union was vociferously supporting the PTCA to galvanize a 
movement for a separate Union Territory called Udayachal for Plain tribals of 
Assam.  
 
There were two main triggers that seemed to have emboldened the Bodo neo-
elite to make a shift in their political agenda to include territorial demands. The first 
one was rooted in the reports of misappropriation of land within the tribal belts and 
blocks, reserved only for ‘protected classes’. As a founding member of the ABSU 
noted, “the tribal belts and blocks seemed to protect our land rights in paper only. On 
one hand there were illegal occupation of ‘tribal land’ and on the other the 
government did not hesitate to classify many acres of cultivable land as reserved 
forests.”202 The PTCA in its memorandum to the President in 1967 also lamented, 
The District Tribal Sangha has observed with grave concern that in May 1952 the 
Government alienated an area of 4037 bighas of cultivable land from the Bijni Tribal 
Bloc constituted in 1947 and included it in the Panbari Reserved Forests, and in 1961, 
an area of about 1000 bighas of cultivable land of the said block was included in the 
Bishnupur Colony which has been created to accommodate the refugees from East 
Pakistan, thus making the land problems of the landless tribals within the tribal bloc 
more dangerous.203 
 
                                                        
201 Interview with Hiracharan Narzary, founding member of ABSU, November 24 2013, Udalguri, 
Assam. 
202 Ibid. 
203 PTCA memorandum, May 20, 1967, ABSU Headquarters, Kokrajhar. 
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Though the Assam government proclaimed a break from the past land policies of the 
colonial state by instituting 42 tribal belts and blocks in the plains, in reality land 
alienation remained unabated.204 On several occasions, the Assamese government 
had chosen to “de-reserve” certain tracts of tribal homelands. For example, in order to 
facilitate the construction of a new capital complex in Assam, almost an entire tribal 
belt was “de-tribalized” (Vandekerckhove 2009, p. 529). Furthermore, by the 1980s 
the Assamese government even decided to legalize certain Bangladeshi settlements in 
these tribal tracts, as part of a poverty reduction program (Baruah, 2007). Similarly, 
state policies turned many forest areas into sanctuaries or national parks, which 
legally allowed extinguishing rights of the local communities to own land in or 
around them (Suykens and Vandekerckhove, 2010). By 1980s, the tribal population 
in the northwest of Assam was enclosed by a substantially large forest zone of 
3539.95 square kilometres of which, in juridical terms, more than 80 percent was not 
accessible to them (Vandekerckhove 2009, pp. 528-29). The tribal belts and blocks 
had failed to protect lands of local communities in the plain areas and became the 
trigger for the Bodo elite to seek territorial protection. 
Second, and more importantly, as an ABSU founding member recalled, “On 
January 13, 1967, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi made a statement to the effect that 
the central government was examining a proposal for reorganizing Assam on a 
federal basis. We welcomed this announcement warmly and felt that time was right 
for us to demand for a separate territory for the Plain tribal people of Assam.”205 As 
the previous chapter showed, the PM’s announcement was mainly concerned with the 
hill tribes of Assam, particularly in relation to the Mizo insurgency. By doing so, 
                                                        
204 In this context, land alienation refers to the illicit transferring of land, through lease or sale, from 
ST communities to non-ST groups (Vandekerckhove, 2009). 
205 Interview with Hiracharan Narzary, founding member of ABSU, November 24 2013, Udalguri, 
Assam.  
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Mrs. Gandhi was making an attempt to appease the moderate Mizo leaders who were 
demanding a separate state for Mizos within the Indian Union as opposed to the 
secession demands of the armed Mizo National Front. However, the new breed of 
Bodo elite felt that putting pressure on the government might yield into some form of 
territorial concessions for their community as well. 
 
It was against this political backdrop, that Bodos under the PTCA launched a 
movement for a Union Territory for the Plain tribes. PTCA’s memorandum to the 
President of India stated, 
That the Plain Tribals’ Council of Assam considers that it will be a great injustice to 
the plain tribals of Assam if their genuine grievances, sentiments and viewpoints on 
the issue of the proposed reorganization of the state of Assam on federal basis are not 
given due importance and sympathetic consideration…The Plains Tribals’ Council of 
Assam deem that full autonomy within the framework of the Indian Constitution will 
alone help the plain tribals grow according to their own genius and tradition. The 
Plains Tribals’ Council of Assam have since long been demanding full autonomy 
comprising the predominantly tribal inhabited areas if the plains of Assam.206 
 
The territory that the PTCA demanded was none other than the 42 tribal belts and 
blocks that were created by an amalgamation of both tribal majority and non-tribal 
villages. The demographic overlap, as the following sections will discuss, became a 
formidable challenge for Bodos in their bid to create a separate homeland leading to 
inter-group clashes and violence. 
 
The move to demand a Union Territory in 1973 may also be understood within 
the framework of ethnic outbidding. The PTCA representing the new sections of 
Bodo elite was trying to deal with both inter-group and intra group rivalry: first by 
creatively deploying the already salient Bodo-Assamese political cleavage and 
second, by attempting to ‘outbid’ the older Bodo elite, who were aligned with 
                                                        
206 PTCA memorandum, May 20, 1967. 
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Congress, by portraying themselves as true defenders of the Bodo interests. This 
strategy even paid electoral dividends for the PTCA in parliamentary elections of 
1977 when PTCA leader Charan Narzary defeated his rival, a veteran Congress Bodo 
leader Dharanidhar Basumatari, in the Kokrajhar (ST) seat of Assam by polling 56.49 
per cent of total vote share (Statistical Report on General Elections 1977, p. 124).207 
It is pertinent to note that in these elections, held after the Emergency had been called 
off, Assam returned Congress candidates in 10 out of 14 seats and the party vote 
share in the state was high at 50.56 per cent (Statistical Report on General Elections 
1977, p. 87). Hence Narzary’s win was a significant political sucsess for PTCA as it 
was the first time that a Bodo M.P. in Kokrajhar was not from the Congress party. 
 
In a competitive environment, factional rivalry was becoming a hallmark of 
Bodo politics. As a senior Bodo activist recalled, “With a confidence that political 
loyalties of Bodos were shifting away from Congress, Narzary and Choudhury 
[PTCA leaders] announced that the party was giving up the demand for a separate 
territory for plain tribes and would work within the state of Assam.” 208 Political 
rivalry among the Bodo elite in the late 1970s needs to be situated in the context of a 
mass movement led by Assamese student leaders against the alleged enrolment of 
‘illegal’ immigrants from Bangladesh into the electoral rolls of Assam as well as 
illegal encroachment of land. As chapter 4 has shown, illegal immigration became a 
polarizing issue in Assam from the colonial period onwards and continued to 
dominate the political discourse in the state after independence. In this context, 
PTCA leaders, Narzary and Choudhury had dropped their Udayachal demands and 
                                                        
207  <<http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/StatisticalReports/LS_1977/Vol_I_LS_77.pdf>>. Accessed on July 
23rd 2015. 
208  Interview with Hiracharan Narzary, founding member of ABSU, November 24 2013, Udalguri, 
Assam. 
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joined hands with Assamese student leaders in their agitation against the Congress 
and illegal immigrants. This move was not received well by the Bodo Student wing 
i.e. ABSU, an organization that had by then acquired a pivotal role in mobilizing 
Bodo opinion and support. To quote an ex- General Secretary of ABSU, “Party 
hardliners and the youth strongly resented this development and there was a sense of 
betrayal.” 209 In a memorandum sent to the President later in 1987, the ABSU used 
strong language against Samar Choudhury, “Chaudhury, the most treacherous 
opportunist (with devil mastermind) PTCA leader bartered Udayachal in lieu of 
ministership in Janata regime.”210 Choudhury was found murdered in 1992 allegedly 
by Bodo militants.211  
  
7.3.2 A militant turn: Bodoland for Bodos only 
Following a vehement and sustained criticism of the PTCA leadership, there was a 
split in the party and the young hardliners formed a new party PTCA (Progressive) and 
brought back the question of a separate Union territory to the forefront (Choudhury 
2007, p. 137). Interestingly, the Progressive party changed the name from the Sanskrit 
term Udayachal to an English one called Mishing- Bodoland. Assamese historian 
Hiren Gohain noted, “This transformation was a significant one for Bodo politics as it 
reflected further change of leadership in that the President of the new faction, Binay 
Khungur Basumutari, was the first Christian Bodo leader and was from a non-Brahma 
                                                        
209 Interview with ex-General Secretary of ABSU, Nov 26 2013, Kokrajhar, Assam. 
210 ABSU Memorandum to President, Nov 10 1987, ABSU Hq. Kokrajhar Assam. 
211 Interview with ex-General Secretary of ABSU, Nov 26 2013, Kokrajhar, Assam. 
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background.” 212 Further the second rank leaders of the party were mostly Christian 
youth educated in Shillong, the then capital of Assam.213   
 
The Progressive faction seemed to be primarily addressing the hardliners within 
the PTCA. 214  While the PTCA had abandoned the demand of autonomy and 
formulated a working alliance with Assam Students’ Union to participate in the anti-
foreigners agitation, the Progressives were vociferously against the agitation. It 
identified the Assam agitation as ‘anti-tribal’ guided by a chauvinistic force aiming 
towards ‘Assamization’ of the tribals.215 By taking an extreme position and portraying 
the existing leadership as disloyal, Basumatari was able to draw the hardliners and the 
youth to form the Progressive group.216  
 
This marked not only a shift in the membership of the Bodo political 
organisations but also in their outlook and aims.  The Bodo student’s body (ABSU) 
was able to successfully project itself as the main representative of Bodo aspirants by 
galvanizing a movement for separate state for Bodos. In 1987, Upendranath Brahma 
took over the reigns of ABSU and shed any pre-existing perceptions of speaking for 
                                                        
212 Interview with Hiren Gohain, Nov 4th 2013, Guwahati, Assam. The demand for the Roman script 
for the Bodo language in the 1970s was part of the process by which the Christian Bodo faction was 
attempting to outbid the traditional elite, predominantly a product of the Brahma movement. 
213 Interview with Khampa Borgiary, Nov 4th 2013, Guwahati, Assam; Also, Choudhury 2007, p. 138. 
214 Intragroup rivalry in contexts of ethnic conflict can often be analyzed in terms of resources and the 
audiences to which the rivaling elites appeal (Casperson, 2008). Casperson’s observation from the 
Croatian case is relevant here, “The audiences of greatest significance for this process of outbidding 
was not the general population, as generally argued in the theory of outbidding, but rather audiences 
within the party” (Ibid, p. 245). 
215 Interview with Khampa Borgiary, Executive member of BTC Nov 4th 2013, Guwahati, Assam; 
Also, Choudhury 2007. 
216 PTCA did not make any immediate electoral losses as a consequence of the widespread criticism 
and the split. In fact an electoral alliance with the Assamese Student leaders (who came to form the 
Asom Gana Parishad) paid dividends as it won three assembly seats in Bodo dominated areas - 
Kokrajhar East (40.14 per cent of total vote share), Sidli (47.51 per cent) and Bijni (26.93 per cent) in 
1985 assembly 
<<http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/StatisticalReports/SE_1985/StatisticalReport%20Assam85.pdf>>. 
Accessed July 23rd 2015. 
 239 
‘plain tribals’ as a group.217 Brahma along with the student cadre organised a mass 
movement with the sole demand for a separate state for Bodos. The state was to be 
created by ‘dividing Assam 50-50’ and was to be called Bodoland (Map 2).  
 
 
 Map 2: Areas of Assam part of Bodoland state demand  
 (Source: All Bodo Student Union Pamphlet: ‘Why Bodoland State?’, 1996. 
 
Two significant points emerge from this development. One as mentioned above, after 
consolidating Bodo support electorally and politically, the leadership under 
Upendranath Brahma no longer felt the need to use of the umbrella identity of ‘Plain 
tribes’. This is evident from the fact that in his memoranda, Brahma now replaced the 
term plain tribes with Bodos and Udayachal/ Mishing –Bodoland with only 
Bodoland. Second, while ABSU from the time of its formation lent a loose territorial 
dimension through its demands of a union territory, in 1987 it explicitly defined the 
boundaries and the nature of the territorial demand. Brahma steered away from the 
moderate vocabulary of previous leaders (autonomy and union territory) and replaced 
it by stating an explicit demand for a full-fledged state to be carved out of Assam. 
                                                        
217 According to Census 2001, Bodos form nearly half (40. 9 per cent) the total Schdeuled Tribe 
population of Assam (<<http://censusindia.gov.in/Tables_Published/SCST/dh_st_assam.pdf>>. 
Accessed on July 23rd 2015). 
 240 
ABSU’s (Memorandum 1996, p. 13) proposal for the state was: “the creation of a 
separate state of Bodoland for Bodos living in the north bank of the river 
Brahmaputra from river Sonkosh in the west to Sadia in the east along the foothills of 
Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh.” In a pamphlet titled ‘Divide Assam Fifty-Fifty’, 
ABSU (1987) declared, 
The ABSU has been demanding that Assam should be divided Fifty-Fifty between the 
Tribals and the non-Tribals. As such Tribals are getting total area: Area of Bodoland 
state- 25, 478.1 sq Kms (including whole of Kokrajhar district, northern parts of 
Dhubri, Goalpara, Nalbari, Bareta, Kamrup, Darrang and Sonitpur districts (See 
Figure 2). 
Proposed area of Autonomous state (for Bodos) in Karbi Anglong and N.C Hills (now 
Dima Hasao) for Bodo population- 15, 222 sq. Kms 
Total Area- 40, 700.1 sq Kms 




The radicalization of Bodo demands in the form of a separate state developed 
simultaneously with the process of mobilizing an exclusive Bodo identity. Using 
Barthian 219  concept of ethnic identity, it may be argued that boundaries of the 
imagined Bodo state were taking shape in a political context where ethnic 
boundaries of the Bodo identity were being fixed. Shifts in the Bodo political subject 
formation from an encompassing Kachari/tribal identity to an exclusive ethnic Bodo 
identity formed the basis of the idea that a people can be organically linked to a 
particular geographical space and can ‘naturally’ claim to belong there. Thus for the 
first time in 1996, ABSU in its memorandum to the PM explicitly argued the case 
for a separate state by giving reasons “not only for fear of losing our identity but also 
to have our Separate Homeland” (Memorandum 1996, p. 5). Bodo political 
entrepreneurs were thus transmuting the fixed ethnic boundaries of their identity so 
                                                        
218 Though the pamphlet uses the generic term Tribal, ABSU was speaking in reference to Bodos only. 
219 Barth (1965) has argued that ethnic claims are not claims about cultural characteristics of group 
members rather these claims are about differences thought to distinguish them from others. 
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created to the idea of a Bodo sacred territory with fixed physical boundaries. The 
vocabulary of the Bodo movement from the 1980s is thus informed by a particular 
spatial imaginary of identity that is seen as naturally as well as powerfully linked to 
territory. 
 
7.4 Bodo conflict 
7.4.1 Violence and the first Bodo Accord 
Once the movement took a radical turn with demands for territorial rights and 
protection for Bodos only, armed groups began to wage a rebellion to back these 
demands. Ranjan Daimary, a Bodo youth, and the founder of the first insurgent outfit, 
the Bodo Security force (BdSF) in 1986, led a violent campaign between February- 
August 1989 (Chadda 2005, p. 264). Modelling themselves on the Assamese rebel 
group ULFA who sought a sovereign Assam at the time, BdSF targeted not only state 
and security personnel, they also embarked on a series of killings, kidnappings and 
bomb attacks involving ordinary non-Bodo citizens.220 Given the close proximity in 
which Bodos and non-Bodo communities lived, violence against the latter, especially 
communities like Bengali Muslims or tea tribes became an important symbol of 
resistance.  
 
The violent mayhem unleashed in districts of lower Assam was met with a 
tough line of action by the government. In 1990, the Army launched two operations 
(named Bajrang and Rhino) against separatist groups in Assam including the BdSF 
and ULFA. A sustained pressure on these militant outfits forced them to relocate their 
                                                        
220 Twenty-one people were killed in a bomb explosion in a train on 13 October 1991, and 61 people 
were killed in Guwahati and Barpeta between 13 October and 21 November 1992. 
<<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/>>. Accessed on July 13th 2015. 
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camps to the hills of Bhutan.221 It is true that the first round of counter-insurgency 
measures taken by the government also caused much grievance among the Bodo 
community. As an ABSU publication (2008, p. 5) describes the period, 
This 6 year long Bodoland movement has the unprecedented history of human rights 
violation by the Govt. in the name of crushing down the democratic and peaceful mass 
movement. As many as 1135 Bodos including a few number of non Bodo agitationists 
(sic) were brutally killed or massacred only in the hands of Assam Police battalion and 
some hundreds were made physically handicapped out of torture. There were many 
cases of custodial death under police custody also. Hundreds of Bodo girls were gang 
raped and molested by the chauvinist Assam police and Assamese extremists. 
 
Though these figures were difficult to verify, data from the National Human Rights 
Commission do reveal disturbingly high count of alleged ‘fake encounter’ cases in 
Assam (Saikia, 2014). Indeed, on the first day of my arrival at Kokrajhar, the capital 
of the BTC adminstration and the heartland of Bodo politics, I witnessed a peaceful 
protest organised by the ABSU regarding alleged fake encounters of two unarmed 
Bodo teenagers by the security forces.222 
 
Along with counter-insurgency measures, the government of India also set up 
an Expert Committee in 1991 to advise it on a possible political settlement to the 
ongoing violence. The committee’s task was to explore the nature and degree of 
autonomy that could be granted to the Bodos. Again, this was a move to counter the 
insurgents by giving concessions to the non-violent Bodo leadership represented by 
the ABSU and cause splits within the rebel groups. Interestingly, the Committee 
                                                        
221 Between December 2003 and January 2004, the Royal Bhutan Army launched Operation All Clear 
in order eliminate militants who had established safe havens in South Bhutan. Assisting them was the 
Indian Army  who was deployed along the Bhutan border to prevent rebels from entering Indian 
territory. About 30 militant camps were targeted in these ‘intelligence-based’ operations and the Indian 
Army claimed that 650 militants were either killed or apprehended during the operations  (Sharma, 
2016). 
222 <<https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/2-teenage-ndfb-insurgents-
killed-in-encounter-in-assam-113121100666_1.html>>. Accessed on January 12th 2017. 
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came up with a territorial solution under the Sixth Schedule. It proposed the 
establishment of two autonomous councils (West-Central and Eastern council) in the 
region north of the river Brahmaputra. The proposed West-Central Council was to 
have a population of 1.10 million people, with a majority Bodos and local minorities 
like Rabhas, Sonowals Bengalis Muslims and Hindus, Koch Rajbongshis as well as 
tea tribes. The Eastern Council was to have a population of 0.31 million people, even 
though it did not make Bodos a majority there.  
Unfortunately, any form of territorial solution was doomed to be a failure from 
the start due to the extremely diverse and overlapping nature of population 
settlements in the region. Unsurprisingly, the first hurdle in reaching a settlement 
came from the Bodos themselves. These recommendations were rejected by the 
ABSU: “the ABSU made an additional demand for 209 villages, along with 1,035 
other villages, which, according to the government record, had no tribal 
population.” 223  After lengthy negotiations, the then Chief Minister of Assam, 
Hiteshwar Saikia, convinced the ABSU to sign the Bodo Accord with ABSU 
President S.K. Bwismutiary in February 1993.224 The government of Assam declared, 
“The Bodo Accord was reached with the objective to provide maximum autonomy to 
the Bodos for social, economic, educational, ethnic and cultural advancement within 
the framework of the Indian Constitution.” Accordingly, the Bodo Autonomous 
Council (BAC) came to function from May 1993 at Kokrajhar. The BAC was to have 
35 elected members and five members nominated by the government so as to give 
                                                        
223 Interview with Pramod Boro, ABSU President, February 12th 2014. 
224 At the same time, Premsing Brahma, chief of one of the militant groups, the Bodo Volunteer Force 
(BVF), surrendered with his cadres.  
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due representation to all groups, including local minorities.225  
7.4.2 Failure of the first Bodo Accord 
One of the reasons why territorial settlements can become a zero-sum game is 
because they inevitably involve demarcating land or border- making. Most intractable 
conflicts are a result of groups making ‘a fetish of such borders’ to create ‘ethno-
national ghettos’ (Bose 2010, pp. 2-3). 226 The success of the Accord thus rested on 
the satisfactory delineation of villages, which were neither defined nor demarcated at 
the time it was signed. In time it was decided that the same criterion used to 
demarcate tribal belts and blocks, i.e. villages consisting of 50 per cent or more of 
Scheduled Tribe (ST) population, was to be used.  This was to be determined by land 
records authorities that were to examine the list of villages to verify whether these 
villages had ST inhabitants amounting to 50 percent or more of the total population. 
Based on the findings, these villages would then be included or excluded from the 
BAC. An All Party Committee was formed to oversee the demarcation process to 
form the BAC area. However, the committee was soon dissolved, as it couldn’t make 
any headway in this contentious matter.  
In place of the All Party Committee, the Assam government made a unilateral 
decision to designate 2,750 villages under the BAC. These villages had a population 
of 2.14 million, with STs forming about 38 per cent of the total population, which 
                                                        
225 The BAC Bill proposed a General Council of 40 members. Of these 30 were to be from the 
Scheduled Tribes. The General Council was supposed to meet once in every three months and the 
quorum for these meetings was 13 members. The council had powers over 38 subjects. In an important 
proposal there was a provision for setting up special courts in consultation with the Guwahati High 
Court to try cases between parties, all of whom belonged to the Scheduled Tribe in accordance with 
the tribal customary law and procedure in the Village Courts and Subordinate District Customary Law 
Courts within a Civil Sub-Divisional Territory and District Customary Law Courts.  
226  This is particularly evident in the colonial experience of Africa and Asia, where “political 
boundaries were often imposed before any corresponding social or ideological identities had 
chrystallized” (Robb 1997, p. 253). In fact in many cases identities have been constructed in 
accordance to the borders that have demarcated and produced spaces to be incorporated into the 
modern nation state. 
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was still less than that of the original criterion of 50 per cent. Bwismutiary resigned 
from his position as the BAC chief in protest that the notification did not include a 
10-kilometre belt along the Bhutan border, the Manas Reserve Forest and the Manas 
Game Sanctuary. The notification also did not include 515 villages, as was 
demanded. The government stood firm, stating that the 10-kilometre belt had been 
left out on the recommendations of the Ministries of Defence and Forest, as per the 
provisions of the Accord. Moreover, the then CM of Assam, Hiterswar Saikia 
declared that Bodos including other ST population did not constitute a majority in 
almost 500 of the villages, and this constituted a major hurdle in the formation of a 
compact, contiguous autonomous district.227 The government was quick to add that 
the Bodos constituted a majority in only 1,100 villages of the 2,750 notified, and 
should thus be more than satisfied. On the other hand, the Bodo contention was that 
the remaining villages were a part of the historical Bodo homeland. The deadlock 
continued.  
Frustrated by the practical difficulties that the execution of the Accord entailed, 
Bwismutiary had declared, “This is all our land and non-Bodos have come and settled 
here from time to time. So changed demography cannot be used against our 
aspiration for autonomy. If therefore we do not have majority, we might consider 
creating one.” 228 Soon after, violence broke out again. Since it was mostly targeted 
against other minorities i.e. Bengali Muslims in 1993 and Adivasis in 1996 and 1998 
(Hussain, 1995), it may be understood as an attempt at ‘ethnic cleansing’. Killing and 
displacing these communities became a tool to reassert their dominance in the area so 
that they could create a compact, homogenous homeland for the Bodos. The fact that 
                                                        
227 Interview with Samudra Bhattarcharya, All Assam Students’ Union, Guwahati, April 24th 2014; 
Also Das 2005, p. 297. 
228 South Asia Report, 12 March 1995. When I interviewed him, Bwismutiary was critical of the 
violence that accompanied the Bodo movement (Kokrajhar, Assam, May 20th 2014). 
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Bodos don’t form a majority in their imagined homeland is a crucial demographic 
aspect that differentiates it from the Mizo case.229 As shown in the previous chapter, 
relatively neat settlement patterns of Mizos make them a majority in the Mizo hills. 
In contrast, the major demographic transformation of the plains due to historical 
reasons discussed in previous chapters makes territorial settlements rather 
challenging for plains-dwelling groups like Bodos. As the next section will 
demonstrate, this challenge endured during the second round of peace talks and has 
continued to contribute to violence after the formation of the Bodo Territorial 
Council.  
Thus the failure of an attempt to resolve the Bodo crisis had thus provided a 
renewed opportunity to those factions of Bodo rebels and civil society activists to 
continue their movement for a separate state. The BdSF renamed as the National 
Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) under Daimary had rejected the Accord and 
continued violence against the state and other local minorities. Other splinter groups 
like the Bodo Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF) continued to demand a separate state. 
However, in 2000 there was a breakthrough as the government reached a ceasefire 
agreement with the BLTF. Furthermore, in a bid to weaken the rebels, the 
government got the BLTF to assist the security forces in hunting down NDFB cadres. 
This was because of the perceptible link that had developed between NDFB and the 
NSCN (IM) and ULFA in the fields of training, intelligence and the use of each 
other’s sanctuaries whenever pressure was applied by the security forces.230 In this 
period, the intra-group clashes increased manifold as NDFB also resorted to killing 
                                                        
229 See Lacina (2015) and Deiwiks (2011) for similar arguments in other contexts. 
230 The NDFB’s political proximity to the ULFA was obvious in the demands they made as a pre-
condition to holding talks with the government, which were similar to ULFA demands.  
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BLTF cadres and ABSU leaders. In an open press release on 16 January 2001, the 
NDFB announced its plan for selective killings targeting rival Bodo organisations. 
Despite these intra-group killings, talks between the government and BLTF 
continued to progress, keeping hopes for peace in the area alive.  
Furthermore, unlike the predominant role of the Church in Mizoram, civil 
society actors in Assam are fragmented on ethnic lines in that individual student and 
literary bodies claim to represent an ethnic community’s interests. As discussed 
through the chapter, in the case of Bodos, the All Bodo Students’ Union (ABSU) and 
the Bodo Sahitya Sabha (BSS) have played key roles in animating cultural and later 
territorial demands for the community. As the chapter showed, in contrast to the role 
of the Church in Mizoram in the peace process, the ABSU and BSS were actively 
involved in mobilizing the statehood movement in opposition to the Assamese or 
other local minorities. This only added to the intractable nature that the conflict took.  
 
7.5 Second Bodo Accord and limits of territorial settlement 
By the end of 2002, after 17 rounds of talks, a negotiated settlement between the 
government and BLTF was fructifying, though the other Bodo faction, NDFB was 
still not willing to consider peace talks. On 10 February 2003, a Tripartite Accord 
was signed between the Centre, Assam government and the BLTF, which finally 
paved the way for the Bodo Territorial Council (BTC) to replace the now defunct 
BAC. This historic agreement was signed in the presence of the Deputy Prime 
Minister, L.K. Advani, the Chief Minister of Assam, Tarun Gogoi, the Minister for 
State for Home, I.D. Swami and Harin Pathak, Union Minister of State for Defence. 
The new peace deal differed from the earlier failed one in three regards. First, the 
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Sixth Schedule was amended to make the BTC more expansive and vested with more 
subjects under its jurisdiction. It would have 46 members, of which six would be 
nominated by the Governor of Assam. The settlement reserved 30 of the 46 seats on 
the BTC for STs, five for non-tribals residing in the area, and five were left open to 
the entire population of the area under the BTC. It is quite clear that the BTC set-up 
gave the Bodos power disproportionate to their population in the area sice the Bodo 
population in the BTC is only about 33 per cent (Saikia 2015, p. 9). Moreover, the 
accord is silent about the ethnic mix in the proposed area which consists of – apart 
from Bodos – Santhals, Koch Rajbangsi, Nepali, Bengali Hindu and Muslim, and 
other Adivasi groups who originally came here as tea garden labourers (Saikia 2015, 
p. 9).  
Second, in contrast to the earlier Accord, this one expanded the territorial reach 
of the Council thereby resolving the earlier contentious issues of contiguity. “As 
many as 3,082 villages have been identified for inclusion in the proposed council, 
which would be divided into four contiguous districts after reorganising of existing 
districts of Assam within six months of the agreement” (cited in Chadha 2005, p. 
271). Third, unlike the earlier peace talks, this one was tripartite in nature involving 
the Central government, thereby giving it more legitimacy and a sense of neutrality. 
At the same time, the ABSU habe been steadfast in their statehood demands 
and the formation of the BTC has only emboldened their resolve to continue the 
movement.231 Though NDFB has lost its legitimacy among the Bodo community, it 
continues to target minorities and rival Bodo leaders because the statehood 
movement is still a salient issue. Bodo civil society groups are also against ST status 
                                                        
231 Interview with ABSU president Pramod Boro, Kokrajhar, February 12th 2014. 
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demands by minority committees. The continued incidents of violence against 
minorities and the virtual absence of power-sharing arrangements for them, makes 
the peace settlement rather facile. As argued in the previous chapter, compact and 
homogenous settlement patterns are essential prerequisites for territorial solutions to 
be effective (Wolff, 2010). Because in the case of Mizoram, both these prerequisites 
were fulfilled, the peace has endured. On the other hand, the area under Bodoland is 
one of the most diverse ethnic-settings in Assam thereby making it an unfit case for 
territorial settlement. Furthermore, the hardened, exclusive identity that Bodo 
activists have mobilized over time is the opposite of ‘nested’ or ‘complimentary’ 
identities (McGarry and O’Leary, 2013) that are essential for such settlements. 
Moreover, the Bodo statehood demand continues to remain a contentious issue 
between the Assam government and Bodo activists. It is highly unlikely that the 
Assamese elite will concede the demand for creation of the Bodoland state.232 It 
considers the plain areas as its own homeland and Bodos a part of the composite 
Assamese identity, despite a violent separatist movement by the latter. Carving out 
the area that Bodo activists claim to be their homeland will significantly diminish 
Assam’s total area as well as the influence that the Assamese elite now exercises. 
Since this is not feasible, the Bodo statehood movement is unlikely to be resolved 
any time soon. In this context of the continued Bodo conflict, I discuss the 
increasingly polarized relations that the community has with two local minority 
groups in the final section of the chapter. 
  
                                                        
232 In India, the Centre has usually exercised caution in the creation of new states, even though 
constitutionally final responsibility of state restructuring lies with it. As Brass (1972) and Tillin (2013) 
have shown, central governments have created new states mostly in those cases where no significant 
resistance exists at the regional level or by the ‘parent’ state. 
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7.6 Changing ethnic boundaries: Creating the ‘Other’ to the Bodo 
Fredrick Barth’s (1969, p. 15) seminal work on ethnic boundaries shifted the focus of 
investigation from constituent elements of ethnicity to “the ethnic boundaries that 
defines the group, not the cultural stuff it encloses.” Barth’s (1969) framework 
suggests that maintenance of ethnic boundaries entails processes of social contact of 
‘different’ cultures in that “ethnic groups only persist as significant units if they 
imply marked difference in behaviour.” Bodo political activists have at different 
phases of the movement emphasized a cultural/ ethnic ‘Other’ in order to legitimize 
their own identity as distinct and separate from others. As discussed previously in the 
chapter, in the first three decades after independence, the Bodo identity was primarily 
juxtaposed against the dominant Assamese identity on the grounds that Bodos are 
outside of the caste hierarchy that otherwise anchored the Assamese society and on 
account of the fact that they have a distinct language and ‘tribal’ identity (See Figure 
7.1). The move from a collective political identity of Plain tribe to an ethnically 
defined Bodo identity was the major development of Bodo politics at the turn of the 
20th century. The ethnic boundary of the exclusive Bodo identity has been hardened 
over time by positing it against other communities.  
 
This section discusses two other groups- the Koches and the Bengali Muslims- that 
have been posited as the ‘Other’ to define the Bodo identity in the last few decades 
when the movement took a militant turn since 1993 to become about a Bodo 
homeland. Interestingly, Bodo activists have somewhat different relations with both 
groups; they posit the Koch-Rajbongshis as once part of a cognate Bodo-Kachari 
identity but now Hinduised and hence a separate group in contemporary society. On 
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the other hand, Bengali Muslims are portrayed not only as outsiders or settlers, but 
are often viewed through the political prism of illegal immigration. 
 
7.6.1 Bodo relations with Koch-Rajbongshi 
As discussed chapter 5, identities in the plains of lower Assam were constantly being 
negotiated and contested, especially as a result of the Bhakti movement. At the turn 
of the nineteenth century, the traditional landed elite of undivided Goalpara in 
western Assam (which included areas such as Kokrajhar, currently the seat of Bodo 
politics) there emerged another set of elite (besides Bodo-Kachari) that provided a 
counter-narrative to the Assamese nationalist ideology.  The identity that was pitched 
was Rajbongshi, a Kshatriya identity, as this section of elite was largely a part of the 
Koch aristocracy, benefitting from the Permanent Settlement. Colonial surveys 
defined Rajbongshi as a “well marked dialect…spoken in the country to the 
Northeast of that in which Northern Bengali is spoken” (Grierson 1903 quoted in 
Misra 2011, p. 146). The Goalparia landed elite said, “We have never been either 
Assamese or Bengali. They are both our neighbours…we are distinct and so is our 
culture, customs and traditions” (Shastri 1928, p. 33). In the local literature on the 
Koch community, there is a constant emphasis of the ‘downfall’ of the community 
from a glorious past, at the hands of caste Hindus.  
It is really surprising to note that an ethnic group of adventurous peoples of ancient 
Kamrup region of ‘Mahabharata’ fame, who marched to Western India and beyond 
up to Persian Gulf and Mediterranean sea kept deep foot-prints at different places 
of ancient India right from pre-Vedic age, established kingdoms…and 
systematically and gloriously in entire north-east India from 15th century to 1950 
A.D. have now fallen into the abyss of downfall…surrendering their future at the 
hands of their priests, the same one Koch-Rajbongshis have become Nepalese, 
Bhutanese, Indian and Bangladeshi nationals. Within India they were made 
Biharees (Purnea district of Bihar state), Bengalees (five districts of North Bengal), 
Assamese and Meghalayees after 1970…In addition to these divisions and sub-
divisions Govt of Assam and India have deliberately given birth to some 
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‘Autonomous Lands’ like Rabha Hasongs, Boroland on their ancestral home lands 
and hearts of Koch-Rajbongshis 233 
 
Following the foot steps of the Bodos, and using the idea of a sacred geography of 
the ‘Puranic’ times, this elite has now began articulating demands for a politically 
autonomous area consisting of parts of northern Bengal and Goalpara called 
Kamatapur. The areas under the imagined Kamatapur (Map 3) overlap with that of 
the imagined Bodoland state.  
 
 
 Map 3. Areas of Kamatapur state demand overlapping with Bodoland. 
 (Source: All Koch Rajbongshi Students’ Union Political Pamphlet, 2002) 
 
The Bodo leadership views the Kamatapur demand as an assault to the right of the 
tribal and indigenous community over this land; they use these terms interchangeably 
the implication being, to be indigenous in the region one has to have a tribal identity. 
As a senior activist of the powerful Bodo Students’ Union remarked during field-
interview,  
AKRSU (All Koch Rajbongshi Students’ Union) leadership is claiming a Scheduled 
Tribe status but they have used a Hindu title of Rajbongshi for a long time. Though 
they may originally belong to the Kachari family, they are now completely assimilated 
into the Assamese society. Rajbongshis no longer exhibit any ‘tribal characteristics’. 
                                                        
233 Cited in Choudhury 2006, pp. 9-10 
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What is the basis in which they now claim they are a tribe, when they are recognized 
as OBC and SC in Assam and Bengal respectively? 234  
 
Further in a focus group discussion, Bodo activists claimed that Koch-Rajbongshis 
are not a ‘marginalized’ group deserving of special status or a separate state. It was 
highlighted during a focused group discussion: “Assam had a prominent Rajbongshi 
Chief Minister and veteran Congress leader Sarat Chandra Sinha even in 1970s. We 
(Bodos) still don’t have strong state level leaders.” 235 The common argument that 
emerges is that Koch-Rajbongshis have been totally assimilated into the Assamese 
community and are part of the dominant Assamese groups in Assam. Hence claims of 
a tribal past and a separate state become baseless. Another Bodo activist discredited 
the Koch movement as a product of hunger for political power, “The Koch-
Rajbongshi leaders began articulating these demands after their failure to get a direct 
share of power in the AGP government after the Assam Movement.” 236  
 
Koch Rajbongshi activists on the other hand argue that they have been caught in a 
political limbo. Biswajit Ray, president of a major faction of the All Koch 
Rajbongshi Students’ Union (AKRSU) points out,  
There is no doubt that there have been attempts to assimilate our community 
into the Assamese society. Despite these attempts, we are still not treated as 
‘insiders’ by the Assamese society. No socio-economic benefits have trickled 
down from Guwahati. On the other hand, non-recognition as a Scheduled Tribe, 
despite many tribal characteristics, has put us at further disadvantage, 
particularly in relation to the Bodos. Bodos are ruling the roost in our 
traditional homeland because they have been granted the Autonomous District 
Council. Unfortunately, the Council doesn’t have even one representative from 
our group. Historical blunders have put us in a limbo- we are neither here nor 
there.237  
 
                                                        
234 Interview with senior ABSU leader, Kokrajhar, Assam, 11th May 2014 
235 Focused group discussion with ABSU activists, Kokrajhar, Assam, 23rd March 2014 
236 Ibid 
237 Interview with Biswajit Ray, AKRSU President, Bongaigaon, Assam, 19th April 2014.  
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I interviewed Ray again after the General election 2014, when he said, “Our 
community and all other non-Bodo groups rallied behind a non Bodo independent 
candidate, Hiranath Sarania, so that our voices reach to New Delhi.”238 It was the first 
time that a non-Bodo had won the Lok Sabha seat from Kokrajhar, the centre of Bodo 
politics (Saikia, 2015).  
 
7.6.2 Bodo relations with Bengali Muslims 
Bodos have had an even more tenuous relationship with Bengali Muslims of lower 
Assam. Ethnic riots in 2012 between Bodos and Muslims put Bodoland on the 
national map, though episodes of violence have been recurring in this region since 
early 1990s (Table 7.1). 
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2012 Bodo-Muslim Kokrajhar, 
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Dhubri 












(Source: Home Affairs Department, Government of Assam, Guwahati). 
 
Bengali Muslim immigrants were first encouraged to systematically settle in 
wastelands of Assam by the colonial government in early twentieth century. As 
                                                        
238 Interview with Biswajit Ray, AKRSU President, Guwahati, Assam, 10th June, 2014. 
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discussed in chapter 4, a Line system was introduced to separate villages with 
‘indigenous’ and ‘immigrant’ population. Though this system was institutionalized 
after independence in the form of tribal belts and blocks, Bodos and Bengali Muslims 
were mutually dependent on each other in a predominantly agricultural economy. The 
Tribal League before independence formed coalitions with the Saadullah government 
that had openly supported Muslim immigrants (Choudhury 2009, p. 123). After 
independence, Bodos and Bengalis formed the Linguistic Minority Right Committee 
(LMRC) to combat the chauvinist agenda of the Assamese elite. ‘LMRC paved the 
way for the subsequent lasting alliance between ABSU and All Cachar-Karimganj 
Students’ Association (ACKSA) of the Barak Valley (Choudhury 2009, p. 124). 
Bodos also hired them to work on rice fields because the latter had superior 
techniques of wetland cultivation. Many Bodos interviewed in the course of this 
study have employed farmhands from Muslim villages for decades. As a Bodo elder 
said, “I have about six acres of land and men from neighbouring Muslim village 
Khujiabasti, come to work here. This arrangement is going on since my father’s time. 
Earlier we could hire only two but now we can afford to hire five. Many others in the 
village also do the same because ‘Mias’ 239  work very hard.” 240  A. R. Dutta of 
Guwahati University, an expert on conflict studies also pointed out that Bodo 
families have had Muslim families not only as cultivators but also as tenants on their 
land.241  
 
As a legacy of the anti-foreigner’s agitation (1979-85), there seems to have been a 
palpable shift in Bodo politics in that the ‘Other’ came to be defined primarily as the 
                                                        
239 This term, although means gentleman in Urdu, in Assam it is often used pejoratively to mean 
‘illegal Bangladeshi immigrant’. However, in this case it merely seemed to refer to a Bengali Muslim 
in Assam. 
240 Interview with Deo Mochahary, Dotma village in Kokrjhar district, Assam, 15th Dec 2013. 
241 <<http://www.downtoearth.org.in/coverage/land-of-discord-38893>>. Accessed on July 18th 2013. 
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‘illegal immigrant’, i.e. the Bengali Muslim. Thus the shifting idea of the Other as an 
encroacher fits very well with the separate homeland demand as it established a direct 
linkage between protection of identity to protection of land, thereby characterizing 
land as an ethnic marker. While maintaining the rhetoric of a distinct tribal identity 
vis-à-vis the Assamese, Bodo activists have increasingly pitched the separate state 
demand against the issue of ‘tribal’ land encroachment by those who they call 
‘Bangladeshi Mia’. 242  As Sanjib Baruah (2010, p. 1) points out, “when a tribal 
political organization protests that a state government has failed to protect tribal 
lands, and demands separate statehood or greater autonomy, there is often a subtext: 
that territory in the hands of interlopers could be reclaimed as tribal lands under a 
reformed pro-tribal political dispensation.” Modelling their politics on their 
Assamese counterparts, Bodo political entrepreneurs legitimize the ethnic boundaries 
with this community in two ways: by using the discourse of indigenous vs. outsiders 
and tribal vs. non-tribal. Not only are Bengali Muslims, particularly in the lower 
districts of Assam often categorized as settlers or outsiders, but they are often seen as 
having come to Assam through illegal means i.e. by ‘walking into’ Assam through a 
rather porous border. Interviews with Bodo activists, government officials and 
students reveal a heightened sense of fear against a people who are pejoratively called 
‘Bangladeshi Mia’. Here are some of the responses from a cross-section of 
interviewees, underlining the fear psychosis that has been woven into the political 
and everyday narrative of Bodos: 
 
“Bangladeshis have for long been encroaching on our land. They use illegal means 
to become part of our political system and electoral rolls through illegal means.” 
                                                        
242 A survey of news articles in a leading English daily called Assam Tribune and an Assamese daily, 
Protidin, from a period between 1990 to 2010, shows that Bodo organizations have constantly raised 
the issue of illegal immigration and land encroachment. 
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“What is happening in Assam is a process of Lebensraum. This is a conspiracy to 
make Bodos a minority in their own homeland.”  
 
“How can we live peacefully with a community that looks different, has different 
culture, language and religion? Our tribal identity is already endangered. If this 
continues we will have no representation and our culture and history would be 
extinct.” 
 
 “They (Bengali Muslim) have many wives and children. They are trying to take away 
our land through a demographic invasion.”  
  
Use of categories such as ‘illegal’, ‘immigrant’, ‘Mia’ in the everyday vocabulary of 
Bodos have helped impersonalizing the Other while hardening the ethnic border that 
seems to separate the two communities. Second, the tribal- non-tribal fault line gets 
further magnified vis-à-vis this group. In most discussions and conversations, 
sartorial and eating habits are highlighted as a major point of difference. This despite 
the fact that the 2011 Census shows BTAD now has a population growth rate lower 
than that of the state average of 16.93 per cent. Dutta also concurred, “Encroachment 
is more of a perceived threat than a reality. There could be a few cases of incursions 
by illegal immigrants, but it is not changing the demographic of BTAD.” 243 These 
facts and arguments however have not at all precluded the continuing process of 
Othering of the Bengali Muslim community. This is because it is much easier for 
                                                        
243 <<http://www.downtoearth.org.in/coverage/land-of-discord-38893>>. Accessed on July 18th 2013. 
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Bodo political entrepreneurs to make the Bodo identity look internally coherent when 
it is strategically posited against a radical ‘Other’.  
 
7.7 Conclusion 
As this chapter explained, the first phase of Bodo politics was almost exclusively 
conducted in the realm of language and culture. From the very beginning, the Assam 
government under Congress’ leadership was of the opinion that plains tribes should 
not be included in the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India, which was 
primarily introduced to provide safeguards for mainly hill tribes of the Northeast, 
based on the principle of territorial recognition of group rights. The Tribal League 
had submitted its memorandum to the Constituent Assembly demanding protection 
under the fifth schedule of the Article 189(A), but their demands were not accepted. 
The fear among the Congress Assamese elite was that extending the Sixth Schedule 
to plains of Assam could give rise to isolationist tendencies and block all prospects 
for their assimilation within the greater Assamese nationality. Instead plains tribes 
got an amended Assam Land and Revenue Regulation Act 1886 in the year 1947, 
which provided for constitution of tribal belts and blocks. The idea of a homeland for 
Bodos along with the formation of a hardened Bodo identity emerged only in the late 
1980s as a result of inter and intra-group competition.  
 
The popular movement slogan ‘Divide Assam 50-50’ shows that territory is the 
medium through which the new brand of Bodo political activists wanted access to 
political and economic power. The movement took a violent turn when Bodo rebel 
outfits attacked minority communities as a method of ethnic cleansing. The peace 
deal that the Assam government struck with moderate groups in 1993 failed to 
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sustain because of the contentious issue of demarcating a compact autonomous 
district for Bodos in a largely multi-ethnic setting. This led to further incidents of 
violence not just against minority communities but against rival Bodo groups as well. 
The chapter thus illustrated that the mixed settlement patterns make Bodoland an 
unfit case for territorial settlement. This is also the reason that the second peace 
Accord reached in 2003, which led to the creation of the BTC has seen substantial 
violence. Moreover, the Assam government’s view that plains are an integral part of 
the Assamese identity and homeland, as a result of the long-term state formation 
processes, makes the Bodo statehood movement even more contentious and the 












8.1 In summary 
This thesis examined the causes of divergent ethnic politics and conflict outcomes 
with respect to two Scheduled Tribe groups- Mizos and Bodos- in Northeast India. In 
the case of the Mizos, a hill-dwelling tribe, insurgency was successfully resolved 
with a territorial settlement while in the case of the Bodos a ‘plains tribe’ peace has 
remained elusive despite a political settlement. The thesis has argued that this 
divergence can be best explained as a contingent outcome of long-term processes of 
state formation in the region characterized by socially and geographically linked 
topographies of hills and valleys. It demonstrated that these processes bear upon the 
ways in which Mizos and Bodos have come to identify themselves and their 
relationship with the geographical space they inhabit. It compared the complex 
interplay of social and geographical factors in both cases to demonstrate how these 
shape the strategies that Mizo and Bodo political activists deploy in their struggle for 
power, which in turn have contributed to the nature of state restructuring in the region 
since independence. In doing so, the study has departed from extant literature and 
explanations that have examined conflicts in the region through a truncated, selective 
historical reading beginning from the colonial times and treated these either as cases 
unto themselves or the entire region as an epistemological whole. Instead, this study 
used an approach that situates contemporary political processes in a long-term 
historical perspective, thereby tracing continuities, changes and any abrupt breaks in 
the political processes of the Northeast. Furthermore it brought to focus the crucial 
role that political geography plays in the ways that successive polities in the region 
have negotiated their rule in the hills and valleys. 
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The key explanatory variable that the thesis argued is important to answer the 
research puzzle are the long-term state formation processes in the region. This 
includes two elements- i.e. the hills-plains dynamic and settlement patterns of groups. 
The existing relations between hills and plains in the region informed traditional state 
practices of shared rule, trade networks and non-territorial identities. The hill-plains 
dynamic continued, albeit in modified forms, in the early colonial period when 
administrators were faced with a similar challenge of expanding rule in a political 
topography with scarce population and difficult terrain. The thesis demonstrated that 
the hills-plains binary began to be reified as distinct categories only during the late 
19th century, owing to the commercial and strategic interests of the British Empire in 
the eastern frontier. This not only affected processes of identity formation and 
political subjectivities but also contributed to the varied form of institutional designs 
in the two topographies in post-independence Assam. In the hills, the British 
instituted a regime of ‘deregulated’ rule whereinny ordinary laws and administrative 
apparatus of colonial India were made inapplicable and which was responsible for 
triggering some profound changes. The colonial state’sIts intervention in the form of 
boundaries and lines transformed a largely non-territorial society into one organized 
around fixed notions of territory. Furthermore, it ended up undermining the 
traditional rule system while giving rise to a modern class of elite who effectively 
challenged the chieftain system. From the very beginning, this new elite represented 
by traditionally non-ruling clans used a territorial strategy that was instituted in the 
hills. They used ‘territoriality’ not only to challenge the existing power structure but 
also to forge an inclusive Mizo identity that helped consolidate its power over the 
territory of Lushai Hills. Territory became a fundamentally salient issue when post-
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independence federal institutions mandated territorial group rights for the hill areas of 
Assam. The institutional logic of territoriality in the hills meant that subsequent 
political activists used the same strategy as a tool of political contestation. As the 
empirical chapters have shown, the UMFO, the All Hill Tribal Conference and the 
Mizo National Front all jumped into the political fray by mobilizing issues related to 
territory and ‘outbidding’ other rival parties.  
 
On the contrary, the plains received a form of intervention that led to a drastic 
transformation in the demography and land settlement patterns in the Assam valley. 
Till about mid-19th century, identities in the plains were far more fuzzy and 
overlapping and the Assamese society eschewed neat social stratification, despite the 
presence of caste and unequal social relations. On the one hand, internal factors like 
the socio-religious reform movement among Bodos propelled a political movement 
and the construction of a political identity in opposition to caste-Hindu Assamese 
hegemony. On the other, changing demographic landscape triggered by British 
policies became a prime reason for the burgeoning sub-nationalist movement among 
the dominant Assamese community. Unlike the hills where regimes of indirect rule 
prevented their penetration, the autonomy discourse in the Brahmaputra valley was 
being negotiated between the Assamese, represented by the nationalist movement of 
the Congress and the British. There was no room for minority groups like the Bodos 
at the time to have a separate narrative in the valley. This was also because the 
hardened hills-plains binary also reified the identity of plains dwellers, so that the 
Assamese believed that the fate of smaller groups was inextricably tied to a 
composite Assamese identity. Hence, ‘tribal’ minorities in the plains weren’t seen as 
suitable candidates for territorial recognition, which was reserved only for hill tribes.  
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In the absence of a territorial template, the Bodos followed in the footsteps of 
the Assamese to conduct their politics in the linguistic-cultural realm till the 1970s. 
As the thesis showed, Bodo movement transformed into a statehood demand with 
rising intra-group rivalry and developments in hill politics of Assam. Thus, even as 
Bodos began to model their politics on a territorial framework from the 1980s like 
their hill counterparts, what was striking was the fact that unlike Mizos, they 
mobilized a narrow hardened Bodo identity thereby making the ‘Other’ exclusively 
defined. The hills-plains binary also formed a core reason that the Assamese elite 
accepted the carving out of the hill state of Mizoram while they are vociferously 
against the creation of the Bodoland state. The Assamese considers the territory 
demanded by the Bodos as their own ‘homeland’. 
 
The second element of the explanatory variable of state formation practices is 
the evolution of settlement patterns of the two groups concerned. As the thesis 
demonstrated, colonial state formation processes and the hilly terrain allowed for 
relatively compact settlements thereby making territorial autonomy workable in the 
Mizo Hills. The granting of territorial autonomy even to local minorities in the hills 
after independence and later as part of the Mizo peace process worked because of the 
presence of relatively neat settlement patterns due to the hilly terrain. On the 
contrary, overlapping settlement patterns in the plains had formed another reason 
why plains tribes were not granted territorial recognition. Even though the Bodo 
conflict resulted in a peace settlement, the relatively more complex multi-ethnic 
setting of plains has precluded it from being effective in restoring peace. Territorial 
autonomy for Bodos without power-sharing arrangements for local minorities makes 
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the latter more vulnerable. In other words, overlapping settlement patterns of local 
minorities makes it non-conducive for territorial autonomy. 
 
8.2 Broader Implications 
 
The arguments presented in the thesis have some wider implications for the ongoing 
debates within the literature on comparative federalism. A lot has been written on the 
role of asymmetric territorial restructuring in the management of ethnic diversity 
and/or conflict and its effects on the overall stability of federal systems. In line with 
some of the existing arguments, the thesis demonstrated that it is indeed difficult to 
apply this principle as a universal prescription for conflicts. Through a comparative 
analysis it was shown that not only does this principle needs to be tailored to the 
specificities of a case, but that it might not be suitable at all in cases where some 
basic pre-requisites are not met for asymmetric institutions to be effective. However, 
the focus of this thesis was also to account for why and how particular federal 
structures of asymmetry emerge in particular contexts in that the thesis aimed to 
historicize federalism. By focusing on the politics of institution formation itself, the 
thesis adopted an approach that sees them as a dynamic site wherein various political 
actors negotiate for power. At the same time these structures are themselves 
undergoing changes under the influence of political processes, thereby underlining 
the dialectical relation between institutions and individuals (structure and agency). 
Thus it makes a case for the study of origin and design of asymmetric federal 
institutions within the field of comparative federalism.  
 
Secondly, in many cases federal or territorial restructuring is explained from a 
normative standpoint and hence seen as resulting from ‘politics of recognition’.  
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These concerns are amply reflected in the thesis, but the arguments presented here go 
a step further in an important regard i.e. in explaining the mechanisms that link ethnic 
identity with state restructuring. It underscored the crucial role that political parties, 
individual agency of elites and other social institutions play in linking identity 
formation and mobilization with federal structures and showed how different 
identities can acquire political purchase at various points in political mobilization to 
be used for territorial demands. Thus the study not only answers whether a certain set 
of institutions accommodate or exacerbate conflict, but also scrutinizes the 
mechanisms that enable them to do so and how these mechanisms then in turn shape 
these institutions and structures. To this end, the thesis thus makes an important 
contribution towards an emerging trend of embedding federal structures in the local 
political processes in the literature of comparative federalism.244  
 
Thirdly, the thesis sought to examine the federal structures and political 
processes within them as a combined product of social and ecological settings in 
which they are embedded. Extant literature on conflict does consider geographical 
factors as a possible explanation of conflict and civil war. Rural and rough 
inaccessible terrains with weak state capacities have been presented as conditions 
supporting insurgency. Similarly, it has been argued that certain geographies are 
integral and attempts to disrupt them could result in political friction and violent 
conflicts. The thesis departs from these accounts that treat geography in a primordial 
and essentialist fashion, and uses a political geography approach to understanding 
institutions and political processes. By doing so, it has sought to explain not only the 
                                                        
244 See Shneiderman and Tillin, 2015. 
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processes through which groups imagine their relations with a geographical space but 
also how these processes inform state restructuring. 
 
8.3 External validity and further research 
 The thesis may be located at the intersection of two bodies of literature, namely 
ethnic conflict and federalism. It used existing theories and concepts within the two 
scholarships in historical, comparative study of Mizo and Bodo conflict and the 
varying outcomes of these conflicts. While this comparative empirical study has 
provided insights into how state restructuring shapes and in turn is shaped by political 
processes, a similar approach may be extended to compare them with other cases of 
territorial movements and conflicts. Within the Northeast region, there are other such 
similar cases in the hills and valleys, with varying territorial demands and conflict 
outcomes. The protracted Naga conflict, for example is one such case, which could 
be juxtaposed against the findings of this research.  
 
Nagas, also historically a hill dwelling community, were among the first in the 
Northeast to declare independence from India in 1947. Nagas also inherited a 
territorial template from late colonial times and hence began their political activism 
directly with demands for territorial sovereignty. The modern political history of 
Naga struggle also witnessed within-group rivalry along with the Indian 
government’s efforts to accommodate the moderate leadership with the granting of 
statehood in 1963. Based on the arguments of this thesisWhile a detailed explanation 
is beyond the scope of the thesis, inter alia, it is plausible that the Naga conflict 
continued due to the differences in the state formation processes in the Naga Hills 
vis-à-vis the Mizos. The modern Naga elite (Naga National Council), in striking 
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contrast to Mizos, was represented by the traditional rulers who were patronized by 
the indirect rule of the colonial state. For the Naga elite, breaking away from the 
Indian union seemed more advantageous to maintain their hold over the Naga Hills 
and hence their starting point was different from the Mizos. In future research, a 
comparative engagement with the Mizo case within a political geography framework 
may be useful to explore the recidivist nature of the Naga movement.245 
 
A similar approach might be used to understand the ongoing conflicts in 
Manipur, a state wherein the hills- plains dynamic has historically formed a crucial 
part of state formation processes. Furthermore, it is possible to use insights from 
comparisons within Northeast and test them in cases involving state movements 
elsewhere in India. The statehood movement for Jharkhand, for example is 
particularly an interesting case as the region is a part of the Fifth Schedule of the 
Indian constitution, which also mandates for safeguarding tribal autonomy. A 
comparative study between statehood movements in the Northeast and Jharkhand will 
be fruitful in explaining how different autonomy regimes affect the political 
processes and outcomes.  A study taking all these cases into consideration will only 
add to the rigour of the arguments in the thesis. Moreover, there is tremendous scope 
to expand on the complex dynamics of state formation processes by an in-depth 
examination of the non-formal or social institutions in the region. While this thesis 
did bring insights about the role of the Church in Mizoram and linguistic 
organisations such as the Bodo Sahitya Sabha in Assam, future research could benefit 
more by further embedding these organisations in the political landscape under study. 
As an ‘outsider’, researching the institution of Church posed a few challenges in 
                                                        
245 Differences in identity formation processes in the Naga and Mizo could be another plausible 
explanation for why Nagas demand territories outside of Nagaland while Mizos were satisfied with the 
state of Mizoram.  
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terms of accessibility due to its opaque structure. However, if these challenges can be 
overcome, I do believe that the Mizo story would benefit even further. 
  
In conclusion, the aim of the thesis was to understand varying outcomes in two cases 
of conflict in India’s Northeast in a comparable institutional and political context. 
The thesis provided a novel approach to the study of the region by looking at some of 
the long-term processes of state formation that it demonstrated has a direct bearing on 
the design of institutions and the strategies of political actors. At the heart of this 
research study is an understanding that political processes are deeply influenced by 
the dynamic that social actors share with the land they inhabit, and which also affect 
the ways in which identities are formed. Furthermore, while it is safe to conclude that 
asymmetry can be an effective tool to manage diversity and conflict, the thesis made 
it amply clear that it cannot be prescribed universally. In the Northeast region 
particularly, institutions of asymmetry have themselves been a contingent outcome of 
historical processes and their effectiveness depend on those very processes. As the 
thesis showed, there was nothing inevitable about the fate of the two conflicts. This is 
reflected in fact that while asymmetry and territorial recognition of group rights are 
suitable for Mizoram, there are limits to their effectiveness in multi-ethnic settings 
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